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BASEBALL'S LABOR WARS IN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE 1919




"It must have been... It must have been like..." But I can't
find the words.
"Like having a part of me amputated, slick and smooth and
painless." [He] looks up at me and his dark eyes seem about to
burst with the pain of it....
"I loved the game," ... "I'd have played for food money. I'd
have played free and worked for food. It was the game, the parks,
the smells, the sounds .... It makes me tingle all over like a kid on
his way to his first double-header, just to talk about it.'
'The original plan of organization... embraced cooperation by
the players in the matter of gate receipts and profits; and one of the
inducements held out to players... was the alluring one of sharing
in the proceeds of the seasons' games.'2
The New York Times reported that when [he] left.., the previ-
ous day, "a crowd of small boys gathered round their idol and
asked: 'it isn't true, is it,... ?' [He] replied: 'Yes, boys, I'm afraid
it is.' "3
* David Ross Hardy Professor of Trial Practice, University of Missouri-Columbia School
of Law. Funding for this research was made possible through grants from the Edgar Mayfield
Research Fellowship and the Lewis A. and Verne H. Snyder Faculty Research Fellowships at
the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. Special thanks therefore go to Edgar
Mayfield, '49 and to Franklin G. Snyder, '83 for their ongoing support of legal research gener-
ally and for this project specifically.
1. W.P. KINSELLA, SHOELESS JOE 12-13 (1982).
2. ALBERT G. SPALDING, BASE BALL: AMERICA'S NATIONAL GAME 184-85 (1991) (quot-
ing from an original manuscript of baseball writer Henry Chadwick in Spalding's possession).
3. Lewis Thompson & Charles Boswell, Say It Ain't So, Joe!, AMERICAN HERITAGE, June
1960, at 24, 91.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For anyone interested in the "game" of American baseball, these
three quotations epitomize a 125 year old trichotomy.
First, the words of W.P. Kinsella's mythical Shoeless Joe Jackson are
surely the novelist's hyperbole. The notion of the baseball player as
overpaid child who would probably play for food money, however, does
have an historically truthful ring.4 As Hall of Famer Rube Marquard
put it: "Every single day of all the years I spent in the Big Leagues was a
thrill for me."5
Second, the idea that baseball is a business with unionist players
working, but not yet sharing in the profit of their efforts with big busi-
ness owners, is a feature of too many current sports pages.
Finally, the role of baseball players as idols to millions of Americans
is so firmly entrenched in our national culture that it has even captured
the attention of a United States Supreme Court Justice, who wrote that
the exploits of American baseball heroes "have provided tinder for re-
captured thrills, for reminiscence and comparisons, and for conversation
and anticipation in-season and off-season."6
None of these quotations, however, were written about current base-
ball labor/management squabbles. All were instead written about organ-
ized baseball's earliest years and about that baseball episode popularly
known as the 1919 Chicago Black Sox scandal.
Fueled by the press, the modem belief suggests that labor strife in
baseball began sometime in the mid-1960s. As one sportswriter put it:
"Baseball has been stopped by four strikes and three lockouts since
1972, and fans have found the constant bickering tiresome."'7
4. See, e.g., LAWRENCE S. RITTER, THE GLORY OF TnEIR TimEs 258 (1985) (interview
with Bob O'Farrell). Catcher Bob O'Farrell, who played in the majors from 1915-1936 ex-
plained the same concept this way: "Of course, when you play every day it gets to be sort of
like work. But, somehow, way down deep, it's still play. Just like the umpire says: "Play
Ball!" It is. It's play." Id.
5. Id. at 13.
6. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 262 (1972).
7. Another Strike? Baseball Union Targets Labor Day for Walkout, NEWSDAY, July 14,
1993, at 132 (report prepared by the Associated Press). It was in 1972 that the Players' Associ-
ation, recognized by the owners in 1966 as the collective bargaining unit for the players, struck
major league baseball for 13 days, causing cancellation of 86 games. See MARVIN MILLER, A
WHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME 221-222 (1991). The events leading up to the strike and
negotiations to end it are discussed on pages 203-223. Games that were lost were not made
up, with the result that some teams lost six games while others lost seven. See CHARLES C.
ALEXANDER, OUR GAME 280-281 (1991). The lost games were significant in the American
League, where Detroit, with a record of 86-70 in 156 games, won the pennant by 1/2 games
over Boston, with a record of 85-70. See DAVID S. NEFT & RICHARD M. COHEN, THE SPORTS
[Vol. 5:1
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The belief is incorrect. And the story of the 1919 Chicago Black Sox,
when properly viewed, serves as an example of how baseball's labor wars
long predate the Players' Association. The labor disputes of the Black
Sox, and their predecessors, as laborers, serve as necessary historical
"context" for a proper understanding of all current professional sports
labor disputes.
While it remains popular to sympathize with members of the inf~i-
mous 1919 Chicago White/"Black" Sox, that is not the purpose here.,
As a result, the suspension for life of eight players accused of conspiracy
to alter the results of the 1919 World Series with the Cincinnati Reds
must remain an historical fact.9
ENCYCLOPEDIA: BASEBALL 404 (13th ed. 1993). For the Red Sox, this result could be seen as
a further extension of the "curse" that supposedly began after the 1918 World Series. See
infra note 235 and accompanying text.
Even Marvin Miller, former Executive Director of the Players' Association, called the
1972 strike "not only the first in baseball history-it was the first in the history of professional
sports." MILLER, supra at 203.
S. The "Black Sox" scandal involved an alleged fix of the 1919 World Series and resulted
in the permanent banishment from organized baseball of eight Chicago White Sox Players;
pitchers Eddie Cicotte and Claude Williams, center fielder Happy Felsch, shortstop Swede
Risberg, first baseman Chick Gandil, third baseman Buck Weaver, reserve infielder Fred Mc-
Mullin, and left fielder "Shoeless" Joe Jackson. The White Sox lost the World Series to the
Cincinnati Reds by five games to three in a best of nine game series. Joe Jackson, however,
batted .375 during the Series and was the leading hitter on his team. Buck Weaver, Chicago's
third baseman, batted .324, while White Sox captain Eddie Collins, not involved in the scan-
dal, batted only .224. See JOSEPH DURSo, BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 127 (1986).
Seven of the White Sox players (McMullin was excluded) were indicted along with five gam-
blers and long-time first baseman Hal Chase for conspiracy, however, none were convicted of
any crime relating to the fix. HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE 324-329
(1989). All eight were banned from baseball for life, along with another player from the St.
Louis Browns. Id. at 330. Weaver, while knowing about the fix, never received any money
and was banned from baseball because of his knowledge of what others were doing, and his
failure to turn that knowledge over to proper authorities. ELIOT AsINoF, EiGrHT MEN Our
279-282 (1987).
9. Going into the Series, the White Sox were heavy favorites. On the eve of the first game
in Cincinnati, however, the Reds began to amass considerable support from professional gam-
blers around the country, many of whom were willing to scrap previous odds in favor of Chi-
cago and bet even money on the Reds. See AsINOF, supra note 8, at 41-43. As observed by
the publisher of The Sporting News, who served as one of the official scorers of the Series,
despite the White Sox being a "stronger team," professional gamblers were "hocking their
rings, raising any money they could, to bet on the Reds." The professional gamblers were
betting on the Reds, while the amateurs bet on the White Sox. JoHN GEORGE TAYLOR SPINK,
JUDGE LANDIS AND TwENTY-FWE YEARS OF BASEBALL 59 (1947). On the other hand, Cin-
cinnati Reds players, including Hall-of-Fame center fielder Edd Roush and first baseman
Heine Groh, saw no impropriety in the on-field conduct of the White Sox during the series,
and, in fact, believed the Reds had a stronger team. RrrrER, supra note 4, at 218-19 (inter-
views with Edd Roush and Heine Groh). All eight were permanently expelled from baseball
by Commissioner Kennesaw Mountain Landis, primarily on the basis of confessions by "Shoe-
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What remains a mystery is "why?" And that is where two parts of
the trichotomy become important. If, as history tells us, players would
play for nothing; if, as our own experiences teach us, players have been
consistently willing idols for children, why would those same ballplayers
throw away those thrills and tarnish their role by attempting to fix the
World Series? Is it even possible that it was just for the money? Or is it
more possible that the actions of the Black Sox were related to the third
aspect of the trichotomy-the desire to share in the ownership and oper-
ation of the game itself?
Eliot Asinof, whose Eight Men Out serves as a biography of the
Black Sox, indicated one of his journalistic purposes was to answer the
questions: "Why did they do it?"; and "What were the pressures of the
baseball world, of America in 1919 that would cause the players to take
the actions they have been historically tagged with taking?" r Admit-
tedly, however, Asinof sought answers from the players and their lives."
As a result, while the fact that the players were laborers working
for management/owners is a matter of historical record,'2 Asinof 's ques-
tions have not generally been asked primarily from a labor law
perspective.
This article seeks to review history from that perspective. To accom-
plish this, the following must be reviewed: the state of organized labor
within baseball at the time of the 1919 World Series; judicial decisions
declarative of player rights and liabilities; organized baseball's pre-
1920's approach to gambling; and finally some of the facts surrounding
the "fix." These facts then can be reviewed in light of the way baseball
was reported by the nation's press.
Placed into this new analytical paradigm, the historical record sug-
gests that if the players attempted to throw the World Series, their acts,
while undoubtedly wrong, were perhaps the players' only available rem-
less" Joe Jackson and pitcher Eddie Cicotte. DURSO, supra note 8, at 127-130. These confes-
sions were, however, lost and only one of the eight players ever publicly discussed their
involvement. In 1956, Black Sox first baseman Arnold "Chick" Gandil, whom many have
alleged was the ringleader of the conspiracy, indicated that while discussions of a fix took
place, and while the eight players were involved with gamblers, the players and gamblers
could never agree on the amount of money that would go to the players and, consequently,
the Series itself was not thrown. Arnold Gandil as told to Melvin Durslag, This is My Story of
the Black Sox Series, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, September 27, 1956, at 61-68.
10. AsINOF, supra note 8, at xiv.
11. Id.
12. In drawing "deductions about the Black Sox scandal," historian Harold Seymour ac-
knowledged most of the facts surrounding the labor disputes described herein, but then con-
cluded with the effect of the scandal on baseball generally, rather than an analysis of the data
as a purely labor law matter. Compare SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 331-339.
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edy to satisfy a legitimate dispute with their owners. If such a dispute
existed, a strong motive for the players' actions emerges. Perhaps more
important, however, a motive emerges for baseball's first commissioner,
hired by owners in the midst of the scandal, to suspend the players for
life, even in the absence of a criminal conviction or other finding of
guilt.' 3
If this labor/management point-counterpoint were misunderstood,
and therefore misreported by the contemporary baseball press, maybe
the historical record is not quite accurate and needs to be disturbed to
the extent that it makes current baseball labor disputes more
understandable.
II. BIRTH OF PROFESSIONAL BASFBALL
The modem view is that refinements in a rough and rowdy game
called "Town Ball"" by New Yorker Alexander Cartwright gave base-
ball its first surge of popularity. 15 By 1860, baseball had spread through-
13. Following their acquittal, four of the players filed lawsuits against the White Sox to
collect salary they should have earned during the period they were suspended pending investi-
gation. Although none of the four, Felsch, Risberg, Weaver, or Jackson, were successful in the
courts (with the exception of Jackson, whose jury verdict against the team was overturned by
the trial judge), all four successfully settled their claims and received money from the White
Sox. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 331.
14. See ROBERT SMrrT, BASEBALL 8-9 (1st Rev. Ed. 1970). "Town Ball" developed in
smaller villages of the New England colonies and took its name from the fact that it was often
played on days when town meetings were held. See DURSO, supra note 8, at 26. At first, the
game could be played by unlimited numbers of players on each side and was thus quite unruly.
As the game developed, it was limited to 11-12 players on each side. Id. Played by "rough-
necks from the edges of the city dumps," runners made outs when they were hit by a thrown
ball. This practice, called "soaking," did not appeal to wealthy youth who were bred to the
more refined game of cricket, and were used to playing dressed up without physical aggres-
sion. SMITH, supra at 8.
It is not the purpose of this article to chronicle the complete history of baseball. In his
multi-volume treatise, Seymour has done an excellent job in accomplishing this purpose. SEY-
MOUR, supra note 8. Similarly, this article does not mention every league that has challenged
the major leagues over the years. The International and Union Associations played important
roles in the development of the game during the 19th Century and the Continental Leagues of
1921 and 1959 and the more recent Global Leagues were important in this century. See
DAVID PrmRUSZA, MAJOR LEAGUES 29 (1991) (discussing these associations). Finally, this
article does not include discussion of some of the regional leagues that have been instrumental
in the nationwide growth of the game. Baseball would likely not exist on the west coast with-
out the influence of the Pacific Coast League and the SALY League is a similar southern
tradition. Omission of any of these leagues from this article is not intended to ignore their
contribution.
15. See SMITH, supra note 14, at 8. Cartwright created a variation of both cricket and
town ball that used four bases, a bat and ball, and nine players per side. This game also
repudiated the physical "soaking" of the New England game. Id. Cartwright first tried his
1994]
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out the east coast and westward to Chicago and St. Louis, with some
sixty (60) clubs belonging to the "National Association of Base Ball
Players.' 6 Players were expected to have both money and social stand-
ing and were expected to invest their own funds in uniforms, dues, and
upkeep of playing fields. Profanity was forbidden, on penalty of fine,
and an argument with an umpire could result in "personal disgrace" until
any levied fine was paid.'7
Within two years after the Civil War, the National Association of
Baseball Clubs had grown to 237 member clubs, with over half of them
in the Midwest.' 8 These teams continued to be considered amateur.
game using only rich young men like himself, and it soon spread to other "Gentleman's
Clubs." Id. The game was so refined, players were fined as much as $.25 for saying a bad
word during a game. Id.
16. DAVID Q. VOiGT, AMERICAN BASEBALL 9 (1966). While it is clear that baseball
spread to other parts of the country during the Civil War, the actual extent of that spread
remains in considerable doubt. Id at 11. It is claimed the game was played by Union soldiers
to relieve the drudgery of military encampment; and played by northern prisoners in POW
camps, both among themselves to relieve tension and against teams of guards. It is also said
the spark that ignited the notion of baseball as the "national pastime" took place on Christmas
Day, 1862 when some 40,000 Union soldiers watched a game at Hilton Head, South Carolina
between teams chosen from the 165th New York volunteer infantry. See id.; SMrrH, supra note
14, at 14. But see ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 11-12. Alexander points to the "appalling
conditions" in Confederate prisons as making it unlikely that Union prisoners would have the
strength to play baseball, noting that one of the southern prison camps where baseball was
supposed to have flourished had a 34% death rate, worse even than the legendary Anderson-
ville. Id. Alexander does acknowledge that baseball spread during the war, both because it
continued to be played in the north and because baseball players did serve in the military. Id.
Following the war, baseball remained essentially a "town game," with teams made up
largely of players from one town, although several notable eastern teams traveled throughout
the country continuing to spread the popularity of baseball. See, e.g., SMrrH, supra note 14, at
10-11. As baseball spread, it did so as a participatory game, rather than a mere spectator
sport, Thus, fans, after watching a touring company of ball players, would attempt to dupli-
cate the players' exploits on their own fields. Id. at 10. One baseball story demonstrating
baseball's increasing popularity (reported as fact by A.G. Spalding), tells of a young Abraham
Lincoln playing baseball at Springfield, Illinois when he was advised that delegates from the
Republican National Convention had arrived to offer him the nomination for the Presidency.
"'Tell them they'll have to wait until I make another hit,'" was Lincoln's fabled reply. JOHN
DURANT, THE STORY OF BASEBALL IN WORDS AND PicTUREs 13 (1947); SPALDING, supra
note 2, at 233.
17. The aristocratic nature of this early game is seen in the fact that the New York group,
led by Cartwright, tried to control the development of the social end of the game, setting itself
out as "the social arbiters of baseball, after the manner of the Marylebone Cricket Club, then
presiding over English cricket." VOiGT, supra note 16, at 8. Following the founding of the
National Association, the New York club was eliminated from much of the organizational
structure. Id. at 8-9.
18. DURANT, supra note 16, at 19.
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Players willing to take money for playing were considered a disgrace. 19
Because teams represented a town, however, the players may have
thought themselves compelled to uphold community pride by attempting
to win against teams from rival towns. As a result, class barriers were
broken and teams began to include strong, working-class players.2" Be-
cause these players did not have the financial wherewithal to be true
amateurs, they were offered jobs or other financial assistance in the
town.2 '
Soon, this indirect support gave way to traditional player salaries. In
1865, the Philadelphia Athletics lured second baseman Albert Reach
from the Brooklyn Atlantics in return for compensation. 2 Two years
later, the Forest City team of Rockford and the Brooklyn Atlantics both
had salaried players.' By 1869, the Red Stockings of Cincinnati had ten
salaried players, with salaries ranging from $600 to $1400, and a total
club payroll of $9300. This first "professional" team won sixty nine (69)
games before its first loss. 24
To pay these salaries, as well as travel and equipment costs, teams
began to charge admission to the games, and to split some of those pro-
ceeds among the players. This practice did not reduce attendance as fans
19. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL 1-7 to 1-8 (Joe Reichler ed. 1962); DuRANr,
supra note 16, at 19. A member of the Empire Club of New York was expelled for taking
money to play in 1865. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra at 1-8. For an excellent
account of small town baseball throughout Ohio during this period, see Carl M. Becker &
Richard H. Grigsby, Baseball in the Small Ohio Community, 1865-1890, in SPORT IN
AMERICA: NEW HISTORICAL PERSPECrIVES 77-93 (Donald Spivey, ed. 1985).
20. VoiGT, supra note 16, at 12, 15-16.
21. Even the federal government became involved, supporting a group of federal "clerks"
whose principal occupation was playing baseball for the Washington, D.C. Nationals on the lot
near the White House or in other towns to which the team traveled. SMrrH, supra note 14, at
10-11. Sometimes, an entire town contributed to the players' well being. When a team from
Rockford, Illinois beat a touring team from Washington, D.C. in 1867, the citizens of Rock-
ford honored their stars by giving them "watches, gold pins, and other gifts." VOIGT, supra
note 16, at 17. The town celebrated for an entire week, settling down only after members of
the Washington team wrote a letter to a Rockford newspaper acknowledging that the Wash-
ington team was no longer the "'national champion.'" Id.
22. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 1-8.
23. Id. (noting that one of the leaders in this drive toward professionalism was A.G.
Spalding). Spalding first came to prominence in connection with the traveling eastern team,
the Nationals. The Nationals played teams as far west as St. Louis. The team expected to win
all of its games against teams that had been in existence for much shorter periods of time, and,
with one exception, this proved true. The exception was a team from Rockford, Illinois for
whom Spalding was the pitcher. SMrrH, supra note 14, at 11; RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 1-8.
24. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 1-8.
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were Willing to pay to watch star players.' As competition increased,
clubs sought the most talented players in the region, which in turn
caused admission prices to rise, and saw the end of the amateur baseball
gentry.26 Baseball free agency had begun and professional baseball be-
came a career option for otherwise working-class youths. 7
III. GROWTH OF "PROFESSIONAL" BASEBALL AS A LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP
The first "professional" baseball league, the National Association of
Professional Baseball Players was organized in 1871 succeeding its pred-
ecessor, the amateur National Association.28 A player-organized league,
the National Association was without labor strife, because players were
free to move about as they pleased.29 The organizers relied on the good
25. VOIGT, supra note 16, at 12, 15.
26. Id. at 15 (noting that even in 1863, some clubs were charging as much as $.25 to attend
a game).
27. Id. at 19. The members of the 1869 Brooklyn club provide a case study. The average
player's age was 23; the pitcher had previously been employed as a stonemason, the catcher by
the post office, infielders and outfielders either had no previous job experience or had been
employed in jobs such as compositor, machinist, and shipping clerk. Id.
28. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 1.9.
29. DAVID Q. VoIGT, AMERICA THROUGH BASEBALL 132 (1976). This new association
adopted both the rules and constitution of its amateur predecessor. VoIGT, supra note 16, at
37. That did not mean, however, that there was no friction between those who favored ama-
teur, as opposed to professional baseball. Cincinnati, the first all-salaried team, found that
success lasted only as long as its latest championship and, when other teams began to pay
players, Cincinnati no longer dominated baseball. As a result, gate revenue fell, and by 1870 it
was reported the team had only broken even over the prior two years. As a result, the
Cincinnati Red Stockings returned to amateur status for the 1871 season. Id. at 37, 33-34. As
has been true since, however, others believed they could succeed even though one team failed.
A newly organized group in Boston hired Cincinnati manager and star Harry Wright to man-
age a team there and Wright took the "Red Stocking" name with him from Cincinnati to
Boston. Id. at 33-34.
The 1870 meeting of the former National Association was said to be "a fiery affair marked
by hot words between" the amateur and professional camps. Ultimately, the amateur group
quit the meeting and the professionals agreed to form their own league, doing so in March,
1871. Nine teams were enrolled for the $10 entry fee: Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, New
York, Washington, D.C., Troy, Cleveland, Fort Wayne, and Rockford. By the middle of the
season, Fort Wayne had folded and was replaced by Brooklyn. While the Philadelphia Athlet-
ics won the league's first championship, Boston's Red Stockings dominated the league, win-
ning the next four years. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 1-9.
The league itself was plagued by organizational problems. It had adopted the amateur
practice of using only volunteer umpires, it had no formal schedule, leaving the arrangement
of playing dates to the individual clubs (although requiring that each club play each other at
least five times during the season), and it had no agreement on admission fees, with most clubs
charging about $.50 and sharing the proceeds two thirds to the home team, one third to the
visitors. VoiGT, supra note 16, at 37.
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faith of the owners and players to discharge existing contracts with
honor before players signed with rival clubs." What the league pro-
duced was a "players' market" in which individuals could set salaries
based upon the strength of their own" 'muscle, endurance and skill.' "I'
Abuse of this early free agency, however, soon began to occur. Be-
tween the time the league was formed and 1875, "[t]he public became
disgusted and turned against baseball ... Contract breaking was going
on everywhere. Businessmen lost interest in the Association."32 Matters
came to a head in 1875 when Chicago owner William Hulbert signed
four of the league's best players away from the Boston club. When re-
maining owners complained to Hulbert about his conduct, "he invited
them earnestly to go fry."33
One of the players who signed with Hulbert was pitcher A.G. Spald-
ing, who believed that player control of baseball was an unwelcome rem-
nant of baseball's gentlemanly beginnings. He found that while teams in
the National Association of Professional Base Ball Players were
designed as stock companies, owners really had no expectation of profit.
Instead, the owners thought of their ownership as a club membership. In
Spalding's view, baseball could not be a commercial success unless the
game itself was willing to both make a profit and control player and
owner discipline.34 Spalding's own words are a testament to the modern
view of owner-player relations: "Base Ball depends for results upon two
interdependent divisions, the one to have absolute control and direction
30. The league provided for arbitration by neutrals from other clubs of disputes to the
services of a player. VoIGT, supra note 16, at 37. This idyllic view suggested that organizers,
many of whom were former ballplayers with no business or management experience, clung to
the view that baseball was a sport for wealthy gentlemen. DORANT, supra note 16, at 26. The
reality was quite different. As one author put it: "The players were no longer young gentle-
men prompted to play by love of sport. They were often tough young men who played for
blood as well as money .... " SMrrH, supra note 14, at 25.
31. VoiGT, supra note 16, at 34.
32. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 1-10.
33. SMrrH, supra note 14, at 26. Compare with MILLER, supra note 7, at 286-319, in which
the former Executive Director of the current baseball players' association discusses his views
that the 1981 baseball players' strike was caused by owners wanting players to give up the free
agency they had won in 1976. The reason give-backs were demanded, according to Miller, was
the free spending habits of the owners themselves. He indicates "that the strike grew out of
conflicts among the owners. Theoretically, [the owners] believed in ... individualism and
competition. But some of them-hard-liners like Calvin Griffith, Gussie Busch, and Ruly
Carpenter-were outraged by the free-spending, high-profile owners like George Steinbren-
ner, Ted Trner, and Gene Autry." Id at 309.
Hulbert did not raid only the Boston club. He also signed Adrian "Cap" Anson of Phila-
delphia, one of baseball's best hitters. SMrrH, supra note 14, at 26.
34. VOIGT, supra note 16, at 52-53.
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of the system, and the other to engage-always under the executive
branch-in the actual work of production. '35
When Spalding and his three Boston teammates moved to Chicago,
the player strength moved with it, leaving the east coast for the first
time. Hulbert, one of the first owners who did not grow up a player,
shared Spalding's view of the game as a business. He therefore sensed
that the eastern owners would attempt retaliation against his raiding of
the Boston club. Instead of awaiting their actions, he and Spalding took
the initiative, drafted a constitution and, with support from the midwest-
ern cities of St. Louis, Louisville and Cincinnati, created the National
League of Professional Base Ball Clubs. The new league had many of
the same teams, but was radically different in structure.36 Organization
was more centralized ("league" as opposed to "association") with the
supporting structure being the individual team ("club"), and not the
players.37 Players limited their activities to the field38 with a clear line of
35. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 169-170. The original of this book was written by Spalding
in 1911. Spalding rejected the commonly held players' view:
[The players] argued that the people who patronized Base Ball paid to see them play.
They were the star performers, the actual "producers" of the entertainment. They held
... that no one would give up a farthing to the man at the box-office; nobody would
part with a ticket at the turnstile; none would contribute a nickel at the grandstand, so
far as the men presiding at those posts were concerned; and as for the owners of clubs,
what did the public care for them?
I [do not] believe that their contentions were based upon safe or sane business
theory.
Id. As a result, Spalding saw no reason to think the production of a baseball game was any
different than manufacturing of baseballs or bats. Compare David Parry, Proceedings of the
Eighth Annual Convention of the National Association of Manufacturers of the United States,
(April, 1903), reprinted in 12 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA 513, 516-17 (1976). Parry, the Presi-
dent of this national association of manufacturers, called the labor movement "an organiza-
tion of manual labor, trained and untrained, of men who do as they are told and who depend
upon the brains of others for guidance." Id. at 516. Parry indicated unions were made up of
"men of muscle," rather than "men of intelligence." As a result, organized labor set about to
overturn the "natural laws of economics." Id. at 517.
36. See VOIGT, supra note 16, at 61-64. The league was formally founded at the 1876
league meeting. Id. at 63.
37. See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 27. Spalding saw these changes as part of the" 'irre-
pressible conflict between Labor and Capital.'" PIErRUSZA, supra note 14, at 29. Each team
paid a $100 per year membership fee enabling the league to set up a national office and well-
known banker, but little-involved baseball person Morgan Bulkeley was named first president.
Bulkeley later served as Governor of Connecticut, and as United States Senator. See Du-
RANT, supra note 16, at 27. When he accepted the presidency of the National League,
Bulkeley indicated that he would serve but one year. As a result, he failed to appear at the
league meeting in December, 1876, when Hulbert was chosen as the new president. Thus,
Bulkeley served as president for less than a full year. His only other baseball experience was
as a banker who became involved in ownership of the Hartford National League club. Ironi-
[Vol. 5:1
1994] BASEBALL'S LABOR WARS
demarcation between "management," (those who controlled the grounds
upon which games were played, discipline, scheduling, player contracts,
and public relations), and the "players."39 Even with these changes,
cally, his minimal contribution led to his selection to the Baseball Hall of Fame. PrETRuSZA,
supra note 14, at 30-31. Hulbert, the real financial force behind the reorganized National
League, has not been so honored although he has recently received "strong support" for selec-
tion from the Veteran's Committee. See Bob Broeg, Veterans Committee Strikes Out, ST.
Louis POST DISPATCH, February 25, 1993, at 81).
Of concern to league organizers were some of the problems they associated with the struc-
ture of the former Players' Association. See supra note 29. These owners wanted baseball to
be a money-making business. The president and board of directors would have real supervi-
sory power over the league, clubs and members. The league secretary was to be paid $400 per
month, from the yearly membership fee. To prevent entry of clubs without financial where-
withal, applications would be accepted only from cities with more than 75,000 people. The
league required member clubs to approve new members, and an "informal black ball" system
produced a negative vote if two or more members disapproved. Teams that did not pay the
membership fee would be expelled. The league created schedules for competition, and ex-
pected league members to play those schedules. VOIGT, supra note 16, at 64-65; PmTuszA,
supra note 7, at 28-30. Umpires were paid for the first time, and could not volunteer, but
needed qualifications to be chosen and were assigned to games by the league. Id. at 29. Ad-
mission prices were also standardized. DuRANT, supra note 16, at 27-28.
In an attempt to have the game appeal to a wider range of Christian audiences, the new
league outlawed all gambling at or around games, liquor in ball parks, and games on Sundays.
VOIGT, supra note 16, at 64-65.
38. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 1-10.
39. PiETRuszA, supra note 14, at 27-28. Much of this was done under the guise of social
reform of the game itself. There can be little doubt but that the prior league was rife with
social ills. As described by one writer:
Pool-selling, bookmaking with booths where both fans and players could put down bets
with professional gamblers were allowed in most parks. Liquor was sold on the
grounds and the stands swarmed with pickpockets who made a good living rolling
drunks. Fist fights and wholesale brawls took place in the seats and on the field and if a
man happened to let out a cheer for the wrong team he had a good chance of getting
his skull laid open by some pugnacious drunk.
DuRANT, supra note 16, at 26. Spalding wrote that the new league owners' job was one of
"herculean proportions," but that the entire future of baseball depended on breaking up the
"unholy alliance" between baseball and "the whole gambling fraternity." SPALDING, supra
note 2, at 135.
Henry Chadwick, the New York sports reporter instrumental in baseball development, see
infra notes 359-365, had already campaigned against gaming interests in baseball, suggesting
that the game had to rid itself of corrupt players and officials and suggesting that one way was
to eliminate profitless teams. VoIGT, supra note 16, at 61. The evidence suggests that Hulbert
resented Chadwick's comments thinking they damaged the game's popularity. Perhaps as a
result, Hulbert excluded the Easterner in order to center control of the league away from the
East. Id. at 62-63.
In reality, use of these social problems as a unifying factor seems to have covered up the
real reason for change to a new league. While baseball had tremendous spectator appeal
during championship-type series, the normal operation of the old association had been largely
unprofitable, with many of the teams failing to fulfill their playing obligations. ALE.xANDER,
supra note 7, at 26. Hulbert recognized that people loved baseball and, because of that, the
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however, by 1879, owners were still not making a profit.40 Attendance
had not radically increased and clubs were struggling economically, with
salaries encompassing about two-thirds of a team's expenses. 41 The ma-
jor problem was the fact that owners continued to bid for players, who
were permitted to sign with any club when their normal one year con-
tracts expired. This kind of free agency was decried by owners like Hul-
owners should be making money. PImUSZA, supra note 14, at 28. His efforts to make base-
ball respectable was designed to protect team, and therefore, owner interests. VOiGT, supra
note 16, at 63. The bottom line then, was to keep gate revenue coming in by playing games
that people would attend. It was thought that people would attend only those games they
thought to be fairly conducted. VOiGT, supra note 29, at 62. "No longer [would baseball] be a
hobby for status-seeking gentlemen." VOIGT, supra note 16, at 64.
The Easterners, particularly Chadwick, who found themselves excluded from the operating
structure of the new National League, opposed its creation. PiErRusZA, supra note 14, at 31.
To assure the sought-after changes, the National League revised several aspects of baseball
organization:
1. By agreement among the clubs, territories were granted, so that only one baseball
club could be recognized by the League in a particular geographic area. See id. at 29; VOTOT,
supra note 16, at 64. This move was not universally popular because it meant that one team
would be eliminated from Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, and St. Louis.
2. Teams agreed that if they did not complete their schedules, they would be expelled
from the league and could be reinstated only upon agreement of all other clubs. VoiGT, supra
note 16, at 65.
3. Teams agreed that if a player were expelled, either by a team or the league, no other
league team would employ that player. PrmRuszA, supra note 14, at 29.
In addition, the teams in the new league agreed, both at the outset and shortly thereafter,
to institute changes in player contracts:
1. A uniform player's contract was developed and, although it allowed players to change
teams, the player was obligated to follow all rules set out by the club. VOiGT, supra note 16, at
64. Because the contract was uniform, an individual player had little to say in its formation.
Players simply received their contracts from owners. They could either sign them and obligate
themselves to play any position assigned by the club or they could not sign and not play. Id. at
66. Players who protested were held to the same standard as those who were crooked and
blacklisted. Id. at 76.
2. Part of the uniform agreement attempted to prevent a player from negotiating with
another club before the season ended by providing that the player could be expelled for vio-
lating the contract. Id. at 64; SPALDING, supra note 2, at 136. The expulsion was for life.
Spalding makes no mention of the fact that he had done this very act when he left Boston and
negotiated with Chicago. See PxmRTjszA, supra note 14, at 23-27.
3. Beginning in 1877, players were charged both for their uniforms and for days spent
on the road, $30 per year for uniforms and $.50 per day for each day spent on the road.
VoiGT, supra note 16, at 70.
4. Beginning in 1879, players were paid only if they played. Claiming the rule as one
restricting "drunken" or "bumming" players, owners did agree to give "special consideration"
to players unable to play who were nonetheless hardworking. Id. at 79. It was already consid-
ered grounds for dismissal that a player was ill, injured or insubordinate. Id at 66.
40. The labor situation in organized baseball must be contrasted with the nation's general
labor situation. See infra note 90.
41. See PmTRUszA, supra note 14, at 39-43.
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bert who complained: "It is ridiculous to pay ballplayers $2000... when
the $800 boys often do just as well." The economic fact however, was
that when clubs bid against one another, costs (primarily of labor) went
up, profits down.42
To control themselves from attempting to outbid one another, the
owners in 1879 adopted the first "reserve rule," which allowed each team
to protect five players from its club.43 No other clubs would seek to hire
or even to negotiate with these players without permission from the re-
served player's present owner. Finally, all owners agreed they would not
play a team, within or without the League, fielding a team containing
any player "reserved" by another team.'
42. Id. at 43. It was generally thought that players were incapable of managing their own
affairs. National League Secretary Nick Young is said to have written to one of the owners
about how players generally frittered away their money: "It comes and it goes.., and at the
end of the season they are hard up as usual, and have little or no idea what has become of it
." ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 31.
43. MILLER, supra note 7, at 309 (indicating that baseball owners have always been in
competition with each other for baseball players. What the owners have thus wanted the
players to do was "to protect the owners from themselves.").
44. PiETRuszA, supra note 14, at 43. The scope of the "reserve" rule was increased from
five to eleven players in 1883, id. at 78-79, and eventually encompassed the entire team when
the American League came into existence in 1903. Id. at 179. In 1889, the National Agree-
ment had expanded the number to 14. SPALDING, supra note 2; at 149-150. The 1903 agree-
ment, however, indicated that "[e]ach and every contract . . . with players . . . shall be
considered valid and binding," and also provided that the clubs could "reserve players under
contract" without reference to number. PrEmuszA, supra note 14, at 179.
Defense of this rule has traditionally been based on the need for competitive balance.
"Otherwise the wealthiest clubs would corral the best men and thereby destroy the industry
by making a mockery of competition on the playing field." SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 7. The
way in which various agreements relating to baseball coalesce to form the reserve rule are
discussed beginning at note 205.
The reserve clause is, in economic terms, an "input" restriction that makes the "output" of
the owners-the game of baseball itself-more profitable because it reduces the total cost of
production of the game to the owners. One author has concluded that such an input restric-
tion in a sports-related industry in fact benefits wealthy members of the cartel, rather than
promoting competition among all members. Compare ARTHUR A. FLEISHER, T AL., THE
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETic AssoCIATION, A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 55-58,
103-104 (1992) (enforcement of "input" restrictions tends to benefit already wealthy teams
and prevent previously poor teams from gaining wealth). The argument has been made that
this theory is true in dealing with major league baseball. In the 1950's, before baseball player
free agency, the Yankees and Dodgers dominated the scene. In the 1980's, following the
adoption of free agency, no single team dominated and teams from smaller, less wealthy mar-
kets such as Kansas City, Milwaukee, Minnesota, and St. Louis became regular playoff
contenders:
What happened with free agency turned out to be exactly the opposite of what the
owners said: Teams could no longer stockpile talent, perennial cellar dwellers could
improve themselves. Competition became keener, pennant races became more excit-
ing, attendance increased, TV revenues went up ....
19941
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With the advent of the reserve rule, organized baseball achieved a
"monopsony... that is, a buyer's monopoly-over their men."4" 'As in
other "great industrial monopolies,"46 it was time for labor and outside
competition to react.
IV. FIRST SIGNIFICANT OUTSIDE COMPETITION-THE AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION
One of the first challenges to National League monopolization of big
league baseball was the American Association, founded in 1881 and
known as "the beer and whiskey league," because one of its founders
was a St. Louis saloon keeper and because it allowed alcohol in the
ballparks.47 The National League and the American Association coex-
isted through early 1882 when there were twenty one (21) inter-league
exhibition games, all won by the National League." During that same
year, however, two players from Detroit of the National League signed
to play in the American Association.49 As a result, the National League
refused to further recognize the Association. The Association retaliated
by refusing to respect the reserve clauses of the National League as well
as signing thirteen former National Leaguers to American Association
options for the 1883 season.50
One of the players the American Association sought to sign was De-
troit Wolverine Charles Bennett, called by one manager "the best back-
MILLER, supra note 7, at 352.
45. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 6.
46. Compare MORRIS M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW § 106 at 173-74 (2d
ed., 1965) (pointing out "the industrial union, as a labor gargantua, appeared first as a re-
sponse to the great industrial monopolies...").
47. PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 61-67. The tavern keeper was Chris Von der Ahe of St.
Louis. His partner in formation of the St. Louis Browns, and purchase of Sportsman's Park
for $500, was Alfred H. Spink, then a sports writer for a St. Louis newspaper. Spink would
later begin The Sporting News, long a champion of baseball. Id. at 67. In addition to the
Browns, the American Association included the Chicago White Stockings and the Cincinnati
Red Stockings and over its existence through the 1891 season, teams from New York, Colum-
bus, Louisville, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Toledo, Richmond, Brooklyn, Washington, Pitts-
burgh, Indianapolis, Cleveland, Kansas City, Rochester, Syracuse, and Milwaukee. Id. at 327-
331. Note that several of these teams came from cities either left out of the new National
League or where one of two preexisting teams was dropped.
One of the first managers of the Browns was a first baseman Spink lured from the Du-
buque Rabbits in 1883 named Charles Comiskey. Id. at 70.
48. Id at 72.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 73.
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stop that ever lived."'" On August 3, 1882, evidently while the 1882
National League season was still being played, Bennett signed an option
to play with the Allegheny (Pittsburgh) Base-Ball Club of the American
Association. He further agreed to sign a regular contract to play for
Allegheny in 1883 before the end of October, 1882.52 Bennett also en-
couraged two other players, third baseman Ned Williamson and pitcher
"Pud" Galvin, to jump leagues with him. 3 Following the season, how-
ever, Bennett evidently reneged, because on October 5, 1882, Allegheny
filed suit in federal court. It alleged Bennett refused to sign with Alle-
gheny instead signing a new agreement with Detroit. The club also al-
leged that Bennett's actions had caused both Williamson and Galvin to
similarly renege. The suit sought specific performance of the option
agreement. 4 The court was not persuaded issuing a one line ruling for
51. Id at 73-74. Bennett is listed as having compiled a .262 batting average in 1038 games
from 1878-1893. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 12-12. In 1900,
Detroit renamed its 8,500 seat baseball stadium "Bennett Field" in honor of this catcher. Pm-
TRUS A, supra note 14, at 150.
52. Allegheny Base Ball Club v. Bennett, 14 F. 257, 257 (W.D. Pa. 1882). Bennett was
paid $100 for signing this option and was to receive $1700 from the Allegheny club for the
1883 season. Id.
53. Id. at 258. These two players were identified in the opinion as "two other skillful
players." Id. "Ned" Williamson was a third baseman/shortstop who batted .255 in 1192 major
league games with Indianapolis and two Chicago teams. Galvin was indeed a "skillful" player.
Known as "The Little Steam Engine," Galvin compiled a majpr league won/loss record of 361-
309 with an earned run average of 2.94. Galvin pitched 639 complete games. He played for
Buffalo, St. Louis, and Pittsburgh teams in the American, National and Players' League. See
NEFf & COHEN, supra note 7, at 10. See also PImuszA, supra note 14, at 74. Galvin was
elected to the Hall of Fame by the Committee on Veterans in 1965. NEFr & COHEN, supra
note 7, at 628.
54. Allegheny Base Ball Club, 14 F. at 258. Defending the action, Bennett presented six
reasons why the court should not grant the remedy of specific performance:
1. The option was preliminary to a final contract that was never executed so that
there was nothing to be enforced;
2. Any contract that did arise was uncertain and indefinite and not therefore sus-
ceptible to the remedy of specific performance;
3. An adequate remedy at law was available if the plaintiff hired players of Ben-
nett's skill. Any additional salary that plaintiff was obligated to pay would be the
damage;
4. Equity will not enforce an agreement for personal services;
5. Even if there were a contract, and even if the court had been willing to enforce a
negative covenant by injunction, the agreement was unlimited in terms of time or geog-
raphy and would not therefore support equitable relief;
6. The lawsuit was premature, since Bennett had until the end of October to sign
and because no damage could accrue until Bennett either played for another team or
failed to play for Allegheny at the beginning of the 1883 season.
The court did not indicate which, if any, of these arguments it found persuasive.
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Bennett: "Demurrer sustained and bill dismissed."55
The import of Bennett was the court's refusal to use its equitable
power to tie a player to a particular team or owner, even while recogniz-
ing a possible cause of action for damages. By refusing to assert equity's
in personam jurisdiction, the court authorized limited free agency during
a period when real competition existed.
The historical record shows the benefit to the players. Average sala-
ries in baseball during the 1880s ranged from $1,000-$5,000.56 While
Charles Bennett's salary is unknown, William "Buck" Ewing, another
"outstanding catcher of that era," earned $1,000 in 1881 and $1,200 in
1882.57 Because Ewing has been elected to the baseball Hall of Fame,5 8
it is certainly plausible that his salary would be among the leaders for
catchers. Thus, Bennett's negotiation with Allegheny for $1,700 before
the 1882 season ended is evidence of a "free market" system driving up
prices.
The effect of market demand becomes even more apparent when
Ewing's salary is reviewed. Having reached $1,200 in 1882, Ewing's sal-
ary jumped to $3,100 for each of the years 1883-1885.s 9 Such a dramatic
increase, while undoubtedly related to ability,60 must be measured in
light of the recognition that a team could not be successful without a
good catcher.6 The possibility that catchers could jump to a new league
would likely increase the marketability of all catchers. In fact, the
American Association invited any National League catcher to join the
new league, but only one did so. "[O]thers threatened to do so and won
pay increases from League clubs."'62
These developments were not lost on the owners. With the death of
55. Id. at 261.
56. PAUL M. GREGORY, THE BASEBALL PLAYER: AN ECONOMIC STUDY 93 (1956).
57. Id. The offensive statistics of Bennett and Ewing were comparable. While Bennett
batted .262 in 1038 games from 1878-1893, Ewing batted .311 in 1281 games from 1880-1897.
Bennett had 63 home runs during this "dead" ball era, while Ewing had 67. RONALD ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 12-12, 12-58.
58. He was elected in 1939, by the Old-timers Committee. See NEFT & COHEN, supra
note 7, at 628.
59. GREGORY, supra note 56, at 93.
60. While Ewing's career batting average was .311, he did not bat over .300 for the first
time until 1883, the first year of his new contract. See supra note 57. Prior to his 158% salary
increase at the beginning of the 1883 season, Ewing had batted .152 in 13 games in 1880, .243
in 65 games in 1881, and .273 in 72 games in 1882. He had two home runs during these three
seasons, both in 1882. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 12-58.
61. GREGORY, supra note 56, at 28.
62. See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 36.
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National League founder Hulbert in 1882,63 lawyer Abraham G. Mills
became National League president. He invited American Association
leaders to a baseball summit conference in New York.6a Recalling the
days before the first reserve clause, Mills argued that, with competition,
players again had superior bargaining power65 and that, as a result, all of
the owners faced financial ruin without a settlement.66 The meeting pro-
duced an agreement that temporarily ended competitive bidding for
players. The leagues agreed on a minimum player salary of $1000,
agreed to retain a reserve clause and, most important, agreed to respect
the reserve rights of other teams.67 Having again eliminated the compe-
tition, baseball owners enjoyed their most profitable season in 1883.68
Elimination of competition also spelled the end of players' salary
gains. Many owners believed the salary increases received by the players
as a result of competition were "[e]ntirely too high.169 Because baseball
was a business, owners were motivated by maximizing profits and mini-
mizing costs, both depended on a stable, controlled work-force.7" Stabil-
ity produced by monopoly, however, also produced arrogance. Despite
overall salary increases during the 1880s,71 baseball players, by mid-dec-
63. See SPALDING, supra note 2, at 145.
64. See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 37; VOIGT, supra note 16, at 127. Also invited were
representatives from the newly formed Northwestern League, another minor league.
65. VoiGT, supra note 16, at 127.
66. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 37.
67. Id. at 37; VOIGT, supra note 16, at 127-128. Under the agreement, the American As-
sociation was recognized as a "major" league and the Northwestern Association as a high
minor league.
68. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 37. Only Pittsburgh lost money. Philadelphia, St.
Louis, Cincinnati, Baltimore, Louisville and Columbus all reported that they either broke
even or made as much as $75,000 for the season. The season was so profitable that it caused
several new minor leagues and yet another new major league to spring up. The Union Associ-
ation was formed in September, 1893. Among its owners was a combination of businessmen
in St. Louis that included Adolphus Busch, grandfather of the later Cardinal owner. After
luring some players away from the National League and the American Association, the Union
Association disbanded in January, 1885. Players who jumped to the Union Association from
the National League and American Association, in violation of the reserve clause, were, by
and large, allowed to return, although some paid fines before so doing. See PIETRLUsZA, supra
note 14, at 80-98.
69. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 53.
70. See id. at 53; VoIGT, supra note 16, at 154-55. Then player Charles Comiskey believed
the owners were motivated by "greed." GusTAF AXELSON, CoMMi 108-109 (1919).
71. See PIERUSZA, supra note 14, at 112-13 (comparing the 1880s salaries of some of the
baseball players who would become instrumental in the formation of the Players' League).
Hall of Fame information is from NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 628-29:
Name 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889
King Kelly (HOF-1945) 1300 1400 1700 2000 2250 2500 000 0 T00
Hardy Richardson 1250 1300 1500 2000 2100 4000 4000 4000 4000
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ade found themselves subject to blacklisting and other arbitrary treat-
ment. "Substitute players were forced to do work around the ballpark,
including watching turnstiles. Discontent grew." 72
V. Ti PLAYERS' LEAGUE
Originally formed in 1885 as a benevolent and protective society,73
the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players became a labor-ori-
ented body following the owners' decision at the end of the 1885 season
to impose a $2000 salary cap.74 The Brotherhood was founded by nine
members of the New York Giants,75 led by captain, John M. Ward.76 An
Ned Williamson 1400 1400 2000 2300 2500 2500 2500 3000 3000
George Gore 1100 1200 1800 2100 2100 2100 2500 3000 7300
Dan Brouthers 875 1200 1600 2000 2500 4000 4000 4000 4700
Jim O'Rourke (HOF-1945) 2000 2000 2250 3000 4500 3000 3500 3500 3500
Deacon White 1600 1600 1600 1600 2500 3500 3500 3500 3500
Jack Rowe 1250 1400 1650 2000 2100 3500 3500 3500 3500
Ned Hanlon 1200 1400 1500 1700 1700 2100 2100 2800 3100
George Wood 875 1000 1400 1600 1600 1800 2000 2100 2500
Pud Galvin (HOF-1965) 1200 1300 1700 2600 2600 2000 2100 3000 3000
Fred Pfeffer 750 1000 1600 1800 1800 2100 2400 3000 3000
Buck Ewing (HOF-1939) 1000 1200 3100 3100 3100 3500 3500 4500 5000
Monte Ward (HOF-1964) 1700 2400 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 4000 4250
Tim Keefe (HOF-1964) 1500 1500 2800 2800 3000 3000 3000 4000 4500
Roger Connor (HOF-1976) 900 1200 2000 2000 2200 3000 3000 3000 3500
72. PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 99.
73. See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 53; SMITH, supra note 14, at 391. One commentator
indicates that initial steps toward formation of an association had taken place earlier, and
involved Chattanooga Mayor and former sportswriter William H. Volz. Pm'iuszA, supra
note 14, at 99. The originally avowed purposes of the association were so lofty, in terms of
helping down-and-out ballplayers and widows of former players, that the organization was
embraced by owners, who invited brotherhood representatives to owners' meetings. SMITH,
supra note 14, at 391.
74. PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 99. Pietrusza indicates that this cap was inconsistently
applied, which may be the reason none of the players in the'list, in supra note 71, appear to
have been affected by it. In his biography of Charles Comiskey, Axelson referred to the or-
ganization as the National Brotherhood of Baseball Players, however, he agrees that the pre-
cipitating event in the organization becoming active in labor relations was the $2,000 salary
cap. AXELSON, supra note 70, at 109. The owners also agreed to no longer make advance
payments of salary. PiuTRuszA, supra note 14, at 99.
75. PiErRuszA, supra note 14, at 99.
76. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 53. Ward had grown up a pitcher and compiled a record
of 158-102 and an earned run average of 2.03 from 1878-1884 with Providence and New York
of the National League. He then trained himself as a fielder and played shortstop, second
base and the outfield for New York, Brooklyn of the Players' League, and Brooklyn of the
National League, compiling a .280 batting average in 1811 games. See VOIGT, supra note 16,
at 155-56; NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 10. He was elected to the Hall of Fame in 1964.
Id. at 628.
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1885 graduate of the Columbia Law School,77 Ward had first tackled
baseball's reserve clause in an article prior to the 1885 season.78
During the 1886 season, as the Giants traveled the league, the Broth-
erhood grew. Within a year, it had 107 members and a separate chapter
in each National League city.7 9
In 1887, Mike Kelly, known as the "King," and called "the most fa-
mous baseball player in the world," was sold by Chicago to Boston for
the then astronomical price of $10,000.80 Kelly had no say in the deal
and received none of the money.8 Ward again bemoaned the slave-like
potential of the reserve rule,s2 although he was careful not to argue for
its total elimination.83 This fact probably got the Brotherhood a meeting
with the owners in 1887 at which the owners agreed to consider a player-
77. See PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 100. He graduated with honors and, in 1886 was also
given a political science prize from Columbia. Id. See also VOiGT, supra note 16, at 156. In
1888, he published what was then considered the definitive work on the technical aspects of
playing baseball entitled Base Ball: How to Become a Player. Id. His intellect evidently had a
practical side as well. Despite potential ridicule by other players, Ward apparently was the
first to wear a glove for fielding. See RUDOLPH BRAsCH, How DID SPORTS BEGIN? 39 (1970).
78. Ward evidently argued from the cases already decided that the reserve rule had no
legal effect, but instead depended on its intimidating effect for its power. He also argued that
the blacklisting of players who violated a rule that did not offend either the criminal or civil
law was tyrannical. PiEruszA, supra note 14, at 100; VOIGT, supra note 16, at 155.
79. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 53; PmTruszA, supra note 14, at 100-102. See also
VOiGT, supra note 16, at 156-57, which reported that chapters were set up in several minor
league cities, therein adding about 30 additional members. The Brotherhood was originally a
secret organization but was made public by sportswriters in 1886. PrmuszA, supra note 14,
at 102.
80. It was said that Kelly was the prototype for Casey of Casey at the Bat fame. He was
known for his crowd-pleasing antics. He helped make the slide a staple of baseball and the
phrase "slide, Kelly slide," refers to him. SMrrH, supra note 14, at 32-38. He compiled a .307
batting average in 1443 games from 1878-1893 and was elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame in
1945. NnFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 10, 628.
81. VoiGT, supra note 16, at 158.
82. See PimrnuszA, supra note 14, at 102. In addition to dealing with the Kelly sale, Ward
discussed the situation of Buffalo player Charley Foley, who had been injured in 1883 and was
thus not paid. The following season, he was still injured, unable to play and therefore did not
get paid. Well enough to play by midseason, he was offered minor league contracts, but was
unable to accept them because of the reserve rule. Buffalo refused to release him, he did not
play or get paid for 1884 and Buffalo then reserved him for the 1885 season. Id. Compare
MILLER, supra note 7, at 193 (in which the former executive director of the current baseball
players' association discusses a meeting with owner representatives in 1970 at which pitcher
Jim Bouton asked if the owners would release players from the reserve clause when the player
turned 65 and was given a straight-faced "no" in response).
83. See, e.g., SPALDING, supra note 2, at 171, (quoting Ward as writing: "The reserve rule,
on the whole, is a bad one; but it cannot be rectified save by injuring the interests of the men
who invest their money...").
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proposed model contract and agreed to remove the salary ceiling.84
While Ward was playing on an international touring team sponsored by
A.G. Spalding following the 1888 season, however, the owners not only
failed to remove the salary ceiling, they turned it into a classification
system. All players were grouped into one of five classes with salary set
by the classification. 5 When Ward and the touring troupe returned, the
players were ready to strike. This fever was not diminished when owners
refused to remove the classification rule after a meeting with the players.
Instead of striking, however, the players set out to form their own league
and the Players' League was born.86
The players advertised their new baseball product by comparing
early integrity of baseball with the present organization of owners whom
the players indicated stood for "for dollars and cents," and which had
power "stronger than the strongest trust."'
Owners, to the contrary, asked the public to recall that the prior
player-operated league was plagued with the "slough of corruption and
disgrace" of "pool-selling and open betting," as well as "the sale of li-
quors."88 In a newspaper interview, Spalding was quoted as calling the
Brotherhood leadership "hot-headed anarchists,"89 clearly trying to tie
84. PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 102-103. The meeting did result in a change in the loca-
tion of the "reserve rule." Prior to this time, the rule was contained in the National Agree-
ment among the various teams, with the players agreeing to be bound by it only because each
player in an individual contract agreed to the terms of the Agreement. After this meeting, the
reserve clause was placed in the individual player's contract.
85. See id.; VOIGT, supra note 16, at 158-59. Compare SPALDING, supra note 2, at 170-71.
For E. classed players, salary would be $1500; for D. classed players, salary would be $1750;
for C. classed players, the salary would be $2000; for B. classed players, the salary would be
$2250; and for A. class players, the salary would be $2500. PIETRusZA, supra note 14, at 103.
It was rumored that only about 20 players would be classified in the A. category. VoIGT,
supra note 16, at 159.
86. PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 103-105; VOIGT, supra note 16, at 159-160.
87. Congress enacted the first national antitrust act in July, 1890. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973).
It is likely the players use of this language was designed to reflect public discussion of this
topic. The players indicated: "Players have been bought, sold and exchanged as though they
were sheep instead of American citizens," the players manifesto and the owners response are
both set forth in SPALDING, supra note 2, at 171-176. Spalding headed up the National
League's "War Committee" designed to defeat the Brotherhood. See PIETRUSZA, supra note
14, at 108.
88. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 173-76. The public was also reminded that current owners
had saved the game from the "destruction threatened by the dishonesty and dissipation of
players;" and that the players themselves had agreed to a reserve rule, making their claims of
"'bondage"'. "meaningless and absurd." As a result, the league "has no apology to make for
its existence, or for its untarnished record of fourteen years. It stands to-day, as it has stood
during that period, sponsor for the honesty and integrity of Base Ball." Id. at 173.
89. VoiGT, supra note 16, at 161 (quoting NEw YORK CLIPPER, Nov. 23, 1889).
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the rebellious leaders to the seamier side of the growing American labor
movement. 90
When this head-to-head competition between owners and players
moved to the courts, the players were the clear victors. In three cases,
owners were unsuccessful in attempting to prevent a major league star
from playing for a Players' League team. Two of the cases were filed by
New York, one in state court, the other in federal court, in an attempt to
prevent captain, and Players' League organizer John Ward, and future
Hall of Fame catcher Buck Ewing, from jumping to the new league.9'
The third case, filed in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, was by
Philadelphia of the National League against infielder Billy Hallman.92
All three of the cases involved virtually identical facts and theories.
Ward, Ewing, and Hallman's 1889 player contracts contained a provision
allowing the team to "reserve" each of them "for the next ensuing sea-
son" provided that their salary would not be less than in the 1889 con-
tract and provided further that each was one of fourteen (14) players
reserved by the club.93 In none of the agreements, however, did the "re-
90. There is a distinct parallel between the labor accomplishments of baseball players
from the founding of the National League until the Players' League and the rise of organized
labor generally. Depression followed the Civil War with the period between 1873 and 1879
being characterized by substantial wage reductions, high unemployment, and a diminution in
the popularity of organized labor. Compare SAMUEL GOMPERS, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE
AND LABOR; AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY xvi (1984). Beginning in the 1840s, an "anarchist" faction
developed within the labor movement that posed a constant threat to orderly organization of
workers; a threat that spilled into violence in the 1870s. See id. at 29-36. Gompers did not
approve of such violence. Thus, reference to ballplayers as "anarchists" would clearly cause
both union and non-union forces to disapprove of them. Id. at 34 (noting that the period
following violence was punctuated by repression of those thought to be involved).
As they would discover in the 1970s, the American laborer and the baseball player had a
great deal in common-both were "striving for minimum, and then increased, standards of
living, which impels various actions" of organized laborers. FORKOSCH, supra note 46, at 3.
91. Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1890); Metropolitan Exhi-
bition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
92. See Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Hallman, 8 Pa. Cty. Ct. Rep. 57 (1890). Hallman
played all of the infield positions, except catcher and pitcher, in his 15 year career, during
which he hit .277 in 1501 games. NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 98. However, another
source says he hit .276 in 1492 games. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19,
at 12-78.
93. Ewing, 42 F. at 200; Ward, 9 N.Y.S. at 782; Hallman, 8 Pa. Cty. Ct. Rep. at 61. The
"reserve" clause was first inserted into the individual player's contract in 1887 after a commit-
tee of players met with a committee of owners. Prior to that time, each player's contract
bound the player to the league-creating "national agreement" which contained the "reserve
clause." 42 F. at 203. This change was apparently made as a result of the meeting mentioned
in the text accompanying supra note 84.
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serve clause" indicate the terms of the 1890 contract.94
In both Ward and Hallman, the court found that the "reserve clause"
did not specifically set out the terms of the reserve year agreement. As a
result, the courts were asked to find a new agreement upon the same
terms as the prior one. Both courts indicated this result would have to
include a new "reserve clause" as there would be no basis for excluding
that paragraph while including all others. If the new contract incorpo-
rated a new reserve clause, then the player could be reserved indefinitely
on a year-to-year basis.95 At the same time, however, the team could
discharge the player for any reason, at any time, upon ten days' notice.
Such a reading would, according to the courts, violate the concept of
mutuality of remedy and specific performance could not, therefore, be
granted to the team.96 If the terms of the prior contract were not incor-
porated into the reserve year contract, then the reserve agreement had
94. 42 F. at 201; 9 N.Y.S. at 782; 9 Pa. Cty. Ct. Rep. at 61. As the Pennsylvania Court said:
"It would have been easy to have said 'upon the terms and conditions mentioned in the agree-
ment of 1888' but that was not said .... ." Id.
95. As stated by the Hallman court, the result of such a reading,
is that while the defendant has sold himself for life to the plaintiffs for $1400 per an-
num, if they choose to hold him for that length of time, he has no hold upon them for
any period longer than ten days. He is absolutely at their mercy, and may be sent adrift
at the beginning or in the middle of a season, at home or two thousand miles from it,
sick or well, at the mere arbitrary discretion of the plaintiffs, provided only they give
him the ten days' notice.
8 Pa. Cty. Ct. Rep. at 63. The New York court called this same scenario a "spectacle." Com-
pare 9 N.Y.S. at 783. Years later, however, the "arbitrary discretion" of the owners, this "spec-
tacle" would be an accepted fact in the United States Supreme Court.
The essence of [the reserve system] is that a player is bound to the club with which he
first signs a contract for the rest of his playing days. He cannot escape from the club
except by retiring, and he cannot prevent the club from assigning his contract to any other
club.
Flood, 407 U.S. at 290 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (emphasis added). Neither Flood, nor its pred-
ecessor Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465
(1922) mentions this discussion in either Ward or Hallman. Flood does, however, cite Ewing
to show that the reserve system had been in existence since 1887. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 259.
The owners would continue to argue this same theory until 1975, contending that when
a Club renews a Player's contract for the renewal year, the contract in force during that
year contains the "right of renewal" clause as one of its terms, entitling the Club to
renew the contract in successive years, to perpetuity, perhaps, so long as the Player is
alive ....
In re The 'Iwelve Clubs Comprising National League of Professional Baseball Clubs et als., 66
Lab. Arb. Rep. 101, 112 (1975) (Seitz). Arbitrator Peter Seitz acknowledged the holding of
early cases like Hallman and Ward refusing to enforce the negative covenant and then held
the reserve clause granted only a one year right to reserve, after which pitchers Andy Messer-
smith and Dave McNally became free agents. See id. at 104, 115-18.
96. See 9 N.Y.S. at 783-84; 8 Pa. Cty. Ct. Rep. at 62-63.
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no terms and thus was not of sufficient certainty to justify equitable in-
tervention.97 In either event, the baseball player, as laborer, maintained
the right to competitively shop his talents.
The federal court in Ewing had the benefit of the New York decision
in Ward and the Pennsylvania decision in Hallman and thus spent little
time reiterating that the team's contractual right to "reserve" did not
translate into a certain and definite contract.98 Seeking certainty instead
from the parties' "other contracts in respect to the same subject-mat-
ter,"99 the Ewing court looked to the National Agreement fixing the
common rights and obligations of all teams. Acknowledging that the
players were not parties to the National Agreement, the court indicated
the practical, yet indirect effect this agreement had on each player.100
Under the National Agreement, all player contracts were for one year
and were required to run for the seven month period between April 1
and October 31. Teams were allowed to reserve up to fourteen (14)
players then under a contract that would expire on October 31 by send-
ing the names of those players to all other clubs by October 10. No team
was permitted to contract with any player for the succeeding season
before October 20.101
As a result of this review, Ewing held the National Agreement did
not add necessary definition to the player contract's "reserve clause."
Instead, the court found, the National Agreement did just the opposite.
The "reserve rule" became operational on October 10, but it could not
define the terms of a player's contract, because those terms could not be
set until at least October 20 when a club could first enter into a contract
with the reserved player for the next season."° For the court, the re-
serve provision of Ewing's contract meant only that the team had the
exclusive right to negotiate with Ewing in an attempt to make a contract.
97. See 9 N.Y.S. at 782-83; 8 Pa. Cty. Ct. Rep. at 61-62.
98. Compare 42 F. at 201-202.
99. Id. at 202.
100. Id. at 202-203. Under the National Agreement, once a team "reserved" a player, all
other teams agreed they would not attempt to contract with that player. Further, if the "re-
served" player refused to report to the reserving club, the club could have the player placed
on the ineligible list, and no other club would contract with a player on this list. The court also
acknowledged, however, that prior to 1887, the provisions of the National Agreement were
incorporated into the standard player contract by a provision that obligated the player to all of
the conditions of the National Agreement and required the player to keep informed of the
provisions of that agreement. In 1887, at the insistence of the players, this general clause of
the player contract was eliminated, and the reserve provision at issue in the case was inserted.
Id. at 203.
101. Id. at 203-204.
102. Id.
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When coupled with the National Agreement, a player was coerced into
negotiating with the team, because he would be ineligible to contract
with other teams. As a matter of equity, however, the reserve clause was
no more than "a contract to make a contract if the parties can agree,"
and was not then capable of being specifically enforced. °3
The three player victories in the courts enabled the Players' League
to lure many baseball "stars," from the National League. With future
Hall of Famers like Hugh Duffy, Connie Mack, Buck Ewing, "Big Ed"
Delahanty, Charles Comiskey," and "King" Kelly," 5 the new league's
stars outclassed those of the National League.' 6 While neither the Play-
ers' League nor the National League kept accurate records of attend-
ance, at least one estimate showed the players outdrawing their former
owners 981,000 to 814,000.17
Having won the attendance battle'08 and with a winning record in the
103. Id. at 204.
104. Unions are designed, in part, to permit the labor-management relationship to be
based upon "personal" rather than "property" concepts. See WILLIAM FoRBATH, LAW AND
THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 136-137 (1991). Charles Comiskey, as
reported by his biographer, in giving up his position as manager of the St. Louis National
League franchise to join the Players' League, embodied this concept of unionism. Even
though he knew the Players' League was doomed to ultimate failure, he joined the new league
so as to maintain credibility with the other players. AXELSON, supra note 70, at 112-13. Co-
miskey only agreed to leave the Browns, however, when guaranteed he would go to a team in
Chicago. Ultimately, the site upon which Comiskey's Players' League team built its stadium
for its only year of operation would become the site used by Comiskey when he purchased his
American League team and ultimately the site for what became known as Comiskey Park. Id.
at 111. His incursion into the Players' League also brought Comiskey to the Spalding view
that players could not operate a league but instead needed a separate group of promoters to
run the financial side of the game. Compare id. at 113 with SPALDING, supra note 2, at 169.
105. Kelly also shared the "union" consciousness of people like Comiskey. See supra note
104. After signing with the Players' League, Kelly was offered a $10,000 signing bonus to re-
sign with the National League, plus a blank three year contract, to which Kelly was to add a
salary figure. After thinking about it, Kelly turned the money down, not because he did not
want the money, but, as he told Spalding "'I can't go back on the boys.'" Kelly then bor-
rowed $500 from Spalding. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 186-87.
106. The only major stars the National League was able to keep were Adrian "Cap" An-
son, who, with Spalding, owned a part of the Chicago team, PIEmUSZA, supra note 14, at 115,
and Harry Wright, the longtime player-manager. See VOIGT, supra note 16, at 164.
107. PiEmUsZA, supra note 14, at 121. See also Du~so, supra note 8, at 47. The actual
numbers were 980,887 for the Players' League, 813,678 for the National League and approxi-
mately 500,000 for the American Association. Id. These figures apparently come from both
the Daily Globe (Boston) and Reach's Official Base Ball Guide of 1891. See VoiGT, supra
note 16, at 166 n.29.
108. But see ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 57-58 (noting that the 1890 season was charac-
terized by low attendance in all leagues). "Confused and disgusted by three leagues, the vitu-
peration flying back and forth, and the numerous player desertions and additions, the
customers [had] stayed away in droves." Id. For the fan who maintained an interest in base-
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courts, the Players' League showed considerable promise.10 9 Players'
League owners soon found, however, that trying to compete with organ-
ized baseball was not worth the high cost.110 Unprepared to face an-
other season of mounting individual losses, the financial backers behind
the Players' League, in a series of October and November 1890 meetings
with National League owners, either sold out to, or consolidated with,
ball, however, tickets were apparently easy to obtain, for free, in bars and barber shops and
both National and Players' League teams financed free "Ladies Days" to attract support. See
VOIGT, supra note 29, at 213.
109. Members of the league thought the league itself so successful that at the end of the
1890 season, several of the League's financial backers purchased the Cincinnati team from its
National League owner for $40,000. PlTRnuszA, supra note 14, at 121.
110. Spalding was chair of a "War Committee" that worked on behalf of the National
League owners. Spalding used dramatic military metaphors to describe the league's battle
with the players. "No general ever planned campaign or conserved his forces with more
painstaking care than did the commanders of the League and Brotherhood warriors." SPALD-
ING, supra note 2, at 179. His actual account of casualties, however, is more general noting the
"Brotherhood war" "caused serious loss to promoters of the National League and wrought
ruin to the moneyed backers of the Brotherhood, while many Brotherhood players lost their
all in the venture." Id. at 177.
Other accounts are more specific showing the Players' League in trouble even by June of
the 1890 playing season when team owners were assessed $2,500 just to keep the league afloat.
Among the Players' League Teams, Pittsburgh drew almost no fans after opening day, on the
way to a 23-113 won-lost record. Buffalo was shored up when four players were given to the
club from other teams. Philadelphia was sold/rescued in July by two Philadelphia butchers.
At season's end, the Players' League Secretary reported losses among the clubs totalling
$125,000. PimTRuszA, supra note 14, at 118. Another report estimated the Players' League
loss at $340,000. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 57. Among National League teams, a preexist-
ing problem of low attendance in Washington and Indianapolis caused both of those teams to
quit the league, although Indianapolis owner John Brush was able to trade-up to a share of the
New York team that had also almost collapsed and had to be bailed out by money probably
supplied by Spalding and Brush. By the end of the season, the National League clubs had
losses of approximately $300,000. The American Association and other minor league clubs
were ravished by National League and Players' League attempts to sign players for "major"
league rosters. At least six minor leagues collapsed. There was almost constant discussion of
a merger between the Players' League and the American Association, with the merged entity
then being brought in under the National Agreement. PrETRUsZA, supra note 14, at 111-12,
118-20.
Some of the conflict was caused by the National League. When it first finished its schedule
for the 1890 season, the Players' League sent that schedule to the National League in an
attempt to avoid scheduling both National and Player's League games in the same cities on
the same day. Id. at 112. The National League, however, took this "war" "to be a fight to the
death," SPALDING, supra note 2, at 179, and the National League thus adopted its own sched-
ule competing with the Players' League in each city at every available opportunity. PIE-
TRUSZA, supra note 14, at 112.
Such intensity did produce its humorous moments. The New York National team (the
Giants) and their Players' League counterparts had stadiums adjoining each other on Coo-
gan's Bluff along the Harlem River in New York. On May 12, a Giant player hit a ball out of
his ballpark and into the outfield where the Players' League game was also being played,
resulting in roars of approval from fans in both ballparks. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 57.
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National League teams. By November 22, 1890, the Players' League no
longer existed."1 All Players' League players were absolved of any vio-
lations of baseball rules, and most were allowed to return to their origi-
nal National League or American Association teams." 2 Although the
111. Apparently flush with success from the purchase of the Cincinnati team, but also
aware of the financial losses suffered by the league's financial backers, Players' League orga-
nizer John Ward sought a meeting with National League owners for the purpose of gaining full
major league status for the new league. See PmTRuszA, supra note 14, at 121; see also VOIGT,
supra note 16, at 167 (indicating that following Ward's proposal for a truce under which the
Players' League would receive major league recognition, it was the National League owners
who initiated a meeting). Spalding claims the players came to him seeking a truce, which he
refused in the absence of a total surrender. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 181. What became
clear as October unfolded was that several of the Players' League owners wanted out. Three
of them met with Spalding and offered complete surrender, after which a group of three repre-
sentatives from the National League, the Players' League and the American Association be-
gan negotiations toward a peaceful resolution of the multi-league strife. The Players' League
delegation did not include any of the players who ran the league. When Ward and two other
players were thereafter added to the negotiating team, neither the National League nor the
American Association representatives would meet with a player-represented delegation. AL-
EXANDER, supra note 7, at 58; PIrRUSZA, supra note 14, at 123; VoIGT, supra note 16, at 167.
Spalding saw himself as a General Grant, dictating the terms of surrender to Robert E. Lee at
Appomattox. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 181-82.
Part of the problem for the Players' League financial backers was undoubtedly the conduct
of the players themselves. Throughout the season, the players had shown little discipline.
VoiGY, supra note 29, at 214. Comparisons with the already failed National Association of
Professional Base Ball Players would not be unwarranted, a fact not lost on Spalding who
claimed that the failure of the Players' League settled forever the proposition that players
could successfully operate a league. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 77.
When the dust settled, only Boston of the Players' League actually made money. Id. at
215. Buffalo, New York, and Pittsburgh all collapsed quickly after negotiations with the Na-
tional League began. By November only Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago were still in the
Players' League fold. Within ten days, Chicago had been sold into consolidation to Spalding
and by November 22, the league was evicted from its offices. Compare ALEXANDER, supra
note 7, at 58; PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 125-26; VOIGT, supra note 16, at 167-68.
112. The owners won such a complete victory over the players that "War Committee"
members like Spalding could afford to be "[m]agnanimous." VoIGT, supra note 16, at 168.
Even Ward was welcomed back into the league. VOIGT, supra note 29, at 215. The "reserve"
lists from the 1889 rosters of National League and American Association teams were sup-
posed to determine ownership rights to the players who jumped to the new league. ALEXAN-
DER, supra note 7, at 59. Disputes over rights to players were to be settled by a newly created
National Board, made up of the presidents of the three principal remaining leagues-the Na-
tional League, the American Association, and the Western Association. Id. at 59-60. One of
the problems that arose was the signing, by the National League, of infielder Louis Bierbauer
and outfielder Harry Stovey, both of whom had played for Philadelphia in the American As-
sociation in 1889. See PiETRuszA, supra note 14, at 127. Stovey was clearly the more impor-
tant player, having batted .404 in 1884 and A02 in 1887, thereafter finishing with a career
batting average of .320 in 1420 games. Bierbauer had a career average of .275 in 1380 games,
however, his best year was 1890, the year he jumped to Brooklyn of the Players' League, when
he hit .319. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 12-185, 12-14. One
author indicates both players were signed by Pittsburgh, while another indicates that
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American Association did not survive the Brotherhood dispute,113 the
reserve clause, in a slightly altered form,1 4 and the salary scale did,115
even with the players accepting the notion that baseball was no longer a
sport, but a business." 6
With no labor friction, baseball became something of a syndicated
Bierbauer was signed by Pittsburgh, while Stovey was signed by Boston. Compare Pm-
TRuszA, supra note 14, at 127 with ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 59-60. The latter report
seems more likely to be true as Stovey is listed as playing with Boston of the Players' League
in 1890 and Boston of the National League in 1891. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL,
supra note 19, at 12-185. In either event, however, the signing of these two players was appar-
ently legal, as Philadelphia had not reserved either after the 1889 season. PiErRUSZA, supra
note 14, at 127. These actions, however, led to increased tensions between the National
League and the American Association and led to the Pittsburgh team being decried as "pi-
rates," a name that quickly stuck. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 59-60.
113. During the war with the Players' League, rumors were rife of a possible consolida-
tion between the Players' League and the American Association. PmrRuszA, supra note 14,
at 120. Following the signing by the National League of two former Philadelphia association
players, see note 112, the Association refused to abide by the newly enacted National Agree-
ment, thereby rendering all Association players "free agents." ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at
60. The American Association, badly hurt financially in the Players' League war, was not able
to successfully compete for players. Id. The Association lost a battle for Cincinnati, which
had been awarded both National and American Association teams for 1891, when the Associ-
ation team was turned over to the league and moved to Milwaukee. PiETRusZA, supra note
14, at 127; ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 60-61. By the end of 1891, Baltimore, St. Louis,
Washington and Louisville were brought into the National League, although Washington was
brought in under new ownership. PiEmUszA, supra note 14, at 128. The remaining teams,
Boston (which had won the 1891 Association pennant), Philadelphia, Columbus, Cincinnati/
Milwaukee and Chicago were bought out for a total of about $135,000 split among the 12
teams in the newly combined National League and American Association of Professional
Baseball Clubs. See id.; ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 62. Thereafter, yet another National
Agreement was signed, this one for the first time incorporating a draft that designated minor
league teams as either "A" clubs, from whom the major league could draft players, or "B"
clubs, from whom "A" clubs could draft players. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 62-63.
Although there was talk of reviving the American Association, first in 1894 and then again
in 1899, both attempts were unsuccessful. See PIETRUsZA, supra note 14, at 128-144.
114. It was now called an "option to renew." VoIGT, supra note 16, at 168. A similar type
contract would later be used by Organized Baseball while fighting the Federal League, dis-
cussed infra beginning with text at note 156. Under such an "option to renew," part of the
player's salary was paid as consideration for the option the player gave the club to reserve the
player for an additional season, under the same terms and conditions as previously existed.
Compare American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 9-10 (Sup. Ct.
1914), discussed infra beginning at text accompanying note 198.
115. Voicr, supra note 29, at 215. The salary scale actually became a reality in 1892 after
the demise of the American Association, when a salary ceiling was placed at $2400. ALEXAN-
DER, supra note 7, at 63.
116. See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 58. Player-manager-league organizer Ward was
quoted following the demise of the Players' League as writing that the player "is not a sport-
ing man. He is hired to do certain work, and do it well." VoIGT, supra note 29, at 215.
The death of the Players' League represented the last significant attempt by players to
organize on their own until the 1970s. See VOIGT, supra note 16, at 168. The players had been
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trust, with the owners its "magnates.""' 7 The game, however, was not
entirely profitable. Unfortunately, these "magnates" did not think about
dividing their twelve team league to produce the kind of post-season
championship that had previously been held with the American Associa-
tion.1 8 Attempts to split the season and to have both half winners meet
for a championship met with claims of slack play against the first half
winner." 9
By the end of the decade, without a winning team in New York, pro-
fessional baseball struggled to survive. 20 While the press claimed the
National League suffered from feudal owners who could not tolerate any
central management,12 ' Spalding claimed that it was the Spanish Ameri-
can War in 1898 that caused economic conditions to change. It made the
supported in their efforts by the Central Labor Union of New York. Id. at 162. For further
efforts to organize, see SMITH, supra note 14, at 400-406.
The baseball guides of the time indicated the post-Players' League status of the players:
"'Bondage come back from the echoless shore, [a]nd bring me my shackles I formerly
wore.'" See VoiGr, supra note 16, at 168 (quoting SPALDING'S OFICIAL BASE BALL GUIDE
44-45 (1891)). Some teams cut player's contracted-for salaries, at times during the season.
SMrrH, supra note 14, at 399. This despite the fact that organized baseball enjoyed an ex-
tremely profitable 1893 season. By the end of 1893, the $135,000 debt to former American
Association teams was paid, and a $25,000 surplus secured. With but the exception of a couple
of teams that broke even, all of the teams made money, despite a generally poor national
economy. PiETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 128.
117. Problems associated with multiple team ownership began to surface after the Play-
ers' League collapse. See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 60-61. By 1900, one estimate of own-
ership of seven of the teams appeared as follows:
Cinn. N.Y. Bstn. Brklyn. Balt. Clev. Chi. St.L.
J.T. Brush XX XX
A. Soden XX XX
F.A. Abel XX XX XX
F. H. Robison XX XX
H. Vanderhorst XX XX
N. Hanlon XX XX
C. Ebbets XX XX
A. Spalding XX XX
PIEmUSZA, supra note 14, at 134-35. Baseball historian Harold Seymour called the era "syn-
dicate ball" because of the interlocking directorships of the various clubs. SEYMOUR, supra
note 8, at 15-16.
118. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 63.
119. Id. Such charges were aided by the extent of cross-ownership, as discussed in note
117, supra.
120. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 69. This was as opposed to "semi-pro" baseball, all of
the noncollege adult teams around the country, from those playing in sandlots, to those organ-
ized by resort hotels whose players were nominal waiters and busboys, and full time players.
Id. at 70-71.
121. Id. at 76.
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game less profitable' 22 and caused owners to reduce the league to eight
teams following the 1899 season. Gone were financially ailing franchises
in Louisville, Cleveland, Baltimore, and Washington. 23 The press
thought it might be time for a new league.' 24
VI. Tim AMERICAN LEAGUE
Two individuals who evidently agreed with the press assessment were
Ban Johnson, then president of the Western League,125 and Charles Co-
miskey, then the Cincinnati National League team manager.126 While
122. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 187-88.
123. See id. at 188; Pm'rRUszA, supra note 14, at 134.
124. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 76.
125. The Western League was the third participant in the National Agreement signed
following the death of the Players' League. It was actually a midwestern league made up of
teams from Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and
(in 1900 only) New York. Its final league standings from the years 1894-99 are contained in
PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 335-37. The president of the Western League was former law
student-former sports writer Ban Johnson who, despite the lackluster performance of major
league baseball during the 1890s generally, made the Western League a financial success,
largely by providing the strong leadership the National League lacked. See ALEXANDER,
supra note 7, at 76. While a sports writer in Cincinnati, Johnson first met then Cincinnati
player Charles Comiskey. See AXELSON, supra note 70, at 126-27. During the life of the
Players' League, Johnson also met Al Johnson who, along with his brother, the mayor of
Cleveland, had made a lot of money in the streetcar business. See PI~mUsZA, supra note 14,
at 105. Al Johnson became a prime financial backer of the Players' League. when the Play-
ers' League purchased the Cincinnati National League club, see supra note 109, Al Johnson
was one of the purchasers. After the Players' League folded, Al Johnson wanted to own the
Cincinnati team, however John Brush, the owner of the Indianapolis Western Association
team, persuaded the league to award Cincinnati to Brush, expelling Al Johnson's team.
Thereafter, Ban Johnson often criticized Brush for absentee ownership, ultimately causing
Brush to withdraw Ban Johnson's press pass to Cincinnati games. EUGENE C. MURDOCK,
BAN JOHNSON CZAR OF BASEBALL 21, 28-29 (1982). When Cincinnati manager Comiskey
suggested Ban Johnson as a potential president of the Western League, Brush was presented
with an opportunity to keep Johnson away from Cincinnati. AXELSON, supra note 70, at 126-
27. The Western League had started as the Northwestern League in 1879 and had been finan-
cially strapped from the outset. It played no seasons in 1880-1882 and 1885. In 1888, it be-
came the Western Association, again without great financial success. In 1892, it changed its
name to the Western League, but was only able to continue operations until July 4. MUR-
DOCK, supra at 30.
Comiskey was not an immediate owner in the League although it was he, along with John-
son, who conceived a revived association. Id. at 31. Comiskey's managerial contract with
Cincinnati did not end until 1894 and, although Brush offered him a new, financially lucrative
contract to continue managing, Comiskey sought and was awarded the Sioux City Western
League franchise in November, 1884. AXELSON, supra note 70, at 128-29; MuDocK, supra
at 33. He moved it to St. Paul after a Western League committee had determined that St. Paul
was a good site for baseball. Id.
126. Johnson biographer Eugene Murdock indicates that ideas for restructuring the West-
ern League may have been conceived over drinks by Johnson and Comiskey, but were more
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the National League faltered during the 1890s, the Western League grew
to the position of being "the best-run circuit in Organized Baseball."'127
likely an outgrowth of a scouting trip Comiskey took in the South following the 1893 season.
During the trip, Comiskey met owners of both Toledo and Kansas City of the Western
League, who told of the ill fated 1892 season, but of their plans to make an attempt to revive
the league in 1893. Comiskey evidently suggested Johnson as a likely president for the revived
league. MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 31. Comiskey biographer G.W. Axelson indicates that
the League was an outgrowth of Comiskey's secret desire to return to Chicago following the
collapse of his brotherhood team. "To locate [in Chicago] meant everything to the minor
league magnate. Chicago was the pivot of the American League venture." Axelson also
claims that Comiskey wanted a second major league team from the outset. AxELsoN, supra
note 70, at 141-43.
127. MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 39. After a successful 1894 season, Johnson was con-
vinced that he should go back into newspaper reporting. Before he was able to submit his
resignation at the league's annual meeting, however, he learned that John Brush was trying to
block reappointment of Johnson for a subsequent term. This caused Johnson to change his
mind and seek to retain the job and he was reelected without a dissenting vote. Id. From the
1894 through 1899 seasons, Johnson was able to withstand numerous problems that might
have jeopardized other leagues. Among them were attempts to oust him from the league's
leadership. Id. at 32-33. Johnson had overcome difficulties with the National League's draft-
ing practices. See id. at 34-38. Drafting was the way the National League took players from
lower leagues, including the Western League. In 1894, the National League paid $500 to the
lower league club whenever a player was "drafted" from the lower club's roster; a figure that
was raised to $1,000 in 1895 and then lowered back to $500. The effect on the Western League
was sometimes catastrophic because teams in the National League were allowed to take all of
the good players previously developed by the Western League. Worse, when drafted players
were no longer needed in the National League, they were sent back to leagues like the West-
ern, but to different teams, thus doubling the harm done. The only team that did not feel the
pinch caused by drafting was Indianapolis, owned by major league owner Brush. Brush con-
tinually "farmed" his players from one club to the other depending on what was needed. See
id. As a result, Indianapolis won the Western league in 1895, 1897, and 1899 and finished
second in 1896 and 1898. PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 335-37.
Another problem for Johnson were attempts to disband the league. See MURDOCK, supra
note 125, at 37-38. In 1896, Johnson nemesis Brush tried to set up a trust within the league, by
combining with the then Minneapolis owner to control four league teams. This plan failed,
but Brush then tried to have the National Board, in control of baseball under the National
Agreement, refuse to recognize four Western League teams, and recognize instead four
Brush-controlled franchises in the same cities. Johnson and his attorney, Philadelphia part
owner John Rogers, convinced the National Board that the decision as to whom franchises
should be awarded in league cities was really an issue of internal Western League concern and
that the National Board should not become involved. Johnson continuously attempted to
back his umpires against rowdy fans and players, but numerous efforts to rigidly control disci-
pline were unsuccessful. See MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 39-41. Fmally, Johnson overcame
disputed player claims within the league. Id. at 32.
As a result, even A.G. Spalding recognized Johnson as "one of the ablest and most consis-
tent Base Ball men the game has ever produced." SPALDING, supra note 2, at 188. One of the
more astute abilities of Johnson was his ability to bring investors into his league. As Comis-
key's biographer indicates in discussing Johnson's discovery of Charles W. Somers of Cleve-
land: "Somers was a baseball fan in Cleveland-one of those enthusiasts who went to bed
with a baseball guide under his pillow. In addition... Mr. Somers had a bank account which,
at this juncture, was of great importance." AXELSON, supra note 70, at 143. Somers had made
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When the National League jettisoned Baltimore, Washington, Louis-
ville and Cleveland following the 1899 season, Johnson and Comiskey
were poised to raise their league from minor to major league status.' z
First, in 1900 the name was changed from Western to American League
and the league moved into direct competition with the National League
in Chicago.12 9 In addition, in 1900, the American League moved into the
National League's vacated city of Cleveland. 3 ° As a result, during the
1900 season, the American League had teams in Chicago, Cleveland, In-
dianapolis, Detroit, Buffalo, Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Minneapo-
lis.' 3 ' The league, however was not considered a major league.
his money in coal and would eventually fund American League baseball clubs in Cleveland,
Boston, Chicago and Philadelphia. PIErRuszA, supra note 14, at 148.
128. See AXELSON, supra note 70, at 136-43. Contrary to the opinions of some sportswrit-
ers who claim that Johnson and Comiskey simply took advantage of existing business condi-
tions to form the American League, or that their move was designed to prevent the formation
of a new American Association, or Spalding's claim that the American League came into
existence because of certain National League owner's attempts to create a baseball "trust,"
Comiskey biographer Axelson indicates that Johnson and Comiskey had always intended the
American League to rival the National, but were simply waiting for the right moment. Id.
Johnson biographer Murdock agrees in principal by stating that "Johnson always believed that
the country could support two big leagues and that the larger cities could support two teams."
MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 44. The balance of Murdock's commentary suggests, however,
that Johnson and Comiskey took advantage of the blunders of the National League owners.
Id. at 43-45.
129. Comiskey considered Chicago to be the "hub" of the American League, as league
headquarters was there (as had been the headquarters of the predecessor Western League).
AXELSON, supra note 70, at 136-37. As a result, while he negotiated with James Hart, the
president of Chicago's National League team for the right to move an American team into
Chicago, Comiskey had already rented a playing field for his team, Id. at 139, thus adding
credence to the notion that the American League had long been planned as a rival major
league, peaceably if possible, through war if necessary. See id. at 142. Ultimately, Hart and
Comiskey agreed that Comiskey could bring his St. Paul team to Chicago provided he built his
stadium on the south side of town, near the stockyards, and provided that his use of the name
"White Sox," was not prefaced by the city name "Chicago." MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 44;
see also PiERuszA, supra note 14, at 150.
130. This was also part of an agreement between Johnson and James Hart of the Chicago
Nationals. Johnson agreed to respect the National Agreement and to pay cash for improve-
ments to the stadium in Cleveland, and further agreed to allow Hart to select two players per
year. PmTRUSZA, supra note 14, at 150; see also MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 44. Johnson
had, however, made it clear that he was prepared to abandon the National Agreement if he
did not get permission to make these moves. AXELSON, supra note 70, at 136.
The Grand Rapids team of the Western League moved into Cleveland. MURDOCK, supra
note 125, at 44.
131. See PiETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 150. The not-to-be-called "Chicago" White Sox
won the league, finishing ahead of the Milwaukee Brewers, Indianapolis Hoosiers, Detroit
Tigers, Kansas City Blues, Cleveland Spiders, Buffalo Bisons, and Minneapolis Millers. Id. at
33.
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Following the 1900 season, several factors coalesced to change that
status:
First, the former Western League's five year ascent to the National
Agreement expired on October 20, 1900.132 With a change in name to
the American League and expansion into Chicago and Cleveland, its
role within the structure of Organized Baseball had to change. Johnson,
in an effort to accomplish this change, thus purposefully neglected to
sign the agreement for another year.133
Second, ongoing talk of a revived American Association continued
throughout the late 1890s and into 1900.134 This threat of a new rival
allowed Johnson to buttress his plan to move the American League east-
ward under the guise of refusing to sign an extension of the National
Agreement. 35
The National League simply ignored Johnson's threat to move into
eastern cities and instead began to align with a revived American/"Na-
tional" Association. As a result, Johnson eliminated Kansas City, Min-
neapolis, and Indianapolis for the 1901 season and moved into Baltimore
and Washington, neither of which had a major league team, and Phila-
delphia, which had the National League Phillies. Additionally, Buffalo
moved into the Eastern League and the American League started a new
team in Boston, again in direct competition with the National League. 36
132. See MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 44-46.
133. AxELsON, supra note 70, at 144-45; PierRuszA, supra note 14, at 153.
134. Adrian "Cap" Anson, then retired, was elected president of a reorganized Associa-
tion in 1899, although the league did not really form until September 1900. MURDOCK, supra
note 125, at 45. This version of the Association was clearly the brainchild of Sporting Life
publisher Francis Richter. In his magazine, Richter took on the American League, claiming
that only three of the league's eight clubs (Chicago, Milwaukee, and Kansas City) had actually
made money during the 1900 season. This was important because Richter's new league
planned to put teams in two of those cities, Chicago and Milwaukee. See PIErRUSZA, supra
note 14, at 154-55. Richter organized a six league team in September, 1900 and planned to
field teams in Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, and St. Louis, in addition to Chicago and Mil-
waukee. Id. at 154. Few, however, gave this league much chance of success. See MURDOCK,
supra note 125, at 45; PiETRuszA, supra note 14, at 154-55.
135. In a November 1900 letter to the National League, Johnson wrote: "For two years we
have been menaced by the possible formation of a league hostile to our interest and detrimen-
tal in many ways to Organized Baseball. This annual agitation is hurtful and we propose to
shape our organization as to check it in the future." PaTRuszA, supra note 14, at 154.
136, See MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 46; PirRUszA, supra note 14, at 155-56. The
move to Washington was actually made by Kansas City team owner James Manning, so the
Kansas City club was not actually disbanded, but transferred. MURDOCx, supra note 125, at
46. Legendary baseball figure John McGraw was awarded the Baltimore franchise and now
familiar baseball names Ben Shibe and Connie Mack were given the Philadelphia franchise.
The real financial backing in Philadelphia, however, was Cleveland's Charles Sommers, who
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The third factor leading to the upgrading of the American League
from minor to major league status was labor turmoil within the National
League. Lingering player grievances over baseball's $2400 salary cap
and excessive fines fanned the flames, as did the major league practice of
"farming" players to the minors, where salaries could be lowered despite
the fact that the player was still tied to the team. 37 The players once
again sought to organize and, in June 1900, formed the Protective Asso-
ciation of Professional Baseball Players (PAPB), electing Pittsburgh
catcher "Chief" Zimmer President and Chicago pitcher Clark Griffith
Vice President. 38 The union soon attracted over 100 players as mem-
bers from the National, American and Eastern Leagues. Perhaps be-
cause baseball's laborers had not generally considered themselves
unionists, 39 or perhaps because of the failure of the Players' League, the
PAPB refused support from labor leader Samuel Gompers. 4 ° While this
new baseball players' union did not initially favor the American League,
the very fact of labor strife within organized baseball allowed Johnson to
curry favor with the players. By February, 1901, Johnson had agreed to
the PAPB proposed players' contract that permitted the ten day clause
also became the President of the Boston franchise. See Pi=rnUSZA, supra note 14, at 157-159;
see also MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 46.
137. See PiTRuszA, supra note 14, at 161-62. The "farming" problem can be seen in the
later case of, Baseball Players' Fraternity, Inc. v. Boston American League Baseball Club, 151
N.Y.S. 557 (App. Div. 1915), aff'd, 117 N.E. 1061 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1917). Pitcher Kurt Hage-
man was under contract to the Boston American League Club at a salary of $400 per month.
151 N.Y.S. at 558. Ultimately, Hageman pitched in a total of 32 major league games for Bos-
ton during 1911-12, and St. Louis and Chicago of the National League in 1914. His record was
3-7 with an earned run average of 3.08. NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 114. After playing
for Boston in 1912, Hageman was assigned to Jersey City, a minor league team, although he
was paid the same salary. Later, Boston sold its option to recall Hageman from Jersey City to
Denver, another minor league club, and told Hageman that he would have to make a new
contract with Denver. Denver also purchased Boston's right to reserve Hageman. Denver
offered him only $250 per month and Hageman refused. He reported for duty to Boston, to
whom he claimed he was under contract and, when he was not paid, he sued to collect the tvo
months salary remaining on his contract. This claim was ultimately assigned to the plaintiff
protective association. 151 N.Y.S. at 558, 563. By the time of this case, major league rules had
changed and Hageman could not be assigned to a minor league club until he had been offered
on waivers to all other major league teams and refused. As a result, the players' fraternity was
successful in its suit against the Boston team. Id at 562-63. Prior to the merger of American
and National leagues, however, the action by Boston in assigning Hageman to Denver and
requiring him to make a new contract for less money with Denver would have been permitted.
Compare PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 161-62.
138. PrETRuszA, supra note 14, at 162.
139. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 170. "[T]he ball player flinches from unionism be-
cause its blue-collar connotations might detract from the public's and his own viev of him-
self." Id.
140. PimuszA, supra note 14, at 162.
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to apply to both player and team, prohibited "farming" without the
player's consent, created health benefits for players, and adopted an ar-
bitration board for player disputes.14 1 At the same time, Johnson
claimed the American League would not sign players until after their
contracts with National League teams had expired. Because Johnson be-
lieved, however, that the "reserve" clause was illegal, American League
clubs were permitted to sign players whose only tie to their National
League team was the "reserve" claim of the National League team.142
Whatever their decision about when to sign players, the fact is that
American League owners did sign National Leaguers to American
League contracts, thus prompting another round of lawsuits by organ-
ized baseball.
Because Philadelphia was one of the cities of direct competition be-
tween the National and American Leagues, it was natural that it should
be a focal point of attention for National League owners and lawyers. 143
When, under cover of darkness, Clark Griffith stole into Philadelphia
and signed future Hall of Famer Napoleon Lajoie away from the Phillies
to a Philadelphia A's contract, the American League gained almost in-
stant respectability.144 In what was considered a test case of the enforce-
ability of player contracts, 45 Philadelphia's National League Phillies
sought injunctive relief preventing Lajoie and others signed by Griffith
from playing with the rival A's. The case was heard in April 1901, with
Lajoie arguing that the reserve rule was unenforceable and the Phillies
arguing the clause as essential to the existence of professional baseball.
In May, the trial court denied injunctive relief, thus allowing Lajoie to
play for the A's, 46 and opening the floodgates for other National Leagu-
141. See MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 47; PmTgvszA, supra note 14, at 162-63.
142. MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 47-48.
143. It was believed the battle for recognition would be won or lost in Chicago and Phila-
delphia, the cities that had both a National and American League club. See id. at 48.
144. Id. Also signed from the Phillies for the A's were pitchers Bill Bernhard and Charles
Fraser. Lajoie had batted .328, .363, .328, .380, and .346 in his previous seasons with the Phil-
lies. In 1897, he was the league's home run champion. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASE-
BALL, supra note 19, 2-50 at 12-107. He was elected with the second class to the Hall of Fame
in 1937. NEPt & COHEN, supra note 7, at 628. Bernhard had a combined pitching record of
20-16 with the Phillies during the 1899 and 1900 seasons, his first two in major league baseball.
Fraser, who had played from 1896-1898 with Louisville and Cleveland of the National League
before moving to Philadelphia in 1899 had a record of 37-23 during 1899 and 1900 with the
Phillies. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 13-9, 13-43.
145. MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 48.
146. Id.
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ers to join the American League.14 7 Again, competition meant higher
salaries for the players and greater bargaining power for the fledgling
players' association. 48 The American League's euphoria was, however,
somewhat short-lived.
Playing for Hall of Fame manager Connie Mack in 1901, Lajoie won
the American League's triple crown, batting .426, amassing 125 runs bat-
ted in and hitting 14 home runs.149 His outstanding 1901 season may
have been his undoing in court, however, because in April, 1902, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania overturned the lower court and ruled
that Lajoie's talents were unique, thus meeting one of the elements of
the Phillies' suit seeking specific performance. 50
Turning to "mutuality," the supreme court noted that Lajoie's con-
tract was one negotiated for three years, and provided for renewal on six
147. PIurRUszA, supra note 14, at 163-64 (reporting that somewhere between 92-111 of
the 182 players who played in the American League during 1901 were former National
League players).
148. See NEar & COHEN, supra note 7, at 12. Lajoie, who had been making $2600 with
the Phillies, was paid either $4000 or $5000 to play for the A's. More importantly, the entire
amount was placed on deposit in a bank and available to Lajoie through two friends. When
Lajoie was later sold to the Cleveland American League team, see text accompanying note 164
infra, he was guaranteed a salary of either $25,000 for 3 or $30,000 for 4 years. PmTRusZA,
supra note 14, at 164. Even choosing the lower $30,000 over 4 year figure, as a direct result of
competition for his services, Lajoie's salary increased from $2,600 in 1900 to $7,500 in 1903, his
first full year with Cleveland, an increase of 288%.
The PAPB "fizzled out" when the American and National Leagues merged. SEYMOUR,
supra note 8, at 170.
149. PIrRUsZA, supra note 14, at 164. He also led the league in runs (145), hits (232 in
136 games), doubles (48), total bases (350), on-base percentage (.451), and slugging percent-
age (.643). Id. at 337. His batting average of .422 ranks second to Rogers Hornsby's .424 for
the St. Louis Cardinals in 1924 in all time season high batting averages. See NEFr & COHEN,
supra note 7, at 646.
150. The trial court had found that Lajoie could be considered "unique" only if his serv-
ices were such as "to render it impossible to replace him." Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie,
202 Pa. 210, 216, 51 A. 973, 973 (1902). The supreme court found this view to be "extreme,"
finding instead that Lajoie had played for the Phillies for several years and had thus become
familiar with the "action and methods of the other players in the club." 202 Pa. at 217, 51 A.
at 974. It was found that Lajoie's work itself was "peculiarly meritorious." Id. Finally,
Lajoie is well known, and has great reputation among the patrons of the sport, for
ability in the position which he filled, and was thus a most attractive drawing card for
the public. He may not be the sun in the baseball firmament, but he is certainly a
bright, particular star.
Id. As a result, the court defined uniqueness as services that "are of such a unique character,
and display such a special knowledge, skill and ability as renders them of peculiar value to the
plaintiff, and so difficult of substitution that their loss will produce irreparable injury, in the
legal significance of the term, to the plaintiff." Id. Under such conditions, those services
would not be capable of redress by money damages, and, as a result, equitable intervention
would be justified. Id.
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month intervals.'' As such, the agreement was different than player
contracts in earlier cases for two reasons.
First, the contract was nonstandard because it gave the Philadelphia
club an option to renew for the 1901, 1902, and 1903 seasons, instead of
the regular one year renewal.'5 2 As a result, the question before the
court was not whether to renew a prior completed agreement with un-
certain terms. The issue in Lajoie was the equities of the parties to an
agreement "partially executed by services rendered."'1 53' Because the
team had fully performed and changed its position in reliance on the
performance of the superb second baseman, the court found it "inequita-
ble to permit the defendant to withdraw from the agreement at this late
date.' 1 54 As a result of this nonstandard right of renewal, the court con-
cluded that Lajoie had "deliberately accepted" the terms of the
agreement. 55
Second, the "reserve" clause itself was different than those at issue in
earlier cases. Under paragraph 18 of the agreement, the right to reserve
was a part of Lajoie's consideration, for which Philadelphia in turn
agreed "to pay him for his services ... the sum of $2400."'151 While the
contract thus looked harsh because it gave the club the right to terminate
on ten days' notice, and gave the player no right to terminate, the court
concluded that "the fact of this concession to the plaintiff is distinctly
pointed out as part of the consideration for the large salary paid to the
defendant .... 11 As a result, the court found the provisions to have
been bargained for by the parties and, when coupled with specific con-
tractual authority to enjoin Lajoie from playing elsewhere, the court
looked only to whether there was any showing of an attempt to over-
reach by the Club. 58 The fact that the court found no "indications of...
unfairness,"'15 9 probably means the court did not understand this new
"option to renew"-type reserve clause and that its negative impact was
not effectively argued. The legendary Ty Cobb, however, later explained
the significance of this clause:
151. 202 Pa. at 218, 51 A. at 974.
152. See id.
153. Id. As a result, "the situation is not now the same as when the contract was wholly
executory," as would have been the case when the formal contract expired and a single "re-
serve" year contract was about to spring into existence. Id.
154. 202 Pa. at 219, 51 A. at 974.
155. 202 Pa. at 218, 51 A. at 974.
156. Id.
157. 202 Pa. at 219, 51 A. at 975.
158. 202 Pa. at 219, 222, 51 A. at 975-76.
159. 202 Pa. at 222, 51 A. at 976.
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Now an option contract was issued by the AL and NL by which
the player reserved his own services to his team for the following
season, and paid for the reservation out of his salary. By signing,
the player tacitly agreed to put himself on option (the club's op-
tion, not his), and so rendered the courts unable to act. As
smooth as goose grease was this agreement, and few players un-
derstood the number of rights they signed away.1 60
Consideration for the option, then, was the salary the player would
otherwise have been paid to play baseball, even without the option.
That Lajoie's option agreement might lack consideration or be otherwise
equitably unfair was apparently not raised.
Following remand to the trial court,'161 Lajoie was enjoined from
playing for another team during the term of his agreement with the Phil-
lies. 6a What was considered a "great victory" for the National
League, 163 however, was short-lived, both practically and legally.
As a practical matter, when it was determined that an action alleging
violation of the injunction would have to be filed in Pennsylvania, Con-
nie Mack sold Lajoie to the American League Cleveland Bronchos, who
guaranteed Lajoie $25,000 for three seasons. Attempts by the Phillies to
have the Ohio courts enforce the Pennsylvania injunction failed, and La-
joie played in all American League cities except Philadelphia."6
As a legal matter, the Lajoie victory caused the National League to
institute two other suits. 65 The courts in both cases, however, did not
concur in the Lajoie precedent.
160. TY COBB & AL STuMP, My Lnwn IN BASEBALL: THE TRUE RECORD 108 (1961).
161. Lajoie, 202 Pa. at 222, 51 A. at 976.
162. PiXrRuszA, supra note 14, at 164.
163. Id.
164. kd at 164-65. Following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling, Charles Fraser re-
signed with Philadelphia, while Bernhard, Lajoie and another affected Phillie, Elmer Flick,
were unable to reach agreement with the Phillies. Compare id. with MURDOCK, supra note
125, at 54. It is said that the deal with Cleveland was made to repay Cleveland owner Charles
Sommers' financial assistance in starting the Philadelphia A's. Even Ban Johnson's biogra-
pher notes, however, how strange it was for two future Hall of Famers (Lajoie and Flick, who
was elected by the Committee on Veterans in 1963, NEnr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 628) to
go from the A's to Cleveland, with Philadelphia getting virtually nothing in return. MURDOCK,
supra note 125, at 54. Lajoie's contract was guaranteed at either $25,000 for three years or
$30,000 for four. Pmr~uszA, supra note 14, at 164. After this sale, when Cleveland came to
play the A's in Philadelphia, the police tried to intercept Lajoie when the team train arrived,
but Lajoie alertly left the train in advance of police arrival. Id. at 165. The efforts of Lajoie
(playing 86 games), Flick (playing 110 games), and Bernhard (17-6 record in 27 games) took
Cleveland from a 7th place 55-82 record in 1902 to a 5th place 69-67 record in 1902. See id. at
338; NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 17. Philadelphia, however, even without these stars, won
the League. See id. at 16.
165. See MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 54.
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In an action filed by Brooklyn of the National League against James
"Deacon" McGuire, already a seventeen (17) year major league veteran
catcher, 166 the federal court rejected the National League club's request
for an injunction to prevent McGuire from playing with Detroit of the
American League.' 67 In a brief opinion, which did not mention the
holding in Lajoie, the court first believed itself obligated to follow
Supreme Court precedent and find a contract provision giving the owner
the right to terminate the contract on ten days' notice, with no reciprocal
right to the player, to be unenforceable in equity.168  Second, the court
indicated the club failed to prove that any breach by McGuire could not
be compensated by the legal remedy of damages. Without showing that
the player was so unique that his services could not be substantially per-
formed by another ballplayer, equity could not lend its aid. 69 In the
other action, St. Louis of the National League filed suit in Missouri state
court seeking to enjoin pitcher Charles Harper from playing for St. Louis
of the American League.170 While unclear from the opinion, it must be
assumed that Harper was under contract for the 1901 season, that the
166. See RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 12-126. McGuire
started with Toledo in the American Association in 1884 and then played with Detroit and
Philadelphia in the National League, Cleveland, Rochester and Washington in the American
Association, and Washington in the National League before joining Brooklyn in 1899. Even-
tually, he would play for Detroit, New York, Boston and Cleveland in the American League,
finishing his career in 1912 with a lifetime batting average of .279 in 1718 games, mostly at
catcher. Id. These numbers compare favorably with more well-known and Hall of Fame
catchers Yogi Berra (.285 in 2120 games), Roy Campanella (.276 in 1215 games), and Johnny
Bench (.276 in 2158 games). See NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 326, 327, 592.
167. Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, 116 F. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1902). See also MURDOCK,
supra note 125, at 54.
168. 116 F. at 782-83. The court found the decision in Rutland Marble Co. v. Ripley, 77
US. (10 Wall) 339, 19 L.Ed. 955 (1870) to be controlling. In that case Rutland sought to
enjoin Ripley from interfering with Rutland's right to quarry marble under a contract between
them. The defendant Ripley countersued for specific performance of the agreement. In deny-
ing specific performance to Ripley, the Court pointed to the fact that, under the contract,
Ripley had the right to abandon the deal for any reason, upon giving Rutland a years notice.
"And it is a general principle that when-from personal incapacity, the nature of the contract,
or any other cause-a contract is incapable of being enforced against one party, that party is
equally incapable of enforcing it specifically against the other.. . ." Id. at 359. The court in
McGuire found that although Rutland Marble had been questioned, it had not been overruled
and was therefore binding. 116 F. at 783.
169. Brooklyn Baseball Club, 116 F. at 783.
170. See American Base Ball & Athletic Exhibition Co. v. Harper, 54 Cent. L. J. 449 (St.
Louis Cir. Ct. 1902). While the case is styled "American Base Ball" club, it was indeed filed
by the National League Cardinals to prevent Harper from playing for the Browns. See MuR-
DOCK, supra note 125, at 54-55 (indicating that outfielder John Heidrick and infielder Bobby
Wallace were also named as having jumped to the American League). See also RONALD EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 12-83, 12-200.
[Vol. 5:1
1994] BASEBALL'S LABOR WARS
club exercised its reserve for 1902 and that Harper then signed with the
American League team.171 While it was agreed that Harper's contract
contained a negative covenant preventing him from playing for other
teams, it was not agreed that his services were unique. Unlike Napoleon
Lajoie, who won the triple crown after the trial court decided his services
were not unique, there was little evidence that Harper's abilities were at
all extraordinary. 17  As a result, the court found the evidence quite dif-
ferent from the evidence in Lajoie.173 In addition, there was no evidence
of independently agreed upon contractual provisions, such as existed in
Lajoie. In Harper, the team had its traditional ten day option to dis-
charge, and the player possessed no meaningful right to reciprocate be-
cause upon team breach and player suit, the team could discharge the
player and, therefore, its agreement. As a result, the court found the
contract lacked mutuality.174 Finally, the court found major league base-
ball owners to be engaged in a combination to fix salaries and control
the ticket prices of baseball. Any player contract only furthered that
171. See Harper, 54 Cent. L. J. at 450. "[D]efendant contracted to render services as a
base ball player for the season of 1901 to wit: From April 15 to October 15, 1902 ... ." Id.
(emphasis added). The logical way for the 1902 obligation to arise from the 1901 contract is
by the reserve clause. If there had been an express obligation, as in Lajoie, presumably the
opinion would have so stated.
172. See 54 Cent. L. J. at 450. Testimony came from a club bookkeeper, who testified as
an expert that Harper was a good drawing card for the team and that, in the early part of the
preceding year, he had won a number of games. Id. In fact, Harper had a record of 23-13
during the 1901 season, the best record on the club. See NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 15.
Two players testified that Harper had been "loaned" out for the 1899 season and that they had
only seen him in a couple of games in 1900. One player indicated that Harper appeared to be
pretty good, while the other player had no opinion. See 54 Cent. L. J. at 450. As discussed in
note 117, supra, through interlocking ownership, many of the National League teams were
linked. St. Louis was under common ownership with Cleveland, NEFr & COHEN, supra note
7, at 14, and that is where Harper pitched in 1899. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL,
supra note 19, at 13-54. In 1900, Harper had a record of 0-1 with St. Louis. Id. This testimony
is thus consistent with Harper's record. Therefore, Harper's record in 1901 was the only real
statistical analysis upon which to show that he was unique. There was greater 1901 statistical
evidence concerning the other two players, however. Heidrick, called "Snags," batted .339
and Wallace batted .322, second and third on the club behind Hall of Famer Jesse Burkett. See
NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 15, 628.
173. 54 Cent. L. J. at 450.
174. Id. In Lajoie, the court found the fact that the team was bringing the suit indicated
an absence of intention to discharge the player and that this somehow mitigated the effect of
the reserve rule. See, 202 Pa. at 221. The court also found that the flexible nature of an
equitable decree would permit amendment if the circumstances of the parties changed. Id. at
221-22. The judge in Harper did not find that merely bringing the suit indicated a waiver of
the right to discharge. Instead, the present suit could be brought to hurt the team signing
Harper, a competitor. 54 Cent. L. J. at 450. Additionally, the fact that the injunction could be
later modified would not place the player in the same position the player was in before the
injunction. Id.
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combination. If the combination was then illegal, the court could not
grant one of the members of the combination equitable relief.175 As did
the federal court in McGuire, the Harper court then denied injunctive
relief to the team, thus allowing the players to perform for the American
League team.
As a result of the ruling in the federal and Missouri courts, any supe-
riority gained by the National League by the Lajoie decision was lost.17 6
With court victories thus allowing it to continue to entice players away
from the National League, the American league won the battle for fan
appeal in 1902, outdrawing the National League by over 500,000 fans.177
When the American League then transferred the Baltimore club to New
York after the 1902 season, the success of the American League was
virtually complete. 178 While the National League made initial overtures
175. 54 Cent. L. J. at 450-51. In discussing the facts as a potentially illegal combination,
the court chose not to discuss Harper's other claim that the uniform contract, together with
the various league rules and regulations incorporated into it, was an unconscionable contract
and thereby against public policy. Id. at 450.
176. See MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 55. Following the 1901 season, even more players
deserted the National League, now in the throes of internal upheaval caused by an attempt to
set the league up as a true "trust," with former owners now owning a percentage of stock in a
unitary National League. See PImnMUSZA, supra note 14, at 168-174. Following the 1902 sea-
son, there were yet further defections from the National to American Leagues. Id. at 175.
177. See PIxrRUSZA, supra note 14, at 178. In 1901, the junior American League drew
1,683,584 while the National drew 1,920,031. In 1902, however, those numbers reversed, with
the American League drawing 2,206,457 and the National 1,683,012.
178. Prior to this transfer, at the end of the 1901 season, a struggling Milwaukee club was
transferred to St. Louis. John McGraw, part owner/full-time player-manager of the Baltimore
club, was a notorious rowdy who consistently thwarted Ban Johnson's attempts to eliminate
disruptive behavior on the field. Early in the 1902 season, Johnson suspended McGraw for
five games after McGraw allegedly incited a bleacher crowd to attack an umpire. See MUR-
DOCK, supra note 125, at 55. Following this suspension, McGraw was deliberately spiked in a
game with Detroit. When he came back to the line-up a month later, he got into meaningless
fights with both umpires, was ejected from the game and suspended indefinitely by Johnson.
Id. Thereafter, in exchange for forgiving a $7,000 loan to start the Baltimore club, and
purchase of his $6,500 in shares of the club by John Mahon, McGraw obtained his release
from the club and was named manager of the New York Giants of the National League. Id. at
56. He remained as Giants manager from 1902 through 1932. RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 1-50. McGraw's sale of his stock to Mahon was a tactical move.
Mahon was a Baltimore politician, co-stockholder of the club with McGraw, and father-in-law
of Baltimore outfielder Joe Kelley. After McGraw became manager of the Giants, Mahon,
now president of Baltimore, transferred his ownership interest to the attorney for the New
York Giants' owner and a series of player moves designed to strengthen the Giants and
weaken Baltimore were made. PimmuszA, supra note 14, at 159-160. The threat of a Na-
tional League owner's ownership of an American League team was a cause for concern to
Johnson. The player moves, however, left Baltimore with insufficient players to field a team, a
technical default that caused ownership of the club to be forfeited to the league on July 18,
1902. MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 56-57.
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toward returning to a twelve team league, Johnson immediately rejected
the idea, correctly confident that without his assent to the National
Agreement, his league would stand on its own.179
Peace was achieved between the National and American Leagues af-
ter the 1902 season. The owners prospered to the extent that, by 1910 it
was believed that an average major league team had gate receipts of
$382,000 annually. Player salaries were thought to deduct only $75,000
from that total and that other expenses, including a club President's sal-
ary of $25,000, amounted to $107,000 leaving an estimated annual team
profit of $200,000.1s° For the player as laborer, the peace was not so
beneficial. On one hand, players who violated the reserve clause of their
National League contracts were allowed to continue to play, with an Ar-
bitration Committee determining whether the player's rights belonged to
the National or American League club. On the other hand, the player
had no choice but to go to the team awarded the player by the Arbitra-
tion Committee. Additionally, if the player had received money from
the other club, that money had to be returned before the player would
be eligible. Finally, the National League's reserve rule remained, with
clubs in both leagues agreeing to honor it.'"
The merger of National and American Leagues put a temporary hold
on player jumping, and thus on the labor competitiveness of the baseball
player. That hold would continue until the Federal League began in
1912.
VII. THE FEDERAL LEAGUE
The Federal League surfaced in 1912 as the Columbian League, 8 2
During the early part of 1902, a group of three New Yorkers, one a noted gambler, the
second a noted bar owner, and the third a coal dealer, offered to purchase the Baltimore club
for $25,000 and built a stadium by removing rock and replacing it with fill dirt on a northern
Manhattan hill top. The Baltimore team was transferred and opened the 1903 season as the
New York Highlanders, with future Washington owner Clark Griffith as manager and former
Brooklyn outfielder and future Hall-of-Famer "Wee Willie" Keeler as its main attraction. PiE-
TRUszA, supra note 14, at 176-77.
179. PiETRuszA, supra note 14, at 179.
180. Id. at 183-84. The figures were supplied by The Sporting News.
181. PTrnuszA, supra note 14, at 179-181. This agreement also fixed the locations of the
teams in each league, a structure that would not change until the 1950s. The National League
would have teams in Boston, New York, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and
Cincinnati and the American League would field teams from Boston, New York, Philadelphia,
Washington, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, and St. Louis. Id
182. Id. at 193. The league had three teams: St. Louis, Cleveland, and Chicago.
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and suffered through a 1913 season with six (6) clubs.'8 3 While its foun-
ders believed the cities chosen were large enough to accommodate an-
other major league baseball team, the Federal League, like many of its
predecessors, was founded on the premise of respect for the contracts of
major league clubs. The league claimed it would sign only free agents,
although it was unwilling to respect the "reserve clause" of its major
league counterparts and was therefore willing to sign players whose con-
tracts had expired. 84
By 1914, however, the Federal League declared itself a "major"
league and competed head to head against major league teams in Brook-
lyn, Pittsburgh, Chicago, and St. Louis. 85 As the league gained momen-
tum, it gathered more financial backing'8 6 and attracted more major
league talent. For the baseball laborer, the new league again provided
competition giving players some freedom of contract and salary
leverage.
First, in contract terms, the Federal League employed a reserve
clause substantively different from those used by the National and
American Leagues. To invoke the clause, owners had to "reserve" play-
ers for the following season by September 15, had to agree to a salary
increase of at least five percent during the reserved year, and had to
unconditionally release or grant "free agency" to any player "upon ten
years Federal League service."' 8 7 This caused the American and Na-
tional Leagues again to use a renewal-type contract with its players.'88
The theory in using this clause was to give the impression of equity by
making it appear the club was paying actual consideration for the club's
option.'8 9 Some owners apparently thought that, like the contract nego-
183. Id. at 209. Teams originally included in the league's plan were Grand Rapids, De-
troit, Chicago, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Cincinnati, and Cleveland. By the time the league
actually got off the ground, however, cities changed so that the league actually opened 1913
with Chicago, Cleveland, Covington, Indianapolis, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. By July, Coving-
ton was transferred to Kansas City. d at 209-12.
184. Id. at 209.
185. See id. at 212; ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 102. In four other cities, Kansas City,
Indianapolis, Baltimore, and Buffalo, the Federal League competed against high level minor
league teams. PmrUSZA, supra note 14, at 212. This continued through the league's final
season in 1915.
During its three year tenure, the league employed some 264 players, 81 from the major
leagues and 140 from the minor leagues. Among those players, 18 breached major league and
25 minor league contracts, 63 transferred to the Federal League despite major league reserve
clauses and 115 transferred despite minor league reserve clauses. Id. at 227.
186. See, e.g., PIE'RuszA, supra note 14, at 217-220; SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 199-201.
187. PirnuszA, supra note 14, at 226.
188. Compare supra note 160 and accompanying text.
189. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 208-209.
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tiated by Napoleon Lajoie during the American/National League dis-
pute, 90 this agreement would meet any legal objections. 19'
Second, in terms of salary, the wealth of Federal League owners
caused salary competition and ultimately higher baseball salaries, a fact
criticized by supporters of organized baseball. 192 A comparison of pre-
and post-Federal League salaries of "twenty important players" showed
a ninety two percent (92%) increase in those players' salaries between
1913 and 1915.13
Once again, lawsuits resulted. Following the 1913 season, the Phila-
delphia National League team exercised its "reserve" over Bill Killefer,
a catcher. Killefer quickly rejected this "reservation" and signed a con-
tract for more money with Chicago of the Federal League. Within
twelve days, Killefer was offered yet more money with his original Na-
190. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
191. Seymour reports that Washington owner Clark Griffith was able to convince pitching
great Walter Johnson of the legality of this new provision. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 209; see
infra note 300.
192. See AXELSON, supra note 70, at 206-207.
193. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 206. The twenty players made a total of $76,350 in 1913
(an average of $3187). By 1915, those players made $146,550 (an average of $7327). Id.
Among some of the players who jumped to the Federal League, a comparison of major league
and federal league salaries shows the following:
Name Major League Salary Federal Salary
Joe Tinker $5,500 $12,000
Arthur "Vin" Campbell $3,200 $8,500
Claude Cooper $2,500 $7,500
Cy "Jinx" Falkenberg $4,000 $8,500
Benny Kauff $2,000 $7,500
Tom Seaton $2,600 $8,200
Hal Chase $6,000 $9,000
PmTRuszA, supra note 14, at 232.
Competition also hurt the minor leagues. One report indicates that some seventeen minor
leagues folded between 1913 and the conclusion of the 1915 season. One of the hardest hit
clubs was Baltimore in the International League, which, to generate income, was forced to sell
a 19 year old pitcher with some promise to Boston of the American League. The pitcher's
name-Babe Ruth. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 103-104.
Even players who did not change leagues benefitted from the general competition for ball-
players' services. 'Ty Cobb, who, in 1911, after winning his fourth consecutive batting title,
held out to have his salary raised from $4200 to $10,000, won three more batting titles but had
raised his salary only to $12,000 by the 1913 season when the Federal League became a threat.
See COBB & STUMP, supra note 160, at 103-106. Cobb received his increase to $12,000 only
after threat by United States Senator Hoke Smith of Cobb's home state of Georgia to investi-
gate organized baseball for violation of federal antitrust laws. Cobb was offered a guaranteed
$100,000, spread over three seasons, to sign with the Federal League. He refused, but the very
possibility of his defection enabled him to raise his contract with Detroit of the American
League to $15,000 per year for three years. Id. at 105-111.
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tional League Club and again signed with it.'94 The Federal League took
Killefer to court in an attempt to block his play in the National
League. 95 Finding that neither the Chicago Federal League team nor
Killefer had acted with clean hands, and finding that the contracts be-
tween Chicago and Killefer lacked mutuality, the court refused to pre-
vent Killefer from rejoining Philadelphia for the 1914 season. 96 As a
result of losing this case, the Federal League refused to continue its self-
imposed ban against raiding the National and American Leagues.' 97
On June 15, 1914, Hal Chase gave his employer, the Chicago Ameri-
can League team, ten days notice in writing that he would no longer
honor his 1914 player contract. 8 On June 20, Chase agreed to play the
balance of the 1914 season for Buffalo of the Federal League. 99 Despite
his later claim that he lost no ballplayers to the Federal League,20 0 Chi-
cago owner Charles Comiskey, on June 25, sought and obtained what
amounted to a temporary restraining order preventing Chase from play-
ing for Buffalo.20' As counsel for Chase, lawyers for the Federal
League 20 2 sought to dissolve the restraint. In deciding this issue, the
New York trial court referred to the general rule that an injunction could
issue to enforce a negative covenant in an employee's contract where the
employer had shown the employee's services to be unique or unusual.20 3
That Chase's abilities qualified as unique was clear from the fact that the
194. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 203-204.
195. Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich. 1914).
196. Id. at 170-73.
197. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 204-205. Agents of the Federal League attempted to
attract players in spring training and even as they returned to the United States from an all
star world tour. The Federal League money was enticing to many major. leaguers with long
standing financial grievances with owners. As noted by Ty Cobb:
[T]he fact was that the Feds could have salivated the American and National Leagues
had they only realized the advantage they held. Players by the score were anxious tojump. The Feds could have picked off almost every star in the game-we were that
sore at our bosses and the contracts they bonded us to.
ConB & STUmp, supra note 160, at 107.
198. See American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 7-8 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1914).
199. Id. at 8.
200. AXELSON, supra note 70, at 207-208.
201. PixruszA, supra note 14, at 231. Buffalo evidently knew about the temporary in-junction because it tried to hide Chase, and even hired a private pilot to secretly bring him to
the Buffalo ball park. The pilot was not able to obtain a plane, however, and Chase was
served with the injunction in the second inning of Buffalo's June 25 game. Id.
202. See id. at 231-32.
203. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. at 8. The negative covenant is distinguished from the affirmative
covenant-that the player will play for the team. The New York courts had previously held
this type of affirmative personal services contract to be unenforceable when dealing with base-
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Buffalo Federal team held a "Hal Chase Day" after he agreed to play for
the team. As a result, there was equitable jurisdiction to enjoin Chase
from playing for Buffalo, so long as his agreement with Chicago both
possessed mutuality and was not illegal.204 In the most in-depth analysis
of baseball's agreements with its players to date, the New York court
reviewed three separate documents declarative of the correlative obliga-
tions of Chase and Chicago.20 5
First, the court reviewed the Player's Contract, signed both by Chase
and the Chicago club. Under the contract, Chase was to be paid $6000;
$4500 as salary and an additional $1500 for the club's option to reserve
him. In return, Chase agreed that he could be discharged during the
contract's term, at any time, with ten days notice. In addition, Chase
agreed that he could play for "no other party" unless the club agreed in
writing. Finally, Chase agreed he could be reserved and that his contract
would then be renewed under the same terms and at the same salary as
his current contract.2 6
ball players in cases like Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779, 780 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1890).
204. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. at 8. The court acknowledged the comparison that had been made
in another baseball player case between the services of a baseball player and those of an actor,
noting the skill needed to fill specific playing positions. As a result, loss of that player (or
actor) left a void that was made worse when the player (or actor) tried to play for another
team (or company). Id. (citing Ward, 9 N.Y.S. at 780-81).
205. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. at 9-10.
206. The actual terms provided:
1. The Club agrees to pay the player.., a salary at the rate of $4,500 for such
season; and an additional sum at the rate of $1,500... said additional sum being the
consideration of the option herein reserved to the Club in clause 10 hereto.., whether
said option is exercised or not, making the total compensation to the player for the
season herein contracted for $6,000.
7. The Club may, at any time after the beginning and prior to the completion of the
period of this contract, give the player ten days["] written notice to end and determine
all its liabilities and obligations hereunder; in which event the liabilities and obligations
undertaken by the club shall cease ... at the expiration of said ten days[']. The player,
at the expiration of said ten days, shall be freed and discharged from all obligations to
render service to the club.
8. The player agrees to perform for no other party during the period of this contract
(unless with the written consent of the club) ....
10. The player will, at the option of the club, enter into a contract for the suc-
ceeding season upon all the terms and conditions of this contract, save as to Clauses 1
and 10, and the salary to be paid the player in the event of such renewal shall be the
same as the total compensation provided for the player in Clause 1, hereto, unless it be
increased or decreased by mutual agreement.
Id. at 8-10.
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The second document reviewed by the court was the National Agree-
ment. Originally executed among teams in the National League and
American Association in 1889,207 the Agreement included minor league
teams in 1901.208 Under the Agreement, clubs agreed to cooperate so
the game could flourish. As a result, teams were generally free to gov-
ern themselves, so long as they took no action in conflict with the Agree-
ment.20 9 Among the provisions to which all clubs pledged themselves,
were agreements respecting the reserve fights of other clubs, providing
an enforcement mechanism for that respect, and providing for a uniform
players' contract that prohibited a waiver of the reserve rule without
permission from a National Commission.210
The National Agreement also created the National Commission con-
sisting of the Presidents of the National and American Leagues and a
third person chosen by them. The National Commission had the "power
to construe and carry out the terms" of the Agreement.21' The Coin-
207. See SPALDING, supra note 2, at 148-149.
208. Id. at 213-214. It was the teams, major and minor, that were signers of the National
Agreement that made up what was known as "Organized Baseball." SEYMOUR, supra note 8,
at 6.
209. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. at 9.
210. The Agreement provided two methods of enforcement. First, a club refusing to rec-
ognize reserve rights of another club was considered an "outlaw" club and second, the agree-
ment vested "title" in a player to the club. The provisions of the National Agreement
provided:
Article VI
1. All parties to this agreement pledge themselves to recognize the right of reserva-
tion and respect contracts between players and clubs under its protection....
2. Any club or league which harbors a player who refuses to observe his contract
with a club member of any party to this agreement, or to abide by its reservation, shall
be considered an outlaw organization, and its claim to contractual and territorial rights
ignored.
3. The right and title of a major league club to its players shall be absolute and can
be terminated only by release, neglect to comply with requirements under this Agree-
ment for reservations, or failure to fulfill its contractual obligations.
Article VIII
1. All contracts between clubs and players in the Major Leagues shall be in form
prescribed by the Commission. All contracts between clubs and players in the National
Association shall be in form prescribed by that Association, provided, however, that no
nonreserve contract shall be entered into by any club operating under the National
Agreement, until permission to do so has been first obtained from the commission ....
Id. at 9-13.
211. Id. at 9. This third member was considered the President of the Commission,
although receiving no salary. The only person to hold this position was Cincinnati owner
August (Gerry) Herrmann. The minor leagues were excluded from Commission membership
for fear they might join forces with one of the major leagues against the other. Players were
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mission was the Supreme Court of Baseball, with power to interpret the
National Agreement, resolve disputes between clubs, and impose disci-
pline for violation of it.2 12 To fulfill its responsibilities, the Commission
adopted rules. These rules were the third document reviewed by the
court in Chase. The court found National Commission rules rendering
invalid any nonreserve contract that had not been approved by the Com-
mission, declaring ineligible any player who violated the reserve rule,
suspending any player who failed to report to the team to which he was
titled, and providing for reinstatement of such suspended player through
provisions that could include a fine and a waiting period.213
From these two agreements and the resulting National Commission
rules, the New York court found Chicago's overall obligation to be the
giving of ten days notice before terminating the agreement. Chase, on
the other hand, was bound to the team not only for the current playing
season, but also for another season at the option of the club. Because of
the reserve system generally, member agreements not to sign players
under contract to another team, and player suspension for violation of
these provisions, the only realistic option for the player who wished to
leave his current team was to abandon baseball. "Can it fairly be
claimed that there is mutuality in such a contract? ' 21 4 Finding none, the
court found no consideration for the negative covenant and refused fur-
also excluded however, it was the commission's duty to protect the players. SEYMOUR, supra
note 8, at 9.
212. 149 N.Y.S. at 9. See also SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 16-17, for a compendium of
much of the work of the Commission.
213. Those rules provided:
Rule 17: A nonreserve clause in the contract of a major league player without the
approval of the Commission... shall not be valid.
Rule 19: A National Agreement player, adjudged to have violated his contract,
shall be declared and promulgated to be ineligible to play with or against any club in
organized baseball until reinstated on his application by the Commission ....
Rule 20: A player who fails to report to or deserts the club having title to his serv-
ices shall be declared and promulgated to be disqualified as a National Agreement
player until restored to good standing on his application... In all cases of failure to
report or desertion the offender may be reinstated with or without a fine ... provided,
however, that if the player shall have joined an outlaw team his application for the
removal of his disability shall not be acted on within three years after the commission
of the offense.
Chase, 149 N.Y.S. at 12-13.
214. Id. at 14. In Ward, 9 N.Y.S. at 783, the court used the following example to show
how onerous these clauses could be: The club could exercise its option at the end of one
season, thereby preventing a player from signing with another club during the off-season.
Though not being paid by anyone, the player would then be barred from negotiating with any
baseball team. Just prior to the start of the following season, the club could then determine it
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ther injunctive relief, thereby allowing Chase to play for Buffalo.215
The owners did win one case. Cincinnati of the National League
sued Armando Marsans after he signed with the St. Louis Federal
League club.216 While one author indicates the court did not consider
the case under the "reserve clause," 217 that is actually unclear from the
opinion. The court first indicated that Cincinnati had signed Marsans
and that Marsans had performed some of the obligated service. What is
unknown is whether St. Louis signed the outfielder during the term of
the contract with Cincinnati, or after the end of his contract during the
"reserve" year, although the former seems more likely.218 The court
found that Marsans' services were both "unique and extraordinary" and
that Cincinnati would suffer irreparable injury without injunctive re-
lief.219 Without reference to "mutuality" or any of the other cases previ-
ously deciding that issue, the court granted preliminary injunctive relief
on the basis of uniqueness and irreparable harm, ostensibly to preserve
the status quo pending trial.2' Evidently, the issue was ultimately
resolved in Marsans' favor, however, as he played thirty five (35) games
for the St. Louis Federals in 1915 and none for the Cincinnati
Nationals.22'
The Federal League produced one additional lawsuit which was un-
like any of those previously filed involving players attempting to switch
leagues. In January, 1915, the Federal League sued the National and
no longer needed the player and discharge him with ten days notice, obligating itself to no
payment to the player.
215. In 1915, Chase led the Federal League in home runs, with 17. PimrnusZA, supra note
14, at 341.
216. Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Marsans, 216 F. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1914). Marsans, a Cu-
ban-bor outfielder played from 1911-1914 with Cincinnati; then played in 1915 with St. Louis
of the Federal League; from 1916-17 with St. Louis of the American League; and 1918-19 with
New York of the American League. In 655 major league games (including those in the Fed-
eral League), Marsans batted .269.
217. See PmiERuszA, supra 14, at 231.
218. This is certainly the suggestion in the opinion: "This made a valid and binding con-
tract, especially after the defendant entered upon the performance of the contract and re-
ceived the compensation there specified during apart of the term." Cincinnati Exhibition Co.,
216 F. at 269 (emphasis added). On the other hand, it was not generally Federal League
strategy to sign players whose contracts had not yet expired. See supra note 184 and accompa-
nying text.
219. See 216 F. at 269-270.
220. Id. at 270.
221. NEnr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 70,75. Baseball historian Harold Seymour indicates
the injunction was dismissed. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 211. Seymour provides further evi-
dence that Marsans actually left during an ongoing contract, citing organized baseball's attor-
ney for the proposition that actual contract-jumping was actionable, as in Lajoie and Marsans,
while failing to fulfill the reserve clause was not. Id.
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American leagues, alleging them to be monopolies in violation of federal
antitrust law. The case, filed in Chicago, was assigned to federal Judge
Kennesaw Mountain Landis." Landis refused to decide the case when
a hearing was held January 20th,2 first asking the parties whether they
wanted him to prevent the teams from going to spring training, 24 then
indicating that he did not consider baseball players to be laborers,225 and
finally advising "'any blows at the thing called baseball would be re-
garded by this court as a blow to a national institution.' "I' As a result,
the National, American, and Federal Leagues were all in operation in
1915, at great cost. The 1900 St. Louis Cardinals, for example, drew
380,000 fans and made money, while their 1914 counterparts drew
600,000 fans and did not. Competition for players within the market-
place was the reason; 7 a reason good for the players but not for the
owners. Peace talks continued through the 1915 season, culminating in
the abandonment of the Federal League in December, 1915.228 In Feb-
ruary, 1916, some thirteen months after he heard testimony in the case,
Judge Landis dismissed the antitrust case.22 9
The demise of the Federal League once again left players without
meaningful competition for their services. To assert economic pressure
against again unified organized baseball, the players' next action was a
222. See PiETRUsZA, supra note 14, at 235. Landis had a reputation as a trust-buster,
having rendered a $29 million antitrust judgment against Standard Oil. He was also, however,
a baseball fan, particularly of the Chicago Cubs. Id. See also MURDOCK, supra note 125, at
114. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 212. This action was the predecessor to the action that ulti-
mately ended in the United States Supreme Court. Compare National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., 269 F. 681, 682, aff'd 259 U.S. 200,
42 S.Ct. 465 (1922).
223. See MuRocK, supra note 125, at 114.
224. See PimTRuSZA, supra note 14, at 235.
225. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 212.
226. PxmauszA, supra note 14, at 235; SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 212. Compare Justice
Holmes statement in the later case: "The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are
purely state affairs." National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. at 208.
227. MuRDOCK, supra note 125, at 115.
228. See PmTRuszA, supra note 14, at 245-248. The Federal League owner in Chicago
was permitted to purchase the Chicago National League team and the St. Louis Federal owner
purchased the St. Louis American League team. Players who had jumped to the Federal
League were removed from organized baseball's "blacklist," although none were guaranteedjobs with the remaining leagues. Id. at 248-49 (detailing other financial provisions of the
agreement); MupmocK, supra note 125, at 116-17.
229. MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 117. A new suit was filed little more than a month
later by the Baltimore Federal League franchise, which had been totally ignored in the settle-
ment to the extent the city had neither a team nor a league and its owner received none of the
settlement. See id.; PmTRuszA, supra note 14, at 250-51. See also National League of Profes-
sional baseball Clubs, 269 F. at 682.
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traditional labor "strike." That took place in the 1918 World Series, be-
tween the Boston Red Sox and the White Sox cross-town National
League rival Chicago Cubs.
VIII. 1918 BASEBALL "STRIKE"
Early in the history of the World Series, major league owners agreed
that the players' share of the profits of the series would be sixty percent
of the gate from the first four games. That amount was then split sixty
percent to the winning team, forty percent to the loser.23° In 1918, with-
out consulting the players, the owners amended the plan to permit the
first four teams in each league to share in these same receipts.231
Following the outbreak of World War I, 1918 baseball attendance
generally fell to a near record low and, as a result, owners did not raise
prices for World Series tickets, as had normally been the case. Nonethe-
less, it was predicted that the Series' participating Red Sox and Cubs'
winning players would earn at least $2000 and losers at least $1400. Per-
haps as a result, the players pledged ten percent of their share to the war
effort.232
When gate attendance at the first three games of the series was also
low, owners lowered their expectations and substantially reduced the
shares of the series' participants. On the train from Chicago to Boston,
the players agreed to strike unless winners and losers were guaranteed
$1500 and $1000 respectively. 3 3 The players refused to begin game five
in Boston until their demands were met, and did not agree to play until
being promised a post-series meeting with owners and no recriminations
against striking players, after a one-hour delay.3 4 Following the series,
however, there was no meeting, the winning Red Sox players received
slightly more than $1000, the losing Cubs slightly more than $670, and all
230. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 253-54. Originally, the division between winner and loser
was 75%/25% but this split caused players to make side deals with their opponents so as to
increase the potential earnings from the series. The first four games were used as the base to
prevent the players from artificially extending the series beyond the required number of
games. Id.; see also WORLD SERIES ENCYCLOPEDIA 8-9 (Don Schiffer ed. 1961).
231. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 254.
232. Id.
233. Id.; WORLD SERIES ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 230, at 14.
234. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 254; WORLD SERIES ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 230, at
14. Seymour reports that American League President Ban Johnson arrived at game 5 "inebri-
ated and made a maudlin appeal to the men" to continue playing. The players then recog-
nized that no meaningful negotiations could take place with Johnson in such a condition and
agreed. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 254-55. Another source, however, places Johnson in a
better light: "President Johnson, a man of great persuasiveness, talked the players out of their
demands . . . ." WORLD SERIES ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 230, at 14.
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players were fined to the extent they were not awarded the usual me-
mentos of their participation in the World Series.35
IX. THE "STATE OF MIM" OF THE 1919 BLACK SOX
The foregoing labor history demonstrates that by opening day, 1919,
baseball was free of labor disputes, with its two leagues intact. The play-
ers who remained found that the courts had protected them from the
onerousness of the reserve clause, thus permitting them to shop their
skills to the highest bidder. As a result of organized baseball's system-
atic destruction of that competition, however, those same players were
left with no meaningful choice in contracting to play baseball. They
could individually "hold-out," refusing to sign contracts with their own-
ers, but such actions rarely succeeded. With no competition and the re-
serve rule intact, owners possessed "extra-legal means of coercion" such
as refusing to pay for a hold-out's travel to spring training or fining a
player who reported late or played in an outlaw league3 6 The players
had no union, but even if they had organized themselves, the White Sox'
1918 Red Sox and Cubs colleagues had found that concerted action by
baseball's laborers, even to the point of strike, was futile. Worse, it led
to further repression.
What would have been apparent to members of the 1919 White Sox
was that on the field, each was an important part of a team effort leading
toward a World's Championship. Off the field, the relationship between
player and owner had not changed since the earliest days of professional
baseball. Despite the great strides made by American labor in its rela-
tionship with management since the last decade of the 1800s,1 7 baseball
owners "were at best paternalistic autocrats who treated their employees
as little more than children."" 8
235. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 255. The winning Red Sox were apparently to receive a
commemorative stick pin which they still had not received, making them the only World Se-
ries winner to not receive any memento of victory. See, e.g., Red Sox Might Honor '18
Champs, USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 1993, at 1C. It is this failure that some claim is a "curse" for
the Red Sox, who have not been able to capture the World Series since 1918. In 1993, on the
eve of the 75th anniversary of game one of the series, Red Sox officials attempted to eliminate
this curse by giving living relatives of the players a stick pin to commemorate the Series vic-
tory of the 1918 team. See, Heir is Confronting the Curse of Frazee, BosTON GLOBE, Sept. 4,
1993 at 27; Joey Reaves, AL Report, CHI. TRwB., Aug. 29, 1993, at 5C.
236. See, e.g., SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 174-77. The story of Iy Cobb's famous hold-outs
is also contained in COBB & STUMP, supra note 160, at 75.
237. See LAWRENCE M. FREDMAN, A HISTORY OF AmRICAN LAW 558 (1985).
238. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 29.
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X. BASEBALL AND GAMBLING
In suspending the eight Black Sox for life in 1921, despite their ac-
quittal of criminal charges, new baseball commissioner Kennesaw Moun-
tain Landis is reported to have said:
Regardless of the verdict of juries, no player that throws a ball
game, no player that entertains proposals or promises to throw a
game, no player that sits in a conference with a bunch of crooked
players and gamblers where the ways and means of throwing
games are discussed, and does not promptly tell his club about it,
will ever again play professional baseball 3 9
The severity of this language gives rise to what has been called "base-
ball's most sanctimonious myth"- that the scandal of the Black Sox is
"baseball's single sin.' '2 4" Neither the history of sport in America nor the
history of baseball supports this contention.
In fact, as early as the Virginia settlements of the late 1700s, gambling
over cards, billiards, nine-pins, dice, backgammon and horse racing was a
fixture of social life. Gambling was a reflection of "gentry culture-its
competitiveness, individualism, and materialism." It was a ritual that
corresponded "to the gentry's values and assumptions."241
Similar "gentry" values were present in baseball, with the result that
gambling was as "important to baseball as it was to horse racing." Even
baseball founder William Chadwick was not opposed to betting on base-
ball games.242 For the fans, the local baseball club was a source of pride.
As a result, it was not unusual to have wagering on the game going on in
the stands.4 Popular thinking today is that virtually all early baseball
games were the subject of betting between the teams.244
By 1867, however, negative reaction to gambling began to surface.
National media claimed baseball had already been sullied by widespread
gambling, and the accompanying fixing of games.245 In 1869, the un-
defeated Cincinnati Reds team returned home and played a local Ohio
239. This statement is published in many baseball sources, but is reprinted here from
Duso, supra note 8, at 130.
240. VOIGT, supra note 29, at 72-73.
241. See T.H. Breen, Horses and Gentlemen: The Cultural Significance of Gambling
Among the Gentry of Virginia, in SPORT IN AMERICA: NEw IsToRmcAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 19, at 1-24.
242. SMrrH, supra note 14, at 29. However, Chadwick did think it impermissible for an
umpire to bet on a game in which he was working. Id.
243. VoioT, supra note 16, at 16.
244. SMrrH, supra note 14, at 29.
245. VoroT, supra note 16, at 16.
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team in a game with extensive betting against the Reds.246 Despite ap-
parent evidence that an argument between the local team's captain and
the umpire was a ruse to have the game called as a tie so that a heavy
gambler would not lose a bet, the league refused to award a forfeit to
Cincinnati and a tie stood.247 There were no suspensions.248 At this
point, baseball provided supplemental income to gamblers accustomed
to playing the horses. "[O]dds [were] posted at the game and men in
hard hats [walked] about selling betting slips in the stands," as A.G.
Spalding noted: "A game characterized by such scenes ... could not
possibly attract honest men or decent women to its exhibitions. '249 As a
result, attendance fell to such a level that most teams were on the verge
of bankruptcy. In part, this economic crisis, caused by gambling, served
as an impetus for the National League as organized by William Hulbert
in 1875.2-o
The new National League found itself challenged during Hulbert's
first year as president when a Louisville newspaper accused members of
the Louisville team of deliberately losing the 1877 pennant 5' Investiga-
246. One author suggests the team was the Lansingburg Union Club (the Haymakers).
SMrrH, supra note 14, at 21-22. Another suggests the Haymakers were actually from Troy.
VOiGT, supra note 16, at 29-30. The latter view matches the historical record of a team being
created in Troy in 1866 and made up of people who had never played baseball but who got a
person from another town to instruct them and their manager. Becker & Grigsby, supra note
19, at 79-80. The earlier view is supported by the fact that the professional gamblers expected
Troy to win the game, VOiGT, supra note 16, at 30, hardly possible if the players had but three
years experience in playing baseball.
These accounts also conflict on who was doing the gambling, with one account, suggesting
the President of the Haymakers, a former prize fighter and notorious gambler, SMrrH, supra
note 14, at 22, and the other indicating that Nev York gamblers had convinced Haymaker
players to throw the game. VOIGT, supra note 16, at 29-30.
247. The score was tied 17-17 after five innings when a dispute arose between the Hay-
maker captain and the umpire. Soon the Haymaker president became involved, eventually
ordering his team to leave the field. To quiet the partisan Cincinnati crowd, the umpire de-
clared a forfeit for the Reds. SMrrH, supra note 14, at 22; VOiGT, supra note 16, at 29.
248. It was also reported that unsavory characters were involved as investors with teams.
One report alleged that William "Boss" 'Tweed was an investor in a New York team in 1870.
VoiGT, supra note 16, at 20. Spalding claims that in 1865, a player convicted of throwing a
game had been reinstated. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 115-117.
249. SMrrH, supra note 14, at 21.
250. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 116-117, 130.
251. See, e.g., AsiNoF, supra note 8, at 11-12; ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 29; PIE-
TRuszA, supra note 14, at 34-36; SMITH, supra note 14, at 27-28; VOiGT, supra note 16, at 71-
73. Louisville had a huge lead in its pennant race with Boston with 15 games remaining. The
team played so poorly in those remaining games that it lost to Boston by seven games. Pm-
TRuszA, supra note 14, at 34. It was said the gambling of the players was exposed because the
team played so poorly. SmrTH, supra note 14, at 27-28.
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tion revealed four Louisville players were involved." 2 Through playing
off individual conversations with each of the four against the others, the
Louisville owner was able to obtain damning admissions. By requesting
copies of all players' telegrams, and summarily suspending the Louisville
captain who refused that request, the same owner alleged the players
had started losing exhibition games so that a New York gambler could
profit and then had escalated their activity. 53 While the suspension of
the four for life is generally reported,' 4 the fact that two of these "das-
tardly" characters went on to successful careers as police officers is gen-
erally not.255 Nor is it generally reported that the four players had not
been paid and were therefore playing for free while allegedly fixing
games.5 6
In spite of A.G. Spalding's protestations that "instantaneous" and
"inflexible discipline" of the Louisville four proved that proper league
management eradicated gambling "from that day to this,"" 7 the histori-
cal record is quite the opposite. Few people took Hulbert's expulsion of
the four Louisville players seriously." 8  "[G]amblers still operated
openly in the ball parks and quoted their prices aloud ... ."9 Wide-
spread was the baseball "pool," in which bettors bid at auction for the
right to bet on a favorite team with an independent banker who held all
bets, received a percentage of the profit, and paid off the winners. In
one New York betting establishment, bets on one game could reach
$70,000, and in Chicago, baseball pools on the early White Sox were part
of the Chicago Board of Trade.260 In New Haven, it was estimated that
some 40,000 factory workers bet a total of $10,000 in one pool, and in
252. James Alexander Devlin, a pitcher, who had won 35 games, ASINOF, supra note 8, at
11; catcher/shortstop and team captain William H. Craver, who had previously been expelled
for gambling from the National Association of Base Ball Players in 1870, Pi-RnuszA, supra
note 14, at 35; George Hall, a strong hitter who had a reputation for consorting with gamblers,
and outfielder Al Nichols, who had some ties to New York gambling interests. Id. at 35;
VoiGT, supra note 16, at 71.
253. PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 36-37; SMrrH, supra note 14, at 27.
254. See PinTRusZA, supra note 14, at 36-37; SMrrH, supra note 14, at 27; SPALDING, supra
note 2, at 141-42.
255. See PIErRUSZA, supra note 14, at 38, mentioning these facts. The two were Devlin,
who worked as an officer in Philadelphia and Craver, who "became a highly respected police-
men in Troy, N.Y." Smith also notes that Hall had a prosperous career as an engraver and
that Nichols changed his name to Williams and continued to play baseball in outlaw leagues.
SMrrH, supra note 14, at 197.
256. See AsINOF, supra note 8, at 12; SMrrH, supra note 14, at 197.
257. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 141-42.
258. AsINOF, supra note 8, at 12.
259. SMrIH, supra note 14, at 29.
260. PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 33, 38. Asinof wrote of one such pool:
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Philadelphia, 20,000 pool tickets were sold on the World Series of
1911.261 Owner calls for reform were seen largely as shallow. While
some owners claimed that pools took fan attendance money that would
otherwise be spent at the ballpark, others thought the practice helped
the game grow. Few were willing to challenge an industry that had se-
cured protection from both politicians and the police. 
62
Pools, however, were for small gamblers. Big gambling money was
wagered by the professionals, aided by a press that regularly printed
odds for games. Few events drew professional gambling money like the
World Series. 63
From the beginning of the twentieth century until the time of the
Black Sox, allegations surfaced of games being fixed: 1) during a post-
season series between the Cubs and White Sox in 1903; 2) during a regu-
lar season game between St. Louis and Pittsburgh in 1904; 3) during the
National League playoff between Chicago and New York in 1908; 4) dur-
ing the 1907 regular season when it was alleged that some St. Louis play-
ers did not make appropriate plays thus enabling Napoleon Lajoie to
beat Ty Cobb for the batting title; and 5) during the close of the 1916
season when members of the New York Giants were accused of not play-
ing their best during the final two games of the year with Brooklyn so
Brooklyn could win the pennant over Philadelphia."6 In addition, dur-
ing the year just preceding the Black Sox scandal, there was regular gam-
bling in Boston's Fenway Park.2 65 Finally, and perhaps most important
to the state of mind of the members of the 1919 Black Sox, there were
allegations that during the 1917 season members of the White Sox gave
One promotion scheme was the baseball pool, which was a kind of lottery. Tickets
would be printed each week on which anyone, with ten cents or more, could bet on a
team to score the most runs per inning or game, the most victories per week, and so on.
A typically famous pool, known as the Keystone, distributed over 165,000 such tickets
each week. It employed 50 agents who, in turn, had 300 subagents.
Asu'oF, supra note 8, at 12. Even in 1917, the Keystone turned a $50,000 per week profit. Id.
261. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 280.
262. Id.
263. See id.
264. Id. at 281-287.
265. See MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 156. Harry Grabiner's diary as discussed by Bill
Veeck also mentions a possible "fix" of the 1918 World Series. Veeck reports Grabiner's claim
of giving Commissioner Landis a list of 27 names" 'mentioned in any wrongdoing' "which list
included the name Eugene Packard and the notation: "'1918 Series fixer.'" BILL VEECK,
THm HuSmER's HANDBOOK 296 (1965). Packard, a pitcher with a lifetime 85-69 record in
eight seasons with Cincinnati, Chicago, St. Louis, and Philadelphia in the National and Kansas
City in the Federal Leagues. Notably, he pitched with the Chicago Cubs in 1917, the year
before they appeared in the 1918 World Series against the Red Sox. See NEFr & COHEN,
supra note 7 at 82, 87, 119. There may thus be some credence to Grabiner's claim.
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members of Detroit new suits for losing four games.2 66
A typical example of baseball's long-term relationship with gambling
prior to the 1919 World Series is the story of Hal Chase, the first base-
man who successfully defeated White Sox owner Comiskey's attempt to
enjoin his play in the Federal League.2 67
Nicknamed "Prince Hal," Chase batted .291 in 1917 plate appear-
ances from 1905 through 1919.268 Though dubbed "the most magical of
all first basemen in the dead ball days, '269 Chase has also been called
"the archetype of all crooked ball players."'27 It is this negative reputa-
tion that has prevented Chase's entry into Baseball's Hall of Fame.27
In 1908, for example, Chase was accused of not giving his best effort
on the field after succeeding in getting one New York manager fired, but
replaced with someone other than Chase's choice. Chase revolted, left
New York and played the balance of the season in an outlaw California
league. He returned to New York the following year after paying a fine
for breaking his major league contract.27 a New York players, newspa-
pers and manager George Stallings then accused Chase of throwing
games.2  Chase responded by petition to New York owner Frank Far-
rell, known for his gambling and ties to Tammany Hall,.74 who either
266. VOIGT, supra note 29, at 74. This story is confirmed in the diary of Harry Grabiner,
who served as Secretary to the 1919 White Sox team. See VEECK, supra note 265, at 274;
ASINOF, supra note 8, at 20.
267. Chase was described by baseball historian Harold Seymour as "a superb first base-
man whose sparkling play long remained the yardstick by which others who played the posi-
tion were measured," and mentions only Hall of Famers Lou Gehrig, George Sisler and
possibly Bill Terry as being in the same class at first base. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 288.
268. For New York in the American League (1905-1913), Chicago in the American
League (1913-1914), Buffalo in the Federal League (1914-1915), Cincinnati in the National
League (1916-1918) and New York in the National League (1919). RONALD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 12-31. Chase led the Federal League in home runs with 17 in
1915. See PiEmRUSZA, supra note 14, at 341.
269. SMITH, supra note 14, at 173.
270. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 288.
271. SMrrH, supra note 14, at 180.
272. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 288.
273. See id.; ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 118. New York infielder Jimmy Austin picks
up the story:
Late in the 1910 season we had just finished a series in Cleveland and were on the boat
going over to play Detroit. Nobody could find Hal Chase. Hal had been the Highland-
ers first baseman for years. Well, he'd just disappeared. The next day we found out
what had happened. When we had gotten on the boat for Detroit, he had taken the
train to New York. He'd gone to Mr. Farrell, the president of the club, and complained
about Stallings and a lot of other things.
RrrrER, supra note 4, at 83 (interview of Jimmy Austin).
274. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 118.
[Vol. 5:1
BASEBALL'S LABOR WARS
fired manager Stallings275 or otherwise backed Chase causing Stallings to
quit.276 Chase then took over as manager of the New York team and
took what had been a second place team immediately to sixth place.
277
When Chase was replaced as manager by former infielder Frank
Chance,278 Chase was again accused by his manager of throwing
games.2 79 Shortly thereafter, Chase was traded to Charles Comiskey's
Chicago American League team for two lesser players8s
It was while a member of the Chicago American League team that
Chase sought to declare his own free agency by giving Chicago ten days
notice before jumping to Buffalo of the Federal League. After the court
decision refusing to enforce the negative covenant in his contract with
Chicago, Chase played with Buffalo of the Federal League until it dis-
banded 281 and returned to the National League Cincinnati Reds in
1916.282 There, it was alleged, he became a virtually full-time fixer of
baseball games,283 adept at making faulty plays around first base to guar-
antee the outcome of games upon which he had wagered money? 84 In
275. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 288.
276. RrrrER, supra note 4, at 83 (Interview with Jimmy Austin). Stallings had previously
been manager of the "miracle" Boston Braves who, in 1914, were in last place on July 18 and
went on to win the National League pennant and the World Series. NErr & COHEN, supra
note 7, at 64, 66.
277. NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 64, 66.
278. Of "Tinkers to Evers to Chance" fame.
279. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 289. Seymour indicates that Chance complained to two
newspaper reporters that Chase had been throwing games, and then immediately thereafter
traded Chase. When these statements were printed in a New York newspaper, New York
president Farrell apparently denied that they had been made by his manager. Id. Another
account indicates that Chase had annoyed Chance, who was deaf in one ear, by standing be-
hind Chance and mocking him on his deaf side. When Chance found out about this, Chase
was ordered "off the bench, out of uniform, and out of the park." SMrrH, supra note 14, at
174.
280. On this, both of the foregoing accounts agree. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 289;
SMrrH, supra note 14, at 174. The players, Babe Borton and Rollie Zeider, SEYMOUR, supra
note 8, at 289, had lifetime batting averages of .271 (in 317 plate appearances over four sea-
sons) and .239 (in 937 plate appearances over nine seasons), respectively. RONALD ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 19, at 12-18, 12-214.
281. He batted .354 for Buffalo in 1914. See NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 69. He also
led the Federal League in home runs with 17 in 1915. PI'ruszA, supra note 14, at 341.
282. The Federal League merged with the American and National Leagues under the
terms of a settlement in the Federal League's lawsuit with organized baseball. See PmrRuszA,
supra note 14, at 248-49 (giving the terms of the settlement). The actual lawsuit itself is cov-
ered earlier in this article. See supra notes 222-229 and accompanying text.
According to historian Harold Seymour, Chase had no chance of being allowed to return
to the American League as that league would continue to blacklist him for jumping to the
Federal league. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 289.
283. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 289.
284. AsINOF, supra note 8, at 14.
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one report, Chase tried to bribe a Cincinnati relief pitcher to throw a
game that Chase had sought to lose, and the relief pitcher turned Chase
in to Reds' management.285 In another report, Chase tried to get a rival
pitcher to throw a game, was discovered by teammates who turned him
in to Reds' management, who then suspended him without pay 286
Chase then sued the Reds for his salary, and the matter was eventually
referred to newly elected National League president John Heydler.
Heydler took testimony from several players, including Giant manager
and future Hall of Famer John McGraw, and received the affidavit of
Hall of Famer Christy Matthewson, the Cincinnati manager then serving
in the armed forces. 287 Heydler found a lack of evidence and dismissed
all of the claims against Chase.8 Chase, again free to contract, immedi-
ately signed to play for McGraw's Giants, thus joining the team of a
principal witness against him. Shortly thereafter, the Giants hired Mat-
thewson as a coach, thus bringing the alleged offender and both principal
witnesses together.289
"This [then] was the world of baseball in 1919. "29o Contrary to any
popular myth today, the story of the 1919 Black Sox is not the first story
of gambling in baseball. All the Black Sox players knew directly or
knew indirectly of players who had been involved in tampering with
games. Indeed, it was two members of the Black Sox who revealed pay-
ment to Detroit in 1917.291
Adding to the difficulties of baseball's long-term relationship with
gambling was the fact that when the United States entered World War I,
organized horse racing was banned. Forced from the race tracks, many
of those professional gamblers, already aware of the money to be made
285. See id. at 14-15.
286. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 290. It seems unlikely the two events are the same.
Asinof's incident is said to occur in 1917 and involve Reds' pitcher Jimmy Ring. Seymour's
incident took place in 1918 and involved Giants' pitcher Pol Perritt. Given Chase's history,
the more likely story is that a combination of both incidents, and perhaps others, soured Reds'
players on Chase, and that the culmination of incidents resulted in his suspension in 1918.
287. Id. at 290. Among the other witnesses were Cincinnati players Greasy Neale, Mike
Regan and Jimmy Ring, as well as Giant Pol Perritt.
288. Id. Heydler did, however, congratulate the Reds for bringing the charges and further
indicate that anyone actually found to be betting on baseball would be dismissed from the
league. Chase dropped his action to recover his salary, although Seymour suggests he was
probably compensated by the Giants for any loss.
289. The conclusion of Chase's story is given later in this article. See infra note 436.
290. AsiNOF, supra note 8, at 20.
291. See VEECK, supra note 265, at 297. Risberg and Gandil told of an assessment against
virtually all of the White Sox of $50 each to pay for the suits given the Detroit players. Id.
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in baseball, simply switched their allegiance. 292 It was some of those
gamblers who participated in dealings with the White Sox players before
the 1919 World Series.
XI. FACTS SURROUNDING THE Fix
In 1906, Charles Comiskey's Chicago White Sox won the American
League pennant. Thereafter, the team's fortunes went downhill to the
point where, in 1912 and 1913, the team finished fourth and then fifth.
In 1914, the White Sox finished sixth in the eight team league.
In Philadelphia, however, the story was just the opposite. From 1910
through 1914, the Philadelphia Athletics failed to win the American
League pennant only in 1912.293 Hall of Famers Eddie Collins and Frank
"Home Run" Baker covered second and third and were flanked by Jack
Barry and Stuffy McInnis to make up what was known as the "$100,000
infield.
294
As World Series winners in three years out of four, the Athletics
were a prime target for raiding by the Federal League. 95 Pitchers Plank
and Bender and infielder Collins all received "tempting . . .proposi-
tions" from the Federal League.296 Following the 1914 season, unable
and unwilling to match Federal League offers, and after losing both
Plank and Bender,2 Connie Mack decided to sell his team.298
292. AsINOF, supra note 8, at 12-13. For an excellent account of the internal workings of
organized baseball during World War I. See MuRDocK, supra note 125, at 118-131; SEYMOUR,
supra note 8, at 245-255.
293. NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 48-65. Connie Mack's Athletics "were one of the
greatest baseball teams ever assembled." RrrrR, supra note 4, at 199 (interview with Rube
Bressler). Bressler pitched on the 1913-14 Athletics teams and later for Cincinnati. Following
an injury in 1920, he became an outfielder, eventually finishing his career in Brooklyn in 1932.
Id. at 198-99, 202-203, 206. The pitching staff included Hall of Famers Eddie Plank, Chief
Bender and Herb Pennock. Id. at 198. Plank was elected to the Hall of Fame in 1946, Bender
in 1953, and Pennock in 1948. NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 628.
294. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 162. Collins was elected to the Hall of Fame in 1939
and Baker in 1955. NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 628. Unfortunately for the players, the
"$100,000" did not refer to their aggregate salary, or even what owner Mack paid for them,
but instead to their estimated market value. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 162.
295. Owner Connie Mack claimed that the distraction of negotiations with the Federal
League by some of the Philadelphia players caused his team to be shutout 4-0 by Boston in
the 1914 World Series. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 219-220.
296. Id. at 219.
297. Plank played for the St. Louis Federal League team in 1915, Bender the Baltimore
Federal League team. NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 110, 118.
298. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 219; see also MuRnocK, supra note 125, at 79 (indicating
the Athletics were also losing money and suggesting that such economic problems contributed
to the decision to disband the team). The result, however, was that by the end of 1915, players
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
Also following the 1914 season, the Federal League Chicago
Whales2 99 signed Washington pitching ace Walter Johnson. °0 With the
prospect of one of the game's most popular heroes301 playing for the
Federal League in Chicago, American League President Johnson con-
vinced Mack to sell Collins to the White Sox." 2 Owner Charles Comis-
key purchased Collins, paying Mack $50,000 and Collins a $15,000 bonus
Eddie Collins, Jack Barry, "Home Run" Baker, and the third Hall of Fame pitcher Pennock
were no longer with the team. PIE'RuszA, supra note 14, at 233-34.
299. Some post-1950 professional team mobility produced incongruous team names such
as the "Jazz" of Utah and the "Lakers" of Los Angeles. A new team, starting in Chicago,
called the "Whales" does, however, strain the imagination. The principal owner of the team
was Charles Weeghman, who owned a chain of cafeteria restaurants. PErTRuszA, supra note
14, at 217; see SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 200-201. There thus appears no connection between
owner and team name. Weeghman was able to attract William Walker as a financial backer
for the team and Walker owned the largest wholesale fish market in the midwest, thus provid-
ing some possible relevant link to the team name. See PIErRUsZA, supra note 14, at 217.
Historian Seymour, however, advises that this "catchy nickname" was the result of a fan con-
test held by Weeghman. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 216. One can only wonder as to the
quantity and more particularly the quality of the losing entries.
300. Known as "The Big Train," see NEFf & COHEN, supra note 7, at 115, it was said that
Johnson's fastball was so fast that you could not see it. "But you hear it. Swoosh, and it
smacks the catcher's mitt." RrrTR, supra note 4, at 57 (interview with Sam Crawford). John-
son's record of 414 career wins stands second only to Cy Young. NEFIr & COHEN, supra note
7, at 654. His 3509 strikeouts was the all time major league record until surpassed by Nolan
Ryan. See id. at 656. Even more remarkable, however, is that Johnson's pitching career was
spent with the largely second-division Washington Senators. In 1909, Johnson won 13 of the
42 games won by Washington for the season, in 1910, 25 of 66 and in 1911, 25 of 64. See id. at
45, 49, 53. The team finished in 8th, 7th, and 7th place in the eight team league during those
years. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL TEAM HISTORIES: AMERICAN LEAGUE
328-29 (Peter C. Bjarkman, ed. 1991). From 1913-1916, Johnson led the American League in
wins each year with 36, 28, 27, and 25 on a team that finished 6,19,17 and 14 games out of first
place. Id. He became a charter member of the Hall of Fame in 1937. NEFT & COHEN, supra
note 7, at 628.
Johnson reported the fact that he was approached by the Federal League to his Washing-
ton team. Nonetheless, after the 1914 season, Johnson was offered $16,000 for either a one or
two year deal with Washington and requested $20,000. On his way home to Kansas, Johnson
was offered his price in a three year deal with St. Louis of the Federal League. Loyal to
Washington, Johnson wrote the club twice but received no reply. Ultimately, he received a
letter from the Washington president lowering the club's offer to $12,500 with a threat to
invoke the automatic extension under the reserve clause. Thereafter, Johnson signed with the
Whales for $17,500 per year with a $6,000 bonus. PETRuszA, supra note 14, at 234.
Ultimately, however, Johnson did not play in the Federal League as Washington manage-
ment convinced the star that he should return, reportedly for the lowered $12,500 figure. See
id.; SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 207. Ty Cobb claims the reversal was due to Washington
threatening Johnson with suit under the contract. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
See also PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 234.
301. See ViOT, supra note 29, at 155-56.
302. MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 79-80. The Yankees were also quite interested in ac-
quiring Collins. Id.
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to sign a five year contract at $15,000 per year.30 3
In Cleveland, the signing by the Federal League of pitcher Cy
Falkenberg 4 together with the virtual collapse of the Cleveland of-
fense,3 5 caused attendance to fall and resulted in substantial financial
difficulties.30 6 To help relieve them, the club sold Joe Jackson to Comis-
key for $31,500 plus options on three other players. 7 When the original
cost of these three other players to Comiskey was added to the amount
paid for Jackson, the total exceeded the cost of Collins by $500, with
both deals setting new transactional records. 0
303. AXELSON, supra note 70, at 201-202, who also reports that Comiskey was tired of
spending money on minor league players who did not work out. MURDOCK, supra note 125, at
80, reports that the yearly contract was $12,000 per year and SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 220,
reports the purchase price as being between $20,000 and $50,000. Axelson's figure is probably
more likely in light of the discovery of White Sox secretary Harry Grabiner's diary by Bill
Veeck. Grabiner reports Collins' 1918 salary at $15,000, consistent with the Axelson figure.
See VEECK, supra note 265, at 256. Another author reports the total value of the transaction
at $140,000, a figure that encompasses the purchase price of $50,000 plus a bonus to Collins of
$15,000 and a five year contract at $15,000 per year. Compare VOIGT, supra note 29, at 66.
Collins was considered the most expendable of Mack's players after writing newspaper
articles in 1914 that embarrassed other players on the Athletics. MURDOCK, supra note 125, at
79.
304. Falkenberg compiled a won-loss record of 128-126 playing for Pittsburgh in the Na-
tional League and Washington, Cleveland and Philadelphia in the American League and Indi-
anapolis, Newark and Brooklyn in the Federal League. NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 113.
He was the leading pitcher on the 1914 Federal League champion Indianapolis team with a 25-
16 mark. Id. at 68. In 1913, he had been Cleveland's leading pitcher with a 23-10 record. Id.
at 60.
305. In 1913, Cleveland finished in third place in the American League, 91/2 games behind
the leader, compiling a team batting average of .348, second highest in the league. NEFr &
COHEN, supra note 7, at 60. Napoleon Lajoie batted .404. In contrast, in 1914, the team
batted .312, sixth in the league and finished in eighth place, 48 1/2 games out of first. Id. at 65.
306. Attendance dropped from over 500,000 in 1913 to less than 200,000 the following
year. See MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 76, indicating Cleveland owner Charles Somers was in
debt $2 million on the club by 1915. As a result, the "club was in the hands of the bankers."
AXELSON, supra note 70, at 202.
307. AXELSON, supra note 70, at 202-203. Murdock indicates the transaction as one for
$30,000 plus two players. MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 80. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL TEAM HISTORIES, supra note 300, at 111, supports Axelson's view that the
trade sent outfielders Braggo Roth and Larry Chappell and pitcher Ed Klepfer to Cleveland.
In writing of the trade, Comiskey's biographer remarkably refers to the today legendary
"Shoeless Joe" as "sockless Joe." AXELSON, supra note 70, at 202.
308. AXELSON, supra note 70, at 203, indicates that Comiskey had paid $11,000 for the
rights to Roth, $5,000 for the rights to Chappell, and $11,000 for the rights to Klepfer making
the total cost of the Jackson trade to Comiskey $65,500, slightly more than the $65,000 total
cost of the purchase price plus bonus to Collins. Shortly thereafter, Comiskey went back to
purchasing minor league talent, buying Oscar Felsch, nicknamed "Happy" because of his dis-
position, from Milwaukee of the American Association for $12,000. Id.
The infield that enabled the White Sox to win the American League crown in both 1917
and 1919, however, was still not complete until Californians Charles "Swede" Risberg joined
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While the amounts spent to bring the two players to the White Sox
were similar, the two players "could hardly have been more unalike."30 9
Collins, a northeasterner, was Columbia University educated, combative
and so self-assured that his nickname was "Cocky." Jackson, on the
other hand, a southerner, was shy and uneducated. 310  Because of
"taunts of teammates from the North and East, '311 Jackson had been
unable to successfully compete on Connie Mack's Philadelphia Athletics
where he and Collins had briefly been teammates in 1909.12 It is thus
no surprise that Collins received $15,000 for himself out of the deal that
sent him to Chicago, while Jackson received nothing." 3 It was, however,
these brilliant baseball players who formed the nuclei of the two cliques
of the 1916-1920 Chicago White Sox, a baseball team "ridden with
dissension." 314
One clique was led by team captain Collins, who was joined by
catcher Ray Schalk and pitchers Urban "Red" Faber and Dickie Kerr.31 5
The other's leader was first baseman Chick Gandil, joined by shortstop
"Swede" Risberg, third baseman George "Buck" Weaver, outfielder
Jackson and pitchers Ed Cicotte and Claude "Lefty" Williams. The lat-
ter group may have acknowledged Collins' ability as a leader, but "re-
sented his polish, his authority, and his high salary. 3 16 In fact, neither
the team as a rookie shortstop in 1917 and Charles "Chick" Gandil returned to the White Sox
after playing in Cleveland and Washington. See NEir & COHEN, supra note 7, at 97, 105;
AsINOF, supra note 8, at 18 ("Gandil and Risberg, both from the wilds of California..
309. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 109.
310. Id. at 109-110.
311. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL TEAM HIsroRiEs, supra note 300, at
110. Jackson's "carefree" nature, particularly when it resulted in Jackson failing to appear at
the ballpark also annoyed Mack. SMrrTH, supra note 14, at 200.
312. NEFT & COHEN, supra note 7, at 44.
313. This is also consistent with the view of later baseball executive Bill Veeck, who called
Jackson "the world's worst negotiator." VEECK, supra note 265, at 256.
314. AsNOF, supra note 8, at 18.
315. Id.
316. VoiGT, supra note 29, at 66. This group was characterized by Gandil and Risberg's
"undisciplined toughness." AsnioF, supra note 8, at 18. Asinof also indicates the differences
in the groups were caused in part by "sectional prejudices," id, although a review of the
birthplaces of the group does not so indicate:
Gandil Group (Birthplace) Collins Group (Birthplace)
Chick Gandil (Minnesota) Eddie Collins (New York)
Joe Jackson (South Carolina) Ray Schalk (Illinois)
Eddie Cicotte (Michigan) "Red" Faber (Iowa)






Risberg at shortstop, nor Gandil at first base even talked to second base-
man Collins, thereby making it difficult for Coffins to touch the ball.317
What really united the Gandil group, however, was their "dislike for
Comiskey," a dislike bred by the latter's frugality. The rumor about the
Sox owner was that he spent freely on his friends but was close-fisted
with his players.3 18 Comiskey was first and foremost a businessman
about the game. He would not buy a player unless anticipated income
would pay the player's salary.319 He did not tolerate players whose
tastes became more expensive as they became stars or players who
would not play when injured.32
Because Comiskey had started out traveling on day coaches, he
thought his players should be more than satisfied with an "upper" berth
on a team train.32' The following conditions and events happened under
his financial policies. The team often wore "filthy uniforms" to keep
cleaning bills low.3 22 White Sox players generally received a $3 per day
meal allowance, lower than the $4 per day players on some second divi-
sion teams received.3 ' In 1917, Comiskey promised the players a bonus
if they won the American League pennant, which the team did, as well
as the World Series. Comiskey's "bonus" was a case of champagne sent
to the club's victory party. 24 The Series itself had gate receipts of
$425,000 with Comiskey's share approximately $100,000. 3 1 Also in
1917, Comiskey promised pitcher Ed Cicotte a bonus of $10,000, an
amount that probably equaled twice his regular salary, if he won thirty
games.326 When Cicotte, who had never before won twenty games,327
NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 94, 97, 99, 105-106, 108, 111, 253, 256; see also Gandil &
Durslag, supra note 9, at 62, 64 (acknowledging the "personal feuds" on the club).
317. ASINOF, supra note 8, at 18.
318. AxELSON, supra note 70, at 302. The author indicates the fact that Comiskey lost no
players to the Federal League disproves this rumor. Id. However, the author also points out
that the leaders of the Federal League gave special treatment to Comiskey because of his role
in breaking the original National League monopoly. Id at 208.
319. Id. at 302-303.
320. As to the former, when a player threatened to quit if he did not get paid $10,000,
Comiskey is reported to have said: "'When I was playing ball I was always afraid the game
was going to quit me.'" As to the latter, Comiskey said: "'When I was in the game I didn't
dare stay out for fear that somebody would get my job.'" Id. at 303, 305.
321. Id. at 303-304.
322. Gandil & Durslag, supra note 9, at 64.
323. ASINOF, supra note 8, at 21.
324. Id. at 22.
325. AxELsON, supra note 70, at 214.
326. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 334 (indicating that Cicotte made $5000 in 1919). If
this amount is correct, then with the bonus, Cicotte would have made as much as Collins
($15,000).
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had won twenty-eight games before the regular season ended, Comiskey
apparently ordered that he not be allowed to pitch.328
Despite being one of the best baseball teams ever to play the game,
players were underpaid.32 9 Buck Weaver, the only third baseman against
whom Ty Cobb refused to bunt, made between $6000 and $7250.330 Joe
Jackson, then in his tenth year, had batted .322 in playing for both Cleve-
land and Chicago in 1915, .341 in 1916 and .301 in 1917.33' In 1918, he
was injured. 32 He had signed a contract to play for $6000 for both 1918
and 1919. 333 By contrast, his counterpart in the 1919 World Series, Cin-
cinnati Hall of Fame outfielder Edd Roush had batted .298 in the Fed-
eral League in 1915, .270 for both New York and Cincinnati in 1916, and
.341 in 1917.334 Roush, however, made almost twice as much as Jack-
son.335 Similarly, pitcher Cicotte's $5000 salary was about one-half that
of his rival World Series opening pitcher, Dutch Reuther of Cincinnati.
Reuther, however, was twenty six (26) years old and had been a major
327. Cicotte first broke into baseball in 1905 with Detroit and had a 1-1 record. NEFr &
COHEN, supra note 7, at 28. From 1908-1912, he pitched for Boston, winning 11, 13, 15, 11 and
1 game, respectively. Id. at 41, 44, 49, 53, 56. He also won 9 games for Chicago in 1912 and
then 18, 11, 13, and 16, respectively. Id. at 57, 61, 65, 72, 76.
328. AsINOF, supra note 8, at 21. Cicotte was 1-1 in the World Series and thus finished the
season with 29 wins. There is some evidence that Comiskey did pay Cicotte $2000 of this
bonus, but this information is not reprinted in any other source. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8,
at 334. Probably more likely is the evidence found in team secretary Harry.Grabiner's diary
by Bill Veeck. There, Cicotte's contract for 1918 was listed at $5,000 with a $2,000 bonus.
VEECK, supra note 265, at 256. Having won 28 regular season and 1 post season games in
1917, it seems likely this $2,000 was actually a raise that was deliberately stated as a "bonus"
so as to lower the base from which to negotiate Cicotte's 1919 salary. See id In fact, Cicotte
only won 12 games in 1918 while losing 19, NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 85. His salary for
1919 is generally reported at around $6,000, GANDIL & DURSLAG, supra note 9, at 64. It
seems highly unlikely that he would have received a raise based on the 1918 season and,
therefore, more likely that his actual 1918 salary was $7,000 reduced by $1,000 for the follow-
ing year. If true, then no bonus was actually paid.
329. Du rANT, supra note 16, at 106 (also quoting Eddie Collins: "'I hate to say it... but
they were the best and don't forget I played on Connie Mack's great championship teams in
1910 and 1911. The Sox were best.' ").
330. Compare VEECK, supra note 265, at 256 ($6,000 was Weaver's 1918 salary) with SEY-
MOUR, supra note 8, at 334. Cobb, who leads the major leagues in all-time batting average
with a .366 mark, NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 651, believed that the bunt was an effective
offensive weapon. See CoB & STUMP, supra note 160, at 152-55.
331. NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 72,73, 76, 80.
332. VEECK, supra note 265, at 256.
333. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 334.
334. NEns & COHEN, supra note 7, at 71,78-79,82. He was elected to the Hall of Fame in
1962. Id. at 628.
335. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 334.
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league pitcher for only two years.336 First baseman Gandil was making
only about $4000. 3 1 Outfielder Happy Felsch, who hit over .300 in both
1916 and 1917 but missed 1918 because of World War I made $3750.338
Pitcher Lefty Williams, a seventeen game winner in 1917, made $3000.
Shortstop Swede Risberg made $2500. Infielder Frank McMullin made
$2750.339
The result of this financial treatment of the players by owner Comis-
key was succinctly stated by American League president Ban Johnson's
biographer:
[The players'] thinking was that they had the best team in base-
ball, but Comiskey was paying them only a fraction of their true
worth. By throwing the series, they could make money for them-
selves, and humiliate their fiscal tormentor. 40
Proof that their actions were, at least in part labor actions, comes
from what the players appear to have wanted out of any "fix." Pitcher
Eddie Cicotte is said to have agreed to throw the World Series if he
received $10,000 cash, before the first game, an amount that was appar-
ently left under his pillow on the eve of the series. 4' Joe Jackson was
promised $20,000, but received only $5000. In confessing his involve-
ment, Jackson nonetheless complained "'I never got that $15,000 that
was coming to me.' 342
The desire for money played a part in what was done, but the reason
for that desire must also be considered.343 Cicotte, for example, testified
that he sold out to pay a mortgage on property he had purchased. 3 "
That mortgage, however, was only $4000.315 It can be neither coinci-
336. ASiNoF, supra note 8, at 60, which also reports Cicotte's salary at $5,000. The notes
in White Sox secretary Harry Grabiner's diary about $5,500, however, are probably more
accurate. See VEECK, supra note 265, at 256.
337. See VEECIK, supra note 265, at 257. Gandil himself claims he was actually making
$4,500, the same amount he had earned during the preceding three seasons. Gandil & Dur-
slag, supra note 9, at 64.
338. NEFT & COHEN, supra note 7, at 76, 80, 85.
339. VEECK, supra note 265, at 257.
340. MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 186.
341. AsINOF, supra note 8, at 17. Compare SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 302-303 (detailing
Cicotte's testimony before the Chicago grand jury investigating gambling following the World
Series in which Cicotte is said to have admitted receiving that amount).
342. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 303. Jackson was reportedly told by Gandil and Risberg
that if he publicly complained about not getting his money, "[e]very honest ballplayer in the
world will say you're a liar. You're out of luck." AsINoF, supra note 8, at 178.
343. AsINOF, supra note 8, at 20.
344. Id. at 171.
345. Id. The balance of the money, Cicotte told the Grand Jury, was for his wife and kids
who did not know about his conduct. Id.
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dence nor historical symmetry that Cicotte was willing to participate
only upon receiving the exact amount of the bonus Comiskey failed to
pay him at the end of the 1917 season.
Additionally, while Joe Jackson had become something of a big
spender since coming to the major leagues, $20,000 would buy a lot of
new clothes in 1919.141 And while he was the brunt of jokes about being
ignorant, Jackson was a dedicated ballplayer who must have possessed
some street savvy. Would he then publicly complain about not receiving
$15,000 of the money he had been promised for fixing the World Series
out of pure greed or lack of intellect? Or could the fact that the $5000
he received still did not bring him to the salary level of his World Series
counterpart Roush, or that $15,000 was the exact amount of the bonus
Eddie Collins had received for signing with the White Sox have had
something to do with it?
The fact that the players may have chosen to "throw" games must
also be viewed suspiciously. Again, can it be considered either happen-
stance or historical symmetry that the players choose this method of la-
bor upheaval? It must be recalled that these same players paid Detroit
players to throw games in 1917.147 The result of those tainted games led
to the White Sox American League pennant, which the Sox players then
parlayed into a World Series championship. Their allegedly promised
"bonus" from Comiskey turned out to be a case of champagne.3' s For
the players to throw games in 1919, thus losing a World Series, could be
viewed as a just reward for Comiskey's 1917 conduct.
The post-World Series actions of owner Comiskey confirm both that
the players' message was received and that the actions were understood
as those of labor activists. While Comiskey's public reaction to the po-
tential for a tainted World Series involving his players was to offer a
$20,000 reward to anyone who could provide evidence of a fix,149 it is
today reasonably clear that Comiskey was given substantial evidence
concerning the actions of his ballplayers immediately after the Series,
but did nothing about it.35 0 More important, however, were the actions
346. See id. at 57. "He became a slick dresser, very conscious of his clothes. He liked the
feel of shiny new shoes and bought more than he needed." He also tried several business
ventures, all of which failed. Id.
347. Id. at 20, 284.
348. Id. at 22.
349. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 295.
350. See VEECK, supra note 265, at 260-64. In late September, 1920, the press first printed
the existence of a potential "mystery" woman grand jury witness. Later, Mrs. Henrietta Kelly
told the grand jury that as Cicotte's landlady, she overheard him tell his brother that he was
no longer worried about money because "'I got mine.'" AsiNoF, supra note 8, at 202-203,
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Comiskey took to sign these same players to contracts for the 1920 sea-
son. 51 With the exception of Gandil, who claimed his request for a
$2000 raise was turned down and who therefore did not report,352 the
seven other players not only signed for 1920, but each of them received
at least a twenty percent salary increase!
Player 1919 Salary 1920 Salary % Increase
Buck Weaver $6000 $7250 (2 yrs.+) 21%
Joe Jackson $6000 $8000 (3 yrs.) 33%
Eddie Cicotte $5000 $10000 100%
Lefty Williams $3000 $6000+ 100%
Happy Felsch $3750 $7000 87%
Swede Risberg $2500 $3200 30%
Frank McMullin $2750 $3600 31%
In addition, the clause allowing the team to waive Buck Weaver on
ten days notice was removed from his contract. Further, Williams'
contract enabled him to receive a $500 bonus if he won fifteen games
and $1000 if he won twenty games in 1920.353 When questioned about
this conduct, both Comiskey and team secretary Harry Grabiner
indicated they signed those who they knew had been accused of selling
206; SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 303. In fact, Grabiner knew about Mrs. Kelly and what she
overheard shortly after the 1919 World Series was over. VEECn, supra note 265, at 260. In
addition, at least two reasonably reliable sources had provided Comiskey with information
early in his investigation. First, St. Louis gambler Harry Redmon had lost money on the series
and was apparently angry that his losses were the result of a fix. He spoke with Comiskey
agents in October, 1919, and gave them the names of some of those involved, including St.
Louis second baseman Joe Gedeon, a friend of Swede Risberg. This discussion took place
even before Comiskey offered a reward for information. Gedeon then talked to Comiskey
immediately after the $20,000 reward was offered. Comiskey claimed that the information
was inconclusive. Id. at 261-62. His attorney called it "sparse" and "useless." AsINOF, supra
note 8, at 130. Yet both Redmon and Gedeon later served as witnesses. See SEYMOUR, supra
note 8, at 307. Most likely, Comiskey simply refused to put the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle
together, see AsINoF, supra note 8, at 130, or bought off those who told him information for
less than the reward money. See VEECK, supra note 265, at 262.
351. The actual fix was not uncovered until the 1920 season was almost over. On Septem-
ber 7, 1920, a special grand jury in Chicago met to consider the possible fix of a National
League regular game on August 31, 1920, between Philadelphia and the Chicago Cubs. As a
result of newspaper accounts reviving the potential fix of the 1919 World Series, see infra notes
388-393 and accompanying text, the focus of the grand jury shifted from the single game to the
prior year's series.
352. Gandil & Durslag, supra note 9, at 68.
353. VEECK, supra note 265, at 266. This material is also reported in SEYMOUR, supra
note 8, at 335. Joe Jackson also claimed that the 10-day clause was removed from his contract,
although that did not turn out to be the case. See AsINOF, supra note 8, at 140-41. Secretary
Grabiner went to Jackson's home to deliver the contract and convinced Jackson to sign the
contract before Jackson's wife had read it. Grabiner apparently assured Jackson that the 10-
day clause had been removed when it had not. Id.
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out their ball club merely as a "necessary formality" to protect the ball
club, though both acknowledged this conduct to be "'unusual.' ,354
Given the fact that none of these players could sign with any other team
unless released by Comiskey; given the fact that none had ever before
been in a position to question the contract offered to them by Comiskey;
and given the fact that these raises ranged from twenty-one percent for
Weaver to one hundred percent for the two pitchers who between them
started all of the games Chicago lost,355 "'unusual'" may not quite be
the correct adjective. And the story does not end there. Even after the
Cicotte/Williams combination had lost all five of the allegedly tainted
games, Comiskey rewarded Cicotte with a bonus of $3000 and Williams
with a bonus of $875.356 These acts are far more than "unusual." What
had more logically occurred was that the players had caused a complete
reversal in their relationship with Comiskey. Comiskey was coerced into
"actually giving them the raises they [had] always deserved. '35 7 These
players had tacitly learned a lesson taught by labor leader Samuel
Gompers. Whether or not they actually participated in throwing the
World Series, they had created the perception of fix and had thus
realized the benefit of a labor fundamental truth: "Whoever or
whatever controls economic power directs and shapes development for
the group or nation. '358  Following the World Series, the players
controlled the economics of the game; Comiskey knew it and took steps
to reward it.
XII. THE ROLE OF THE PRESS
Sportswriters have done more than just write about baseball. Per-
haps more than in many other sports, baseball journalists are among
both the architects of the game and the instruments in its growth and
success. English-born Henry Chadwick, called by Spalding "The Father
354. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 336. The two were congratulated for their
"'straightforwardness'" by The Sporting News. See id.
355. As told by Eliot Asinof: "Chick Gandil had been thinking about the coming World
Series for a long time .... How may ball players were necessary to insure the fix? ... And
more significant than the number - who? First, pitchers. Impossible to fix the Series without
them. He had to start lining up pitchers." AiNOF, supra note 8, at 15. Cicotte and Williams
started six of the eight 1919 World Series games, with only Cicotte's victory in game 7 being a
winning effort. NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 91.
356. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 335. Happy Felsch also received a bonus of $3,000.
Id.
357. VEECK, supra note 265, at 265.
358. GOMPERS, supra note 90, at 94.
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of Baseball,"359 began reporting the early amateur games in New York
as early as 1848.360 He invented the box score36' and, as chair of the
rules committee, officially declared that a baseball game could not end in
a tie.36 He was the author of the first books about baseball,363 and be-
came a regular contributor to Spalding's annual guides."6 He was so
important to the game that he was elected to Baseball's Hall of Fame in
1938.365
Even before the founding of the National League, the press played a
part in shaping public perception of baseball players. The press admired
the rugged individualism of early professional players. The same press,
however, also misunderstood it. The media equated toughness on the
field with unbridled loyalty to the contracts signed with the club. It was
assumed "that ballplayers should bind themselves this way to their em-
ployers, as if the tie were one of blood and birth rather than money. ' 366
This, of course, missed the point of the then National Association of
Professional Base Ball Players, a league in which players were free to
shop themselves, and their talent, to the highest bidder. As a result,
when players like Spalding and his Boston teammates began to change
clubs to secure more lucrative employment, they were labeled "revolv-
ers," and "shooting stars" by the media and "goddam seceders" by the
public.
367
Despite the fact that organizers of the National League sought to
change baseball into a business, writers like Chadwick continued to view
baseball players as something other than laborers. He opposed player
salaries that exceeded $1000 indicating that "[c]atchers and pitchers de-
serve more than players at other positions but $1000 is good pay even for
359. See SPALDING, supra note 2, at 218.
360. See VoIGT, supra note 16, at 6. Among others, Chadwick wrote for the Brooklyn
Eagle, see ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 10, and the New York Clipper. PIETruszA, supra
note 14, at 5.
361. DuRAmN, supra note 16, at 2.
362. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 91. This took place at a Championship game in 1870
between Cincinnati and the Brooklyn Atlantics. Id. at 89-90.
363. VOIGT, supra note 16, at 6.
364. DuRANT, supra note 16, at 2.
365. Along with Morgan B. Bulkeley, the first president of the National League, Ban
Johnson, the first president of American League, who were elected in 1937, and Alexander
Cartwright, who organized one of baseball's first teams, Chadwick was elected to the Hall as a
non-player. NErr & COHEN, supra note 7, at 628.
366. SMrrm, supra note 14, at 25. This is reminiscent of the pre-industrial revolution per-
sonal relationship between employer and employee. Compare FoRxoscH, supra note 46, at
65-66.
367. SMrrT, supra note 14, at 25-26.
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them, and a hundred dollars a month ... is sufficient for the other
positions." '368
Criticism by writers such as Chadwick, however, neither slowed the
growth of professional baseball nor sportswriting about it. Indeed, most
successful teams were located in population centers that provided good
newspaper coverage. That coverage grew with the game until, by the
1880s newspapers began developing specialized departments to cover
nothing but sports. 369 Because baseball was a linear game with a finite
beginning point in the spring and a finite ending point in the fall, it lent
itself to the equally linear quality of the daily newspaper. The newspa-
pers helped by breaking the season down into multiple phases.3 70 The
result was that the message of the sports pages became the gospel by
which fans learned the game. Local papers developed the "star" system
and it was newspaper writers who made heroes or fools of players, man-
agers, and umpires depending on their performance.37'
One of the favorite topics of early baseball journalists was gambling,
and about how it might ruin the game. Chadwick, for example, wrote
about gambling on baseball games as early as 1858, at the time of the
founding of the National Association of Base Ball Players.372 Thereaf-
ter, the press continued to write about the evils of gambling and the fear
that baseball would fall into disrepute like boxing or horse racing.373 It
368. Id. at 28. One hundred dollars per month would exist only during the 6-month sea-
son. He also complained, for example, that uniform admission prices instituted by the new
league, and necessary as revenue measures, were too high, urging it to return to the prior
generally accepted $.25. See id.
Some would argue that this type of journalism still exists. Writing about the early days of
the current Players' Association, former executive director Marvin Miller stated:
The press generally followed the owners' lead. The public heard that the players had
the most generous pension plan in America and they were greedily grasping for more,
even though what we were seeking was stable pension benefits. We endured editorials
like 'The fan goes from steak to hamburger while the ballplayer rides a golden gravy
train'-as if we were taking steaks out of the fans' mouths! And they echoed manage-
ment's line that the athletes were well paid for 'playing a game.'
MILLER, supra note 7, at 206.
369. VoioT, supra note 29, at 185-87.
370. Id. at 188-89. According to the author, there was a spring training buildup; a begin-
ning and middle of the season phase; a pennant drive phase; a World Series phase; and a "hot
stove" phase when all of the phases of the preceding year could be reviewed in anticipation of
the following season. Id. at 188.
371. See id. at 189-191.
372. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 50-52. Spalding reports Chadwick wrote a story about
how a batter won part of a $100 bet by hitting a home run in an 1858 championship game.
373. See, e.g., VoIGT, supra note 16, at 82 (quoting a Buffalo writer's opinion that for one
fearful of a fixed result, a horse race was a safer bet than a professional baseball game). See
also SMrrH, supra note 14, at 29.
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was, in fact, the newspapers that broke baseball's first gambling scandal,
making "folk villains" of players on the Louisville club in 1877.374
The potential for fixing the 1919 World Series was thus a natural
topic for some baseball writers. Even prior to the series, investigative
reporters like Hugh Fullerton and James Crusinberry began gathering
facts that would allow them later to question the series play of the White
Sox.
Fullerton, described as "one of the most widely read sportswriters of
the day,"'3 75 was not just a baseball writer, but also a dedicated baseball
tactician, sometimes writing about intricacies of the game.376 His spe-
cialty was the "inside expos6. 3 7 7 Prior to the 1919 World Series, for
example, Fullerton had written a series of articles comparing the White
Sox and the Cincinnati Reds position by position and had decided he
could stake his personal reputation on the White Sox being a better team
374. VoIGT, supra note 29, at 190. The questionable games between Hartford, one of the
worst teams in the league, and Louisville, one of the best, "had been scandalously ragged."
SMrrH, supra note 14, at 196. "'!!! - ??? - I!!,'" and "'What's the Matter?'" were the
reported headlines in the Louisville newspaper. PmrmuszA, supra note 14, at 36; VOIGT,
supra note 16, at 72. When Pitcher James Alexander Devlin regained his early season pitching
effectiveness in post season exhibition games, the paper went public with rumors of a fix and
those rumors lead to the team investigation and ultimate banishment by National League
president William Hulbert. PIETRUSZA, supra note 14, at 36-37; VOIGT, supra note 16, at 72.
Interestingly, however, and not generally reported, the newspaper reporter who broke the
story was the son of the Louisville team owner. Even more interesting is that even before the
season, pitcher Devlin was at odds with the Louisville club over an unknown matter. The
newspaper sided with the club against Devlin so that at the beginning of the season, there was
already a rift between the club and Devlin. VorGT, supra note 16, at 71. Part of the dispute
was apparently demands made by Devlin in light of a new "get-tough policy" employed by the
National League against its players generally. See id. at 70-71; see also supra notes 251-256
and accompanying text.
375. SMrrH, supra note 14, at 194.
376. A.G. Spalding, for example, presents a portion of a 1911 article in which Fullerton
compares the likelihood of success of the hit and run, the sacrifice and the stolen base. In-
cluded in this discussion is the following display of Fullerton's knowledge and research:
In the average seasons of the two major leagues-the American and National-89,156
face the pitchers. Of these 27,058 reach first base-19,154 of them on safe hits, 1,303
on errors that permit them to achieve the first ninety feet-645 by being hit by pitched
balls, and 5,950 on bases on balls. These figures are the averages of the two leagues for
five seasons. Of the 27,058 who reach first base, 17, 138 arrive at second, 12,822 at
third, and 8,272 score.
Yet the average number of stolen bases in the 1,232 games of the two seasons of the
major leagues is only 2,744. That is, out of 55,988 opportunities to steal bases, only
2,744 are improved.
SPALDINGO, supra note 2, at 306.
377. VoiGT, supra note 29, at 190.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
that would win the Series handily.37 When, even before the series, Ful-
lerton was alerted to possible manipulation of the results, he consulted
with his Series roommate, Hall of Fame pitcher Christy Matthewson.379
Matthewson, covering the series for a New York newspaper, and Ful-
lerton agreed to watch the series for evidence of a fix and to confer on
all plays that looked questionable.3 8 0 Eventually, in the eight game se-
ries, the pair settled on seven plays that looked "highly suspect."'381 Fol-
lowing the series, and after at least one source indicated he had
conferred with Comiskey, Fullerton wrote that the world championship
had been fixed.38 2 While it has also been reported that Fullerton merely
put into print what many thought, the reception his allegations received
belies such easy analysis.383 Comiskey publicly indicated Fullerton's
"'yams are manufactured out of whole cloth and grow out of bitterness
due to losing wagers,'" and offered $20,000 to anyone who offered evi-
378. AsINOF, supra note 8, at 45. At least one of the participants, Hall of Fame outfielder
Edd Roush disagrees:
Sure the 1919 White Sox were good. But the 1919 Cincinnati Reds were better. I'll
believe that till my dying day. I don't care how good Chicago's Joe Jackson and Buck
Weaver and Eddie Cicotte were. We had Heinie Groh, Jake Daubert, Greasy Neale,
Rube Bressler, Larry Kopf, myself, and the best pitching staff in both leagues. We were
a very underrated ball club.
RrrrER, supra note 4, at 222 (interview with Edd Roush). In fact, the Reds had won more
regular season games than the White Sox (96-88). While the White Sox had pitchers Cicotte
and Williams with records of 29-7 and 23-11 respectively, the next best White Sox starter,
Dickie Kerr had a record of 13-8. The Reds, on the other hand, had Sam Sallee at 21-7, Hod
Eller at 20-9, Dutch Reuther at 19-6 and Ray Fisher at 14-5. The Reds pitchers also had a
better team earned run average (2.23-3.04). The White Sox did have a better team batting
average (.287-.263). NEFr & COHEN, supra note 7 at 88, 90.
379. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 295. Matthewson had already been frustrated in his
belief that Hal Chase had been fixing games while Matthewson was manager of the Reds. But
his suspicions had been rejected by the National League, as discussed at supra notes 287-289
and accompanying text. Matthewson, with a career pitching record of 374-187, is third in
career total victories, and was a charter member of the Hall of Fame, elected in 1937 along
with ly Cobb, Honus Wagner, Babe Ruth, and Walter Johnson. NEFr & R. COHEN, supra
note 7, at 117, 628, 654.
380. See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 115; AsINOF, supra note 8, at 46-47 (indicating that
Fullerton was to circle the plays on his scorecard).
381. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 115. The series itself had 514 at bats (251 by Cincin-
nati; 263 by Chicago). Three of the games were played over eight and one-half innings, with
the home team being ahead at that time; four of the games were played over a full nine
innings; and one of the games was played a full ten innings. See NEFT & COHEN, supra note 7,
at 91. The seven suspicious plays seen by Fullerton and Matthewson thus took place during
the 514 at bats over 81 1/2 innings.
382. See, e.g., MuRDocK, supra note 125, at 188. There is no mention of the possibility
that Fullerton might have been motivated by the fact that his own comparative predictions of
the results had not come to pass.
383. SMITH, supra note 14, at 194.
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dence of a fix.384 The regular sporting press then rose to Comiskey's
defense, deprecating Fullerton's attacks on the "sacred" institution of
baseball.3 85 In a scathing attack, with obvious ethnic ill-will, Sporting
News editor Earl Obershain wrote:
Because a lot of dirty, long-nosed, thick-lipped and strong-smell-
ing gamblers butted into the World's Series - an American event
by the way - and some of said gamblers got crossed, stories were
peddled that there was something wrong with the games that
were played ....
Comiskey has met that by offering $10,000 [sic] for any sort of
a clue that will bear out such a charge. He might as well have
offered a million, for there will be no takers, because there is no
such evidence, except in the mucky minds of the stinkers who -
because they are crooked - think all the rest of the world can't
play straight. 86
With the exception of Fullerton, who kept up his attack on the series,
and one published interview with catcher Ray Schalk indicating his
knowledge that seven members of the team would not be playing with
the Sox in 1920, the balance of the baseball press evidently did not share
Fullerton's thoughts and largely allowed allegations of a fix to die.3 7
At the end of the 1920 season, however, a new allegation of the fixing
of a regular season game between the National League Philadelphia
Phillies and Chicago Cubs prompted a Chicago grand jury investiga-
tion.3 88 By the time the grand jury was convened to hear testimony on
the single national league game, public interest over the play in the 1919
384. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 295. Various other sources report the amount of the
reward at $10,000, which Seymour acknowledges, but sticks with the $20,000 amount. Com-
pare id. with SMrrH, supra note 14, at 197-98; VoiGT, supra note 29, at 69. White Sox secre-
tary Harry Grabiner's diary appears to support the $20,000 figure. See VEECK, supra note 265,
at 262.
385. See VOIOT, supra note 29, at 69. It is this defense of the 1919 Series that perhaps best
perpetuates the idea that the Black Sox scandal was baseball's original sin. See supra note 240
and accompanying text. Fullerton, whose baseball prose had previously been quoted by
Spalding, was called a fool and a baseball outsider because no baseball insider would be able
to seriously criticize the integrity of the game. Other publications reported to take a neutral
look at all of the plays of the series and determined for themselves that the games were on the
level. They then concluded "that the possibility of fixing a ball game was 'practically nil.'"
SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 296.
386. SPmN, supra note 9, at 60-61. Those implicated in the fix by Harry Grabiner's diary
included among others Abe Attell, Carl Zork, and Arnold Rothstein, thus making it seem the
ethnic slur was directed against Jews.
387. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 297.
388. Id. at 297; see also SMrrH, supra note 14, at 198.
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series had renewed.389
The reason for that renewed interest was sportswriter James
Crusinberry, who wrote a letter to his own paper and had it signed by a
prominent Chicago White Sox fan.3 90 The paper featured the letter on
the front page of its sports page391 and the grand jury immediately began
to expand its investigation.3 92 Ultimately it centered around the White
Sox and their activities in the 1919 World Series.393
Describing events following public disclosure of the scandal, Eliot
Asinof wrote that,
the American people were at first shocked, then sickened. There
was hardly a major newspaper that did not cry out its condemna-
tion and despair... But the scandal was a betrayal of more than a
set of ball games, even more than of the sport itself. It was a
crushing blow at American pride .... Baseball was a manifesta-
tion of the greatest of America at play. It was our national game
Now, suddenly, that pride was shattered. The National Pas-
time was nothing more than another show of corruption.394
Asinof ascribes some of the public reaction to the fact that the American
victory in the recently completed World War I was a victory for values
such as sacrifice, nobility and humanity,395 values that then seemed shat-
389. See MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 190.
390. According to Sports Illustrated, Crusinberry was the sportswriter who first broke the
Black Sox scandal. A Newsman's Biggest Story, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, September 17, 1956, at
69. While the historical evidence today shows this statement to be clearly erroneous, it also
shows how little credit Fullerton was given by this popular sports journal. Crusinberry claims
that it was American League President Ban Johnson who got the grand jury to investigate the
rival National League. Id. at 71. Other reports, however, indicate that Johnson's role was
more of the advisory nature. When he was asked by the Judge supervising the grand jury if
the fixing of a game was a matter that a grand jury should investigate, Johnson supposedly
replied: "'Most decidedly it is.'" MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 190.
391. A Newsman's Biggest Story, supra note 390, at 71. Writing this article for Sports
Illustrated was the first time Crusinberry admitted that he actually wrote the letter for noted
Sox fan Fred Loomis. Id.
392. See SMrrH, supra note 14, at 198.
393. See ASINOF, supra note 8, at 159. For several months, the investigation lagged and
appeared to be going nowhere. National League president John Heydler, for example, told
the grand jury that the 1919 Series was competitively played. It was not until Rube Benton, a
pitcher for the New York Giants admitted he heard the series was fixed and told the grand
jury that they should talk to Eddie Cicotte that the story began to unfold. Id. at 158-160.
At the same time, gambler Billy Maharg decided to go public, telling a Philadelphia sports
writer of his involvement in the fix. It was publication of Maharg's story, including his naming
of Cicotte and Gandil, that is said to have finally persuaded Cicotte to come forward and
"confess" to the grand jury. See Thompson & Boswell, supra note 3, at 88-90.




tered by the actions of the Black Sox. While this seems undoubtedly
true, public reaction to the revelations were probably also based on the
dual method by which sports had been reported to the great majority of
Americans prior to the scandal.
On one side were journalists for whom all of baseball was a romance
and who therefore portrayed ballplayers as superheroes without fault.
Baseball's "rowdies" were said to be "'fierce competitors,'" and "play-
boys" were players who simply" 'liked the bright lights.' "91 Individual
players were portrayed as commoners with character, "modest, yet
tough, virile American males in keeping with the image glorified in Jack
London's novels."397 The game itself was also romanticized, with claims
that it made its participants develop character traits necessary to a suc-
cessful life and with managers portrayed as brilliant military strategists.
The game was a model for American morality.398
On the other side were writers like Hugh Fullerton, who portrayed
players and the game of baseball critically. Ring Lardner of this latter
school, for example, portrayed the player as "an insensitive, oafish brag-
gart" who, when off the field, "was a gluttonous, beer-guzzling penny
pincher. 399
Surely such a contrast sold newspapers. Editors encouraged sports
writers to maintain fan interest with stories rife with speculation and gos-
sip.400 At least one estimate was that one-fourth of some big city news-
396. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 97. Seymour says these journalists are from the "'Gee
whiz'" or "'Aw nuts'" school of journalism. Id.
397. Id. at 93.
398. Id. at 92-93. For example, John McGraw was called both the "'Mastermind'" and
"'Little Napoleon.'" Id.
399. Id. at 97-98.
400. Id. at 92. Seymour claims that total sports news increased from 4% of the total news-
paper to 16% between 1890 and 1923. Seymour also appears to suggest that the development
of the "Aw nuts" and more critical schools was consecutive rather than concurrent; however,
with writers like Lardner being in the latter school, it seems more logical that there was at
least some overlap of the schools.
Lardner played a role in both Fullerton and Crusinberry's efforts to uncover the story.
While Fullerton and Matthewson were considering how to tell if a particular play had been
"thrown" by White Sox players, Lardner came to tell both of them how he had learned that
Chicago gamblers were trying to fix the series by getting the entire Cincinnati pitching staff
drunk so they would lose the series. The series was apparently being "rigged" on both sides.
See AsiNoF, supra note 8, at 47. One of the events causing Crusinberry to insist that the grand
jury look into the scandal took place while Crusinberry and Lardner were covering the White
Sox in New York in July, 1920. During a rainy afternoon, Crusinberry and Lardner were
telephoned by Chicago manager "Kid" Gleason and told to come listen to a New York gam-
bler in the hotel bar. When Crusinberry and Lardner reached the bar, they overheard gam-
bler Abe Attell tell Gleason that famed New York gambler Arnold Rothstein had been
behind the fix. A Newsman's Biggest Story, supra note 390, at 70.
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papers were purchased by fans looking for sports coverage that included
not only game statistics, but feature stories and "exposes." 0' 1
Unfortunately, as a result baseball fans were fed both ends of the
reporting spectrum-but nothing from the middle. In fact, baseball
players, like any other group, contained "every kind of individual." As
one ballplayer said: "'We had stupid guys, smart guys, tough guys, mild
guys, crazy guys, college men, slickers from the city and hicks from the
country.' "402 In short, baseball players were human beings, neither
more nor less moral than others, and probably just as concerned about
their "moral and social condition" and just as concerned about making
"improvements in their art. '403
Tipping the repertorial balance were the owners. While team owners
railed against criticism by certain writers, complaints about conditions in
the press box, and the possibility that too much press coverage could
hurt gate attendance,404 baseball owners recognized the need to freely
accommodate the press.4 °5 While there continued to be a debate be-
401. See VoIGT, supra note 29, at 190-91.
402. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 98. It is clear that the impression of the baseball player as
ignorant oaf was inaccurate. See RrrrER, supra note 4, at 152-53 (interview with Harry
Hooper) indicating the extent of college-educated players even in 1909; Bill Carrigan, Andy
Coakley and Jack Berry (Holy Cross), Christy Matthewson (Bucknell), Jake Stahl (University
of Illinois), Larry Gardner and Ray Collins (University of Vermont), Hooper and Duffy Lewis
(St. Mary's), Marty McHale (University of Maine), Chris Mahoney (Fordham), Frank Chance
(Washington University), Hal Chase (Santa Clara), Buck Herzog (University of Maryland),
Orvie Overall (University of California), Eddie Plank (Gettysburg), Chief Bender (Dickin-
son), Art Devlin (Georgetown), Ginger Beaumont (Beloit), Eddie Collins (Columbia), Eddie
Grant (Harvard), Fred Tenney (Brown), Bob Bescher and Ed Reulbach (Notre Dame), Jack
Coombs (Colby), Harry Davis (Girard College), Chief Meyers (Dartmouth), Davey Jones
(Dixon College), and John McGraw (St. Bonaventure). Hooper also indicated that after be-
ing in the Major Leagues, Miller Huggins graduated from the Cincinnati Law School and
Hugh Jennings graduated from the Cornell Law School. He indicated that perhaps one in six
major leaguers had attended college. Id.
403. Compare Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111, 129, 4 Metcalf 111, 129 (1842).
404. See VoiOT, supra note 29, at 190-91. Most of these issues have now been resolved.
While press boxes were once overrun by non-press personnel, many of whom were friends of
the owner, see id. at 190, the press box of today is exclusively controlled by the sporting press.
Not even the owner can tell the press who can, or cannot enter. See STANLEY WOODWARD &
FRANK GRAHAM, JR., SPORTSWRrING 61 (1967).
The problem of press coverage hurting gate attendance remains and may be the reason
that all professional leagues have an antitrust exemption if the members agree to a monopolis-
tic media package; even one that prevents broadcasting of a local team's events under certain
circumstances. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 et. seq. (1982).
405. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 92-93. When newspapers began to reduce the space
given to baseball because of the telegraph, the sporting press warned owners to be more open
with that press. See id. In some cases, telegraphers were given more limited access to games.
VOiGT, supra note 29, at 191.
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tween owners and the press about "who was exploiting whom," the fact
remained that baseball sold newspapers and that editors of those papers
would have printed more baseball news if it had been available .4 6 As a
result, the press enjoyed easy access to tickets and free food and drink
courtesy of the major league teams, and owners like Charles Comiskey
were generally viewed favorably in print.40 7
Indeed, Comiskey's selective generosity became part of the discon-
tent of the White Sox players. While the players existed on a daily food
allowance lower than players on other teams, Comiskey's generosity to-
ward the press had no major league baseball peer:
For them, he had a special room in Comiskey Park, with a huge
table laden with succulent roasts and salads, a chef to serve them,
and a bottomless supply of fine bourbon to liven their spirits.
40 8
In return, the press spoke highly of Comiskey:
Ever since he first started to make "copy" for the newspapers
there has been much mystery why he should get so much public-
ity. There is no secret about it. He has furnished news fit to print,
has treated the cub reporter with as much consideration as the
veteran,... and has never asked for a retraction.... If on the
other hand the truth or falsity of a report needed clearing up, a
'Comiskey statement' would stand the test. Never an equivoca-
tion. It was either 'yes' or 'no.' ,,409
It now appears that Comiskey was able to use his reputation with the
press to his advantage following Fullerton's expose that the World Series
was fixed.
If it is assumed that Fullerton did consult Comiskey before printing
the story claiming that seven Sox would not be resigned for 1920,41° the
later denial of a fix by Comiskey and the promise of a reward for any
evidence of wrongdoing, 41' if not equivocation, can only be viewed as
playing both ends against the middle. If Fullerton's allegations turned
out to be true, Comiskey, despite public denial, had positioned himself
406. VOIGT, supra note 29, at 191.
407. See WOODWARD & GRAHAM, supra note 404, at 55, 61-62. While this book is un-
doubtedly speaking of the press box of the 1960s, it appears to adequately convey the scene at
the time of the Black Sox scandal, at least so far as Comiskey's White Sox were concerned.
See infra note 417 and accompanying text.
408. AsINOF, supra note 8, at 21.
409. AXELSON, supra note 70, at 309-10.
410. See text accompanying supra note 382. Even if Fullerton had not consulted Comis-
key, Axelson indicates that "Commy" would have supported Fullerton: "To deny a yarn be-
cause it was not true or because it didn't please him, never entered his mind... 'Well, it must
be right. The Bazoo says so.'" AXELsON, supra note 70, at 309-310.
411. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
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as a Fullerton confidant, thus making the explanation that he resigned
the players only for the good of the team plausible. If, on the other
hand, the story turned out to be false, Comiskey could rely on his repu-
tation of never requesting a retraction and point instead to his ongoing
belief in his players, as evidenced by their signings. In either event, Co-
miskey would have remained blameless.
That would then leave fault squarely on the players. Having vilified
their colleagues who dared to print the story of a fix, and having tradi-
tionally written of baseball players as demigods with enviable moral
character, and considering the American traits so recently defended by
the W6rld War, the sporting press' full swing in the opposite direction
following public exposure of the scandal's facts should not be surprising.
What is interesting, however, is public reaction to the revelations.
The general public assumed each of these players was making about
$10,000. When this myth was finally debunked, the White Sox magnate
was viewed as stingy.412 Thus, when the criminal verdict of acquittal was
read, "spectators cheered, and the judge congratulated the jury, whose
members responded by carrying the vindicated players from the court-
room on their shoulders." '413 When a Chicago Tribune reporter inter-
viewed seven citizens following the verdict, five thought the players
should be reinstated. In south Chicago, 14,000 fans signed a petition
seeking reinstatement of Buck Weaver in just one day.414 The Illinois
Attorney General's office closed its files, indicating it would seek no fur-
ther baseball gambling indictments of either ballplayers or gamblers.41 5
The public, it appeared, had learned the same lesson previously learned
by both owners and players. Contrary to what they had been told by the
press, the public viewed the game with "a diminished sense of reverence.
The notion that it is a big business, run for profit, is now widely
embraced."4 6
The press, however, having publicly humiliated itself by blind loyalty
to the game and its owners following the World Series, was slower to
learn. In addition, the press needed baseball for success of its sports
page, which in turn helped provide a profitable paper. As a result, news-
papers described the result as "'a petty and hollow triumph' " for the
players, a triumph that showed "'a dangerous lesion in the American
412. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 334.
413. Thompson & Boswell, supra note 3, at 92.
414. ASINOF, supra note 8, at 274.
415. Id.
416. Thompson & Boswell, supra note 3, at 24.
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moral sense.' ,,417 It referred to the result as a" 'travesty,' " and the New
York World is reported to have chastised owners that "'if the crooks
who were acquitted try to show their faces in decent sporting circles,
they should be boycotted and blackballed.' "418
Unfortunately, whatever the motive, the press again played into the
hands of major league owners, who uniformly publicly decried the jury's
verdicts. American League president Ban Johnson is said to have called
the players' actions "'the greatest crime it was possible to commit in
baseball. The fact that they were freed does not... minimize the magni-
tude of the offense.' "419
In the long run, it was this self-righteousness of the press and the
owners that prevailed. Despite having done virtually nothing to aid the
investigation of the series,420 baseball's first commissioner, Judge Landis,
was given virtually carte blanche authority by the owners, partially as a
result of the fear the ongoing scandal would have on their pocket-
books.4"1 He was able to use the press call for ostracism of the play-
ers,422 to become the "'puritan in Babylon,' "" and without regard to
the extra-legal nature of his acts,424 to begin to build his own empire as
czar of baseball42 by expelling all eight of the players.426
XIII. CONCLUSION
Eight years before the Black Sox, baseball pioneer A.G. Spalding
called the relationship between non-player baseball owners and players
an "irrepressible conflict between Labor and Capital asserting itself
under a new guise."'427
417. SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 329 (quoting what he refers to as "four typical comments
from as many papers.").
418. Thompson & Boswell, supra note 3, at 92-93.
419. AsrIoF, supra note 8, at 274.
420. See MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 192. Landis' biographer seems to agree. See
SPrNK, supra note 9 at 84 (recognizing that Landis was not, "on the surface... as active as
Johnson.").
421. See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 126.
422. See Thompson & Boswell, supra note 3, at 92-93.
423. VoiGo, supra note 29, at 75.
424. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 132.
425. See MURDOCK, supra note 125, at 192.
426. The fans continued to believe in the players. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 328-31
(describing fan efforts to petition for reinstatement for Buck Weaver and the fact that a jury
found in favor of Jackson in a contract claim against Comiskey for failing to pay on Jackson's
three year salary).
427. SPALDING, supra note 2, at 118.
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Following the demise of the Players' League, Hall of Fame player
and player-organizer John M. Ward wrote that he and his baseball play-
ing colleagues were not sporting men, but instead were "hired to do cer-
tain work, and do it well." 428 Despite the "free agency" stemming from
repeated judicial refusal to enforce the "reserve rule," Ward's contract
freedom had been taken from him by organized baseball's superior eco-
nomic muscle. From the original American Association, through the
Player's League, the American League, and the Federal League, all
meaningful competition to Spalding's "Capital" was systematically elimi-
nated by the organized baseball monopoly.
As a result, what Ward wrote at the turn of the century was equally
true in 1919. The baseball player was permitted to shop his competitive
wares, but lacked a competitive market. Because of the "reserve" rule,
other labor-like remedies, such as hold-outs and strikes were futile.
That players had no effective remedy did not mean, however, that
baseball was free from labor injustice. Far from it. Members of the 1919
Chicago White Sox were victims of a pattern of disparate treatment,
from being ill-fed, to underpaid, to being the objects of broken promises
by one of baseball's foremost magnates.
Today, the circumstantial evidence makes it difficult to positively de-
termine what actually took place during the 1919 World Series.42 9 As a
result, the historical record holding the eight White Sox responsible for
conspiracy to fix the 1919 World Series must be supported. The reason
for that conspiracy, however, was not an absence of moral character.
The dictionary defines "greed" as "a desire for more than one needs or
wants."43 There is simply no evidence to suggest that Ed Cicotte, Joe
Jackson or the other "Black" Sox were motivated by anything other than
a desire to receive fair payment for the labor they performed.431 In act-
ing as they did, they earned bonuses Comiskey had promised but not
paid and opened the White Sox owner's wallet for subsequent salary ne-
gotiations. While Cicotte's famous comment, "'I got mine,' "432 can be
interpreted as arrogance, it could just as easily be interpreted as success
"in a struggle for 'security,' ,43' a universal goal of labor. The fact that
success took place as a by-product of gambling was insignificant for
428. VOIGT, supra note 29, at 215.
429. See, e.g., Thompson & Boswell, supra note 3, at 24.
430. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 574 (1978).
431. That they were baseball players who were overpaid in relation to much of the bal-
ance of society should not be an issue.
432. See ASINOF, supra note 8, at 206.
433. FORKOSCH, supra note 46, at 2.
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these players. Not only did they have no alternative, but gambling was
part of the baseball player's daily life. All eight of the players were on
the roster of the 1917 World Championship White Sox team assessed $50
per player, with the alleged approval of White Sox management, to pay
the Detroit Tigers to throw games.434
Unfortunately, the baseball press did not understand either Spald-
ing's classic labor struggle or the symbiotic relationship between baseball
and gambling. From the outset, the media opposed player free agency
and any link between baseball and gambling. Both threatened economic
success-the former by creating the possibility of a non-competitive
team generating little fan interest-the latter by threatening the poten-
tial honesty of the game. So strong was the influence of the press that
even the players believed they were not laborers and that any contact by
them with gamblers was evil.435 When it came to the Black Sox, the
press overplayed the gambling aspects of an otherwise labor dispute.436
By making gambling, rather than labor, the focus of public attention,
the press allied itself with the owners. Despite public recognition of the
dispute as a business one, organized baseball nonetheless used the press'
misplaced demand for ostracism to clean up the game to eliminate labor
troublemakers.
That their complaints were labor-oriented is evident from a modern
day comparison. Jim "Catfish" Hunter's 1974 dispute with owner
434. Compare NEFr & CoH-N, supra note 7, at 80 (showing the 1917 White Sox roster)
with ASINOF, supra note 8, at 284-85 (discussing Risberg and Gandil's disclosure of the 1917
fix and the fact that when it was disclosed in 1927, Commissioner Landis decided to overlook
the event as having taken place before his tenure). See also VEECK, supra note 265, at 274
(discussing White Sox attorney Alfred Austrian's knowledge of the 1917 transaction).
435. See Gandil & Durslag, supra note 9, at 68.
436. See SEYMOUR, supra note 8, at 331. This is part of the "original sin" notion discussed
in text accompanying supra note 240. For example, even in 1919, the Black Sox was not base-
ball's only gambling scandal. In the same year, there was also an attempt to fix the results of
the Pacific Coast League championship. See Bob Lemke, Black Sox Had Nothing on Babe
Borton, THE BLEACHER BUM, SPORTS COLLECTORS DIGEST, August 27, 1993, at 50.
Hal Chase is mentioned throughout the literature as being involved in the 1919 Black Sox
scandal. Indeed, he was one of those indicted. See AsusoF, supra note 8, at 225. In NEFr &
COHEN, supra note 53, at 94, Chase is listed as "DU," "Unofficially declared ineligible for
life." That Chase was barred would be consistent with the fate of the other players linked to
the case. That his banishment was "unofficial" would not. Seymour indicates: "More aston-
ishing, Landis not only overlooked Hal Chase, a prime fixer of the Series who had cheated for
years, but even wrote him officially later that there was nothing against him." SEYMOUR, supra
note 8, at 338 (emphasis added). Chase's "unofficial ineligibility" then may have been only
owner refusal to sign him.
Others who confessed their pre-World Series knowledge to the fix, however, such as Rube
Benton, were cleared to play baseball again, see id. at 376, and did play, through he 1925
season. See NEFT & COHEN, supra note 7, at 110.
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Charles Finley is analogous to Cicotte's claim to a bonus for the 1917
season. Both cases involved a unilateral decision by an owner to change
the player's salary structure. Hunter was to be paid $50,000 as salary in
1974 and an additional $50,000 was to be used by Finley to purchase an
annuity for Hunter. When Finley did not purchase the annuity directly,
and later offered Hunter the money in cash, Hunter sought free agency
for breach of his player contract. The matter was resolved through the
union-won grievance process. 437 When Cicotte was held out of games
after winning twenty eight, a similar grievance would have resolved
whether Comiskey thwarted Cicotte's contractual performance. Indeed,
Cicotte's 1.awyer indicated that none of the 1919 events would have hap-
pened if the players had the organizational structure of today.43
If the "Black Sox" committed wrong, it was in effecting a self-help
remedy to correct their perception of labor injustice. They may have
been ineffective; they may have gone too far; they may have even been
wrong; clearly their actions have caused baseball to view gambling with a
rightfully suspicious eye. But they were not gamblers trying to defraud
their team or the public. Rather, they were laborers rebelling against
management. History should judge them only in that light.439
437. See MILLER, supra note 7, at 227-37. The real dispute was over taxes. By deferring
his income, Hunter would not have to pay income tax on the $50,000 used to purchase the
annuity. Finley, however, could not deduct the $50,000 as he could if it were salary to Hunter.
Id. at 228.
438. VOiGT, supra note 29, at 75. See also, Ira Berkow, Baseball Cards: Out of the Pocket
and into the Met, THE NEw YORK TIMES, Aug. 13, 1993, at C1, col. 3 (making the point "that
players today are much less likely [than the Black Sox] to connive to throw a game, because
they have salaries C.E.O.'s might envy.").
439. This article is not intended as a "brief" for selection of Joe Jackson or Buck Weaver
or any of the other players to the Baseball Hall of Fame. Nor is it a criticism of baseball
writers as the selection committee for the Hall. Compare HOWARD COSELL, WHAT'S WRONG
WITH SPORTS 140-41 (1991).
Hall of Fame selection requires an assessment of a player's record, ability, integrity, sports-
manship, character and contribution to his teams(s). That assessment cannot, however con-
sider other player activities in baseball. See JOHN A. MERCURIO, RECORD PROFILES OF
BASEBALL'S HALL OF FAMERS 466 (1990). Following this standard, the early baseball labor
activities of John M. Ward, the labor hold-outs of TY Cobb, Sandy Koufax, and Don Drysdale,
and the free agency of Catfish Hunter have been excluded. It would thus seem logical to
similarly exclude the labor activities of players like Jackson and Weaver.
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